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ABSTRACT 
 
Economic historians conventionally date the origins of the English fiscal 
state to the foundation of the Bank of England in 1694. By European 
standards this was a belated innovation; the Spanish, Dutch and French 
had developed effective methods of debt service around a century earlier, 
based upon high tax revenues and borrowing. This study will explore the 
reasons why the English lagged behind their rivals in developing a fiscal 
state. 
 England was not a poor country, and the reasons for its low tax base 
and poor creditworthiness were largely political. However, political 
historians, accustomed to analysing texts, rarely appreciate the 
significance of figures. This study will use financial data to contextualise 
debates about Crown finances, showing that a significant proportion of the 
political nation was dissatisfied with important areas of domestic and 
foreign policy. However, a political culture which sought to establish a 
consensus encouraged them to subvert, rather than confront the regime; 
keeping the Crown underfunded was an effective way of achieving this 
goal. 
 The 'power of the purse' is usually interpreted as Parliament's 
propensity to vote inadequate sums of direct taxation; but it included the 
ability to block attempts at financial reform, often portrayed as arbitrary 
government. When King Charles implemented significant reforms despite 
widespread criticism, he raised sufficient revenue to govern without 
recourse to Parliament. However, this undermined the consensus on which 
his regime relied, and became a key factor in its abrupt collapse in 1640. 
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Style conventions: 
 Dates are given in the Old Style (Julian) calendar, with the year 
beginning (according to modern usage) on 1 January rather than 25 
March. 
 Spelling and punctuation in quotations has been modernised and 
anglicised; translations are my own. 
 Capitalisation: the royal Court is capitalised, to distinguish it from the 
lawcourts (although individual lawcourts, such as Chancery or 
Parliament, are capitalised). Some historical events are also capitalised, 
including the Reformation, the Armada, the Union (of England and 
Scotland), the Forced Loan of 1626-8, the 1628 Petition of Right and 
Ship Money of 1634-40. The Civil War(s) refers to the conflicts of 1642-
51. 
 In a parliamentary context, ‘the House’ can signify either Lords or 
Commons. It can also be used as a shorthand for debates or reports ‘on 
the floor of the House’, as opposed to debates held in select committee, or 
in a committee of the Whole House. 
 Individuals are generally referred to by the titles they used at the time, 
although the inflation of honours after 1603 creates confusion. To 
minimise this, Francis Bacon will be referred to as Bacon, Robert Cecil as 
Cecil or Salisbury, Lionel Cranfield as Cranfield, James Hay as 
Doncaster, Thomas Sackville as Buckhurst or Dorset, Richard Weston as 
Weston, and George Villiers as Buckingham, the favourite, or (from 
1623) the Duke. 
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Footnote conventions: 
Printed works are cited in full at their first mention in the footnotes of each 
chapter, then abbreviated as follows: 
 
Volume title      published source material 
Author, Volume title     contemporary or modern book 
Author, 'Essay title' in Volume title   article in a volume of essays 
Author, ‘Essay title’, Journal    published journal essay 
Author thesis      unpublished thesis  
 
Websites are cited as follows: [title] website, with full details of the address 
in the bibliography. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 During the years 1598-1603, military commitments in Ireland, the 
Low Countries and on the high seas stretched the Elizabethan state to its 
limits.
1
 By contemporary standards, the scale of this war effort was not 
particularly large, but when the Privy Council debated whether to sue for 
peace with Spain in May 1602, Lord Treasurer Buckhurst argued,  
it was fittest to have peace with Spain before we be too far spent, for 
he [Spain] hath a spring that yieldeth continual supply, his Indies, & 
we are like a standing water, which war will exhaust & make dry & 
barren.
2
  
 
The torrent of American bullion so envied by Buckhurst served the 
Spanish as collateral for loans from Flemish, Italian and Portuguese 
bankers, leveraging their revenues on a scale far beyond anything the 
English could aspire to.
3
 At her death, Elizabeth left debts of between 
£400,000 to £600,000 – about a year's peacetime revenue – but apart from 
£160,000 borrowed from the City and wealthy subsidymen (and never 
repaid), these sums were raised via involuntary credit: unpaid bills to 
suppliers, and debased coinage used to pay the Irish army.
4
 Yet even 
without wealthy colonies, England's landed and mercantile classes did not 
lack means in 1603; so why did the state have problems raising money?  
 The problem was political; as Sir Francis Seymour told the 
Commons in 1624, ‘the King is greater by the hearts of his people, than 
                     
11  For which see P.E.J. Hammer, Elizabeth’s Wars (Basingstoke, Hampshire, 
2003), pp.182-264; N.A. Younger, War and Politics in the Elizabethan Counties 
(Manchester, Lancashire, 2012), pp.200-23. 
2
  Wilbraham Journal ed. H.S. Scott in Miscellany X (Camden Society, 3
rd
 series, 
IV), (London, 1902), 49-50. 
3
  Spanish credit networks are discussed below. 
4
  Contemporary estimates of Elizabeth's debts differed considerably, see F.C. 
Dietz, English Public Finance, 1558-1641 (New York, NY and London, 1932), pp.108-
9; J. Cramsie, Kingship and Crown Finance under James VI and I, 1603-1625 
(Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2002), pp.67-9. 
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prerogative’.1 Taxpayers and lenders respond positively to what economists 
call ‘credible commitment’ – a state’s resolve to honour its financial 
obligations; and willingness to build consensus over policymaking and 
revenue raising – which, the economists Douglass North and Barry 
Weingast argue, is what happened in England during the 'financial 
revolution' of the 1690s.
2
 The economic and political assumptions of the 
North/Weingast thesis are hotly debated,
3
 but the general principle holds 
true: a regime which inspires public confidence is better able to tax and 
borrow than one guided by autocratic whim, aristocratic faction or populist 
demagoguery. Yet why did the near-universal support propagandists 
claimed for the early modern Crown not translate into creditworthiness? 
 In 16
th
 century England, royal revenues were generally used to build 
political credit among courtiers, the nobility and Crown tenants, rather than 
financial credit in the capital markets of London and Europe. The Tudors, 
finding it difficult to borrow, resorted to various alternatives: asset sales; 
debasement of the coinage; requisitioning of men, arms and ships; 
exploitation of regulatory and monopoly patents; and tardy payment of 
suppliers and lenders.
4
 Although some of these expedients proved 
controversial, many became institutionalised, which freed the Crown from 
                     
1
  Holles diary, 13 April 1624. 
2
  The central argument of D.C. North and B.R. Weingast, ‘Constitutions and 
Commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-
century England’, Journal of Economic History, XLIX (1989), pp.803-32. 
3
  The North/Weingast thesis is critiqued in Questioning Credible Commitment: 
Perspectives on the Rise of Financial Capital ed. D. Coffman, A. Leonard and L. Neal 
(Cambridge, 2013). J.S. Wheeler, The Making of a World Power (Stroud, 
Gloucestershire, 1999) and D. Coffman, Excise Taxation and the Origins of Public 
Debt (Palgrave Studies in the History of Finance), (Basingstoke, Hampshire, 2013) both 
argue that the development of public credit started well before the Glorious Revolution. 
4
  Dietz, English Public Finance, 45-6, 53-5, 73-6; Younger, War and Politics in 
the Elizabethan Counties, 160-231; C.E. Challis, 'Lord Hastings to the great silver 
recoinage, 1464-1699' in A New History of the Royal Mint ed. C.E. Challis (Cambridge, 
1991), pp.232-51. For asset sales see Chapter 2. 
19 
complete dependence on parliamentary supply, but made public credit a 
divisive issue. Debates over a range of schemes to increase Crown revenues 
resonated throughout the reigns of Elizabeth and James: purveyance in 1589 
and 1604-6, patents in 1601 and 1621, impositions in 1606-14, wardship in 
1604-6 and the Great Contract in 1610. Most acrimonious of all were the 
‘new counsels’ which funded Charles’s Personal Rule, revoked by the Long 
Parliament, and damned to the memory in the Grand Remonstrance of 
1641.
1
 During the Civil War both sides established the modern revenue 
system Charles had aspired to build in the 1630s, based on direct taxation, 
customs and excises, which evolved into the revenue base for the fiscal-
military state after 1689.
2 
 
 This narrative of fiscal modernisation is a staple of economic history, 
so why re-examine the issue? First, because economic historians focus on 
the financial revolution of the 1690s, and while increasing attention is being 
paid to the modernisation of state finances between 1642 and 1689, there 
has been little discussion of why the fiscal state remained so attenuated 
before 1640. Secondly, while financial constraints were an important factor 
in politics before 1640, political historians, unaccustomed to handling 
figures in the critical manner they would use in analysing a speech, 
manuscript or book, rarely appreciate the sophisticated level of 
contemporary debate over political economy – the political implications of 
economic policy.
3 
                     
1
  Historical Collections ed. J. Rushworth (8 volumes, London, 1721-2 edition), 
IV.437-51. 
2
  Wheeler, Making of a World Power; Coffmann, Excise Taxation; R. Hutton, 
The Royalist War Effort, 1642-1646 (London, 1982); C.D. Chandaman, The English 
Public Revenue, 1660-1688 (Oxford, 1975); J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power (London, 
1989). 
3
  C. Russell, ‘Parliament and the King’s finances’ in The Origins of the English 
Civil War ed. C. Russell (Basingstoke, Hampshire, 1973), pp.103-4, argued that many 
politicians were financially illiterate; few other historians have considered whether early 
20 
 
There have been monographs on important aspects of the English 
revenue system before 1640, and on relations between the City and the 
Crown, but the revenue system as a whole was last examined by Frederick 
Dietz, since whose time the spreadsheet has transformed our capacity to 
manipulate and analyse figures.
1
 This study assembles data about what was 
collected, when, and from whom, and correlates this information with policy 
debates. Statistics rarely tell the whole story, but where political disputes 
cannot be resolved equitably, one of the most effective forms of passive 
resistance is to plead poverty or ignorance of the costs of government.
2
 
Financial data provides an economic context which can illuminate the 
motives of those who uttered polite fictions about Crown finances. What 
emerges is that many contemporaries had a keen – if untutored – grasp of 
both fiscal policy and self-interest, and could be more sensitive to the 
impact of policy than the Crown itself.  
 This study examines how the political economy of early modern 
England worked out in practice. Were the taxpayers, ratepayers and Crown 
tenants of early modern England financially literate? When faced with a 
royal demand for funds, could they weigh profit against risk in an uncertain 
                                                            
Stuart politicians knew what they were talking about, or whether economic constraints 
were appreciated by contemporaries. Russell's views altered considerably before his 
death: C. Russell, James VI and I and his English Parliaments ed. R. Cust and A.D. 
Thrush (Oxford, 2011), pp.154-76. 
1
  Dietz, English Public Finance; The Estates of the English Crown, 1558-1640 
ed. R.W. Hoyle (Cambridge, 1992); H.E. Bell, An Introduction to the History and 
Records of the Court of Wards and Liveries (Cambridge, 1953); M.J. Braddick, 
Parliamentary Taxation in Seventeenth Century England (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1994); 
R. Ashton, The Crown and the Money Market, 1603-1640 (Oxford, 1960); R. Ashton, 
The City and the Court (Cambridge, 1979). Cramsie, Kingship and Crown Finance 
examines monopoly patents. The only recent overview of the seventeenth century fiscal 
state is M.J. Braddick, The Nerves of State (Manchester, Lancashire, 1996), which 
focuses on fiscal policy and administrative developments, rather than political 
consequences. 
2
  This strategy is more normally associated with peasant societies resisting the 
power of feudal or capitalist masters, see J.C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of 
Resistance: hidden transcripts (New Haven, CT and London, 1990). 
21 
world, as they would in their own affairs? Were they capable of appreciating 
the trade-off between principle and profit which Crown was sometimes 
obliged to make on their behalf? This study will furnish evidence to confirm 
all these assertions, and to illustrate the ways in which those expected to 
fund the Crown’s policies sometimes chose to ignore or subvert royal policy 
if they decided it controverted their interests. Thus when the merchants and 
shopkeepers of London, or the landed gentry, declined to lend money to the 
Crown, it was because experience suggested they would not be repaid in a 
timely fashion (Chapters 1 and 4). Where private investors paid seemingly 
inflated prices for Crown lands, it was because they could, with better 
management, be made to yield far more than the Crown's meagre rentroll 
(Chapter 2). The fluctuation of subsidy yields, in response to the Crown’s 
strategic prospects and financial demands, suggests a lively appreciation of 
the local and international context of the fiscal-military state (Chapter 4). 
On the other hand, the Great Contract, the most ambitious fiscal reform plan 
of the era, was undermined because neither James nor his subjects could 
calculate the costs and benefits of the deal with any certainty (Chapter 3). 
Impositions were a perennial cause célèbre for lawyers, but merchants were 
unlikely to sacrifice their cash flow on the altar of principle, and it took 
extraordinary provocation to push them (briefly) into a tax strike in 1628-9 
(Chapter 5). 
 Finally, why does a study of the state finances of early modern 
England exclude any detailed consideration of expenditure? At a practical 
level, the assembling of further data about expenditure would have made 
this project unfeasibly large. In macroeconomic terms, while expenditure 
usually exceeded revenues by 5-20% annually during 1585-1630, the 
English state was no more incompetent, venal or corrupt than its rivals.
1
 Its 
                     
1
  For a brief discussion of expenditure, see Braddick, Nerves of State, 21-34. 
22 
financial problems derived from the Crown's inability to modernise its 
revenue and credit facilities, without provoking serious resistance from the 
moneyed elites who would have borne the brunt of such an increase. Why 
was this so? It is first necessary to examine the nature of the financial 
transformations taking place on the Continent, and then to ask why England 
failed to effect similar reforms. 
 
The Financial Revolution in early modern Europe  
 States generally claim an effective monopoly of coercion within their 
own jurisdiction. Those which dominated early modern Europe were 
additionally defined by the evolution of bureaucratic forms – ‘centralized, 
differentiated and autonomous structures’ – although the rudimentary 
development of institutions encouraged the co-optation of social, economic 
and religious elites into the processes of governance, thus bolstering the 
state's authority.
1
 The pre-modern state raised taxation in exchange for 
protection: the maintenance of order at home and defence against 
commercial and military rivals abroad, but, more broadly, the rule of law, 
the suppression of religious heterodoxy and a secure dynastic succession; 
many political disputes ran along these ideological faultlines.
2
  
 The implementation of this agenda was expensive, particularly 
warfare, the costs of which increased exponentially during the early modern 
period with the advent of gunpowder weapons, trace italienne fortifications 
                     
1
  C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD990-1992 (Oxford, 1992), 
pp.1-5; M.J. Braddick, State Formation in early modern England, c.1550-1700 
(Cambridge, 2000), pp.11-20; M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power (2 volumes, 
Cambridge, 1986-93), I.1-32.  
2
  Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States; F.C. Lane, Profits from Power 
(Albany, NY, 1979), pp.22-36; D.C. North and R.P. Thomas, The Rise of the Western 
World: a new economic history (Cambridge, 1973); J. Glete, War and the State in Early 
Modern Europe (Abingdon, Oxfordshire, 2002), pp.42-66. 
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and specialised warships.
1
 States which exploited these capital intensive 
technologies undertook an open-ended investment, expressed succinctly in 
Cicero's dictum, 'the sinews of war is infinite money'. A protracted war cost 
far more than taxation or plunder could supply, and required credit, the legal 
and fiscal framework for which developed from the 12
th
 century, in the 
trading cities of the Mediterranean and the Low Countries.
2
 In the early 16
th
 
century, the Hapsburg and Valois monarchies circumvented the problem of 
procuring credit under a monarchical system – where the Crown stood 
above the law – by selling rentes or juros (long-term annuities) to their 
urban elites, as security for cash advances.
3
  
 American silver helped Spain secure loans from the international 
banking houses of Germany and Italy; but long-term debt in Spain, as 
elsewhere, had to be funded by taxation which was not assigned to any 
existing purpose.
4
 This required a broader tax base than most monarchies 
commanded in 1500, when demesne estates and feudal rights still comprised 
a significant part of Crown revenues. Spain and France imposed new taxes 
on economic activity, but the most successful example of a 'tax state' was 
                     
1
  The vast literature on the 'military revolution' is discussed in J. Black, 
European Warfare, 1494-1650 (London, 2002); J. Glete, Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650 
(London, 2000). 
2
  Lane, Profits from Power, 72-81; J.D. Tracy, 'On the dual origins of long-term 
urban debts in medieval Europe' and L. Pezzolo, 'The Venetian government debt, 1350-
1650' in Urban Public Debts: urban government and the market for annuities in 
western Europe (14
th
 – 18th centuries) (Studies in European Urban History, 3) ed. M. 
Boone, K. Davids and P. Janssens (Turnhout, Belgium, 2003), 13-26, 61-74; D. 
Stasavage, States of Credit: size, power and the development of European politics 
(Princeton, NJ and Woodstock, Oxfordshire, 2011), pp.25-46, 110-31. 
3
  Glete, War and the State, 67-139; Stasavage, States of Credit, 132-50; M. 
Wolfe, The Fiscal System of Renaissance France (New Haven, CT and London, 1972); 
I.A.A. Thompson, 'Castile: polity, fiscality and fiscal crisis'; idem, 'Castile: absolutism, 
constitutionalism and liberty'; and P.T. Hoffman 'Early modern France, 1450-1700', all 
in Fiscal Crises, Liberty and Representative Government, 1450-1789 ed. P.T. 
Hoffmann and K. Norberg (Stanford, CA, 1994), pp.140-252. 
4
  M. Drelichman and H.-J. Voth, Lending to the Borrower from Hell: debt, taxes 
and default in the age of Philip II (Princeton, NJ and Woodstock, Oxfordshire, 2014), 
pp.26-31. 
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the Dutch model established in the 1580s, comprising land taxes, customs, 
and excises, which funded the sophisticated network of credit holding the 
mighty Army of Flanders at bay.
1
 This was the fiscal yardstick against 
which both contemporaries and historians have gauged the performance of 
rival states, and by this measure, early modern England performed woefully 
badly. 
 
Politics and Crown Finances in Early Modern England  
 While English taxpayers between 1560 and 1640 often complained 
about their insupportable burdens, when their situation is compared with 
either their continental neighbours or their descendants, they were lightly 
taxed: in England, Crown revenues between 1560 and 1640 represented 
around 1-2% of GDP in peacetime and 2-4% in wartime; whereas in France, 
Spain and Holland (though maybe not the rest of the United Provinces) 
wartime revenue yields were much greater, perhaps 5-10% of GDP. English 
wartime revenues rapidly converged with Continental norms after 1640: 6-
7% of GDP until the Glorious Revolution, then 10% or more after 1689.
2
 
Yet if the English were comparatively under-taxed before 1640 – and 
merchants, financiers and diplomats who had lived and worked abroad were 
clearly aware of this – why did the Crown find it so difficult to secure a 
political consensus over tax increases?  
                     
1
  J. Schumpeter, 'The crisis of the tax state', International Economic Papers IV 
(1954), pp.5-38; A.J. Veenendaal jr., 'Fiscal crises and constitutional freedom in the 
Netherlands, 1450-1795' in Fiscal Crises, Liberty and Representative Government, 
1450-1789 ed. Hoffmann and Norberg, pp.96-139; L. Van der Ent, W. Fritschy, E. 
Horlings and R. Liesker, ‘Public finances in the United Provinces of the Netherlands in 
the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries’ in Crises, Revolutions and Self-Sustained 
Growth ed. W.M. Ormrod, M. Bonney and R. Bonney (Stamford, Lincolnshire, 1999), 
pp.249-92; J.D. Tracy, The Founding of the Dutch Republic: war, finance and politics 
in Holland, 1572-1588 (Oxford, 2008). 
2
  R. Bonney, The European Dynastic States, 1494-1660 (Oxford, 1991), pp.352-
60; P.K. O’Brien and P.A. Hunt, ‘The rise of a fiscal state in England, 1485-1815’, HR, 
LXVI (1993), pp.148-63. 
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 The fiscal regime inherited by the Stuarts in 1603 had its origins in 
the 14
th
 century, when English invasions of Wales, Scotland and France 
were funded by an income derived from demesne lands, feudal revenues, 
direct taxation
1
 and customs. This system had undergone periodic 
renovation, most recently during the mid-Tudor period, with the acquisition 
of huge amounts of monastic and chantry property in 1536-48, the 
subjection of the clergy to First Fruits and annual Tenths from 1536, the 
emergence of the assessed subsidy as the mainstay of lay taxation in the 
1540s, and substantial increases to customs tariffs in 1558. However, this 
immense new endowment failed to meet the prodigious expense of warfare 
in 1542-62, when the shortfall was covered by a disastrous debasement of 
the currency and the alienation of part of the Crown’s newly acquired 
demesnes.
2
 The Elizabethan regime retrenched, paring expenditure and 
remaining upon the strategic defensive, which rendered the cost of warfare 
supportable until the final years of the reign, when the Irish army and other 
commitments in France, the Low Countries and at sea bequeathed the 
Stuarts a legacy of wartime debt. 
 When James came to the throne, his councillors were debating the 
need for structural reform, yet the financial reforms of the 1640s proved 
beyond the capabilities of the early Stuarts. Parliament attempted to evade 
the Crown’s demands for supply by appealing to the medieval notion that 
the King should ‘live of his own’ in peacetime, while efforts to increase 
                     
1
  M. Braddick, Nerves of State (Manchester, Lancashire, 1996), pp.11-12 outlines 
the conventional definition of direct taxation as any charge levied directly upon 
individuals; but in this study, wardship and purveyance will be discussed as examples 
of fiscal feudalism. 
2
  P. Cunich ‘Revolution and crisis in English state finance’ in Crises, 
Revolutions and Self-Sustained Growth, 110-37; R.W. Hoyle ‘War and public finance’ 
in Reign of Henry VIII ed. D. MacCulloch (Basingstoke, Hampshire, 1995), pp.75-99; 
J.D. Gould, The Great Debasement: currency and the economy in mid-Tudor England 
(Oxford, 1970); Hammer, Elizabeth’s Wars. 
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revenue via the prerogative instigated several of the key political conflicts 
of the age.
1
 Failure to consider available options in peacetime meant that 
fiscal policy was either changed arbitrarily at moments of crisis (1598, 
1626-8, 1641-5, 1660-1 and the 1690s), or developed incrementally from 
judicial and administrative decisions. Neither approach fostered the 
development of a political consensus, which cost the Crown dearly, 
particularly during the military crisis of 1639-40.  
 Both contemporaries and historians have ascribed many of the 
Stuarts' financial problems to the spendthrift practices of the monarchs 
themselves, but this is not entirely fair.
2
 Rewards lavished on the 
Bedchamber Scots and the Villiers affinity can be traced in the Exchequer 
accounts;
3
 but Elizabethan courtiers also derived huge, unrecorded profits 
from discounted leases and monopoly patents, discussed only in hostile 
polemics such as Leicester's Commonwealth. The annual cost of the royal 
Household – about £200,000 in Elizabeth's final years – increased 
substantially after 1603,
4
 but this included provision for dowagers, consorts 
and children, the natural corollary of a settled succession, and the Jacobean 
largesse which attracted such unfavourable comment appears less 
exceptional when compared with that of his son and grandson (Table 0.1).
5
 
                     
1
  G.L. Harriss ‘Medieval doctrines in the debates on supply, 1610-1629’ in 
Faction and Parliament ed. K. Sharpe, (Oxford, 1978), pp.73-103; Wheeler, Making of 
a World Power; Cramsie, Kingship and Crown Finance. 
2
  For a classic critique, see Dietz, English Public Finance, 103-8. Cramsie, 
Kingship and Crown Finance, 40-66 explains the political logic behind James's 
generosity. 
3
  Though the gains from some remain obscure, such as the sale of honours (see 
Chapter 1), or profits from Ireland (see V. Treadwell, Buckingham and Ireland, 1616-
1628: a Study in Anglo-Irish Politics (Dublin, Ireland, 1998) 
4
  Dietz, English Public Finance, 45-7, 73-6; P.R. Seddon, ‘Household reforms in 
the reign of James I’, BIHR LIII (1980) pp.44-55; Chapters 2, and 3 below; M.C. 
Questier, 'Elizabeth and the Catholics' in Catholics and the 'Protestant nation': 
religious politics and identity in early modern England ed. E.H. Shagan (Manchester, 
Lancashire, 2005), pp.76-84. 
5
  The figures in Table 0.1 differ considerably from those cited in Braddick, 
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Historians tend to emulate contemporary Exchequer officials in focussing 
on the Crown's financial problems, but it should be recalled that the public 
squalor of James's reign contrasted with private opulence, indicating a 
revenue potential which went largely untapped by the state. 
 
Table 0.1 Expenditure on the royal Court under 
James I, Charles I and Charles II 
 
  
YE M1618 
Annual average 
for 4YE 
M1635 
 
YE M1664 
Households £119,177 £207,847 £116,967 
Wardrobe £24,046 £31,261 £58,390 
Stables £1,700 £2,250 £2,718 
Works £10,000 £16,162 £12,354 
Privy Purse £6,200 £7,248 £20,986 
Other departments £16,775 £27,603 £12,743 
Diets £3,175 £379 £1,972 
Wages, pensions, 
rewards 
£110,931 £60,280 £83,144 
    
Court expenditure £292,004 £353,066 £309,274 
Ordinary revenue £488,200 £618,379 £1,021,893 
Sources T48/87, pp.1-
2 
E407/78/5 Chandaman, 
English Public 
Revenue, 349-51 
 
Notes: (1) figures rounded to nearest £; (2) pensions to courtiers for 4YE M1635 have 
been reconstructed from assignments upon receipts; (3) Ordinary revenue for YE M1664 
calculated from receipts plus relevant assignments. 
 
 The clearest empirical assessment of a state’s power is its ability to 
raise revenues, which can be measured in three ways: in cash terms; 
strategically, by comparison to its contemporary rivals; or historically, with 
reference to past and future performance. By all these indicators, English 
                                                            
Nerves of State, 26, because I define the cost of a Court in a broader way. The 
Exchequer's own accounting standards were palpably inconsistent across the three sets 
of figures in Table 0.1. 
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Crown finances experienced two low points, 1430-70 and 1563-1626, 
following protracted wars which overstretched the state’s resources. Under 
Mary, Elizabeth and James, peacetime revenues (line A-B in Graph 0.1) 
amounted to little more, in real (deflated) terms, than those of Henry VIII 
before the dissolution of the monasteries.
1
 War compounded these 
problems, as the Crown's ordinary income was never intended to cover 
military expenditure. Land sales and currency manipulation enabled Henry 
VIII to quadruple his peacetime revenues during the wars of the 1540s, 
while Elizabeth briefly managed to triple hers during 1559-62. However, 
Charles I struggled to raise his income by 50% during the wars of 1625-30 
and 1639-40, while during the Anglo-Spanish war of 1585-1603, Elizabeth's 
revenues increased by no more than 30% over peacetime norms, and that 
only in the crisis years of 1588 and 1599-1602. 
 Fiscal weakness had political consequences: strategically, it forced 
the English onto the defensive, to the regret of those who sought to resurrect 
the Angevin empire, or to acquire a new colonial empire.
2
 Domestically, it 
afforded taxpayers leverage over royal policy, a boon for those who did not 
wish to foot the bill either for religious war or colonial conquest. Crown 
finances improved under Charles I, yet while his regime achieved solvency 
during peacetime, it could not raise the means to sustain a protracted war, as 
his English critics were perfectly aware, in encouraging the Covenanters to  
                     
1
  Graph 0.1 can be criticised on two counts: (1) figures for Crown revenues are 
largely taken from the researches of Frederick Dietz, which are not entirely 
comprehensive; (2) the O'Brien/Hunt index (explained in O'Brien and Hunt, 'Fiscal state 
in England', HR, LXVI.171-2) is not wholly satisfactory as a deflator for Crown 
revenues. However the trends are sufficiently accurate to be usable. 
2
  Hammer, Elizabeth’s Wars. However, N.A.M. Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea 
(London, 1997), pp.327-46 suggests that Elizabethan navy was adequate for the task in 
hand. 
29 
30 
prolong their resistance in 1639-40.
1
 Why did the Crown's arguments fall on 
deaf ears? On 15 November 1610, Richard Martin, scorning a vote of 
supply, remarked that ‘the King cannot want when there is fit and just 
occasion for him to have it’.2 In other words, taxpayers did not trust the 
Crown sufficiently to offer generous peacetime funding. Nor were they 
prepared to subsidise offensive warfare, something their predecessors had 
done as recently as the 1540s, and their heirs were to do again after 1649. 
Tempting as it is to blame Charles for the breakdown of 1640, the fiscal 
history of early Stuart England suggests a deeper, systemic failure within 
the English state, which is rarely discussed by historians. 
 
The Historiography of Early Modern England  
 Until the 1970s, the historiography of early modern England was 
dominated by Whig and Marxist narratives which, in the words of an earlier 
critic, ‘emphasise certain principles of progress in the past and… produce a 
story which is the ratification, if not the glorification of the present’.3 
Revisionism attacked these linear narratives by prioritising contingent 
factors, concluding that while James and Charles faced opposition to their 
                     
1
  L.J. Reeve, ‘The politics of war finance in an age of confessional strife: a 
comparative Anglo-European view’, Parergon, XIV (1996), pp.85-109; S.M. Healy, 
‘Oh, what a lovely war? War, taxation and public opinion in England, 1624-29’, 
Canadian Journal of History, XXXVIII (2003), pp.439-65; Russell, FBM, 61-3, 99-
101, 149-51; J.S.A. Adamson, The Noble Revolt: the overthrow of Charles I (London, 
2007), pp.45-8, 54-6, 59-60, 72-3. 
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  PP1610, II.332. 
3
  H. Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (London, 1931), preface. For 
Whig and Marxist historiography, see M. Bentley, Modernizing England’s Past: 
English Historiography in the age of Modernism, 1870-1970 (Cambridge, 2005); C. 
Hill, The English Revolution, 1640 (London, 1940); P. Corrigan and D. Sayer, The 
Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution (Oxford, 1985); R.A. 
Cosgrove, ‘Reflections on the Whig interpretation of history’, Journal of Early Modern 
History, IV (2000) pp.147-67; J.S.A. Adamson 'Introduction: high roads and blind 
alleys – the English Civil War and its historiography' in The English Civil War: 
conflicts and contexts, 1642-49, ed. J.S.A. Adamson (Basingstoke, Hampshire, 2009), 
pp.5-21. 
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policies, the political culture of the age was ‘consensual’ – there was no 
formal ‘Opposition’ before 1640.1  
 Revisionism was a useful corrective to the teleology into which any 
narrative is prone to lapse, yet the divisions which led to Civil War cannot 
have arisen from nothing.
2
 The ‘new British history’ shows that any 
political settlement which might have proved viable for one of Charles’s 
three realms during 1637-51 provoked armed resistance in at least one of 
the others,
3
 while those who sought to put the polemic back into political 
history – generally described as 'post-revisionists', for want of a more 
precise term – use printed tracts, newsletters and libels to establish that 
issues of national and international significance were debated, criticised 
and even subverted at all levels from the royal Court to parish elites, long 
before the prospect of civil war arose.
4
 This fed into a larger debate about 
                     
1
  M. Kishlansky ‘The emergence of adversary politics in the Long Parliament’, 
Journal of Modern History, XLIX (1977), pp.617-40, dates the concept of adversarial 
politics to the aftermath of the first Civil War; others place it around 1640, for whom 
see Adamson 'Introduction' in The English Civil War, 30-33. 
2
  An argument cogently, if controversially, made in J.C.D. Clark, Rebellion and 
Revolution (Cambridge, 1986). 
3
  C. Russell, FBM and The Causes of the English Civil War (Oxford, 1990). G. 
Burgess, 'Introduction – the new British history', A.I. MacInnes 'Regal union for Britain, 
1603-38' and T. Harris 'Critical perspectives: the autonomy of English history?' in The 
New British History: founding a modern state, 1603-1715 ed. G. Burgess (London, 
1999), pp.1-64, 266-86 explore the broader historiography. See also P. Lake 
'Retrospective: Wentworth's political world in revisionist and post-revisionist 
perspective' in The Political World of Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, 1621-1641 
ed. J.F. Merritt (Cambridge, 1996), pp.279-83.  
4
  R. Cust, The Forced Loan and English Politics, 1626-1628 (Oxford, 1987); T. 
Cogswell, The Blessed Revolution: English politics and the coming of war 1621-1624 
(Cambridge, 1989) and Home Divisions: aristocracy, the state and provincial conflict 
(Manchester, Lancashire 1998); A. Bellany, The Politics of Court Scandal in Early 
Modern England (Cambridge, 2007).  
 For the methodological context of this approach, see F.J. Levy, ‘How 
information spread among the gentry, 1550-1640’, Journal of British Studies XXI 
(1982), pp.11-34; R. Cust, ‘News and politics in early seventeenth-century England’, 
Past & Present CXII (1986), pp.60-90; P. Lake and M.C. Questier, ‘Puritans, Papists 
and the “Public Sphere” in early modern England: the Edmund Campion affair in 
context’, Journal of Modern History LXXII (2000) pp.589-92; N. Mears, Queenship 
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the public sphere – the physical and conceptual space in which European 
intellectuals, generally excluded from political power before the later 19
th
 
century, met to exchange opinions, in an environment where the calibre of 
one’s argument (theoretically) outweighed conventional considerations such 
as wealth, social status and gender.
1
 Peter Lake and Steve Pincus have 
applied this concept to the post-Reformation period, suggesting that ‘issues 
of religious identity and division came together with issues of dynastic and 
geopolitical rivalry to create a series of public spheres’.2 Such controversies 
did not always evolve in a linear fashion, and while princes, ministers and 
lobbyists often appealed to public opinion, they were quick to condemn 
such tactics when turned against them. Yet attempts to suppress debate 
merely forced it underground, where it evolved into something far more 
radical.  
 None of these critiques necessarily invalidates the revisionist notion 
of consensual politics: both Kishlansky and Russell acknowledged that 
such a system could accommodate dissent, if expressed in measured 
                                                            
and Political Discourse in the Elizabethan Realms (Cambridge, 2005), pp.12-32. 
 For work on opinion formation at humbler social levels, see P. Seaver, 
Wallington’s World (Stanford, CA, 1985); P. Lake, The Boxmaker’s Revenge (Stanford, 
CA, 1999); S. Hindle, ‘Hierarchy and community in the Elizabethan parish: the 
Swallowfield articles of 1596’, Historical Journal, XLI (1999), pp.835-51; S. Hindle, 
The State and Social Change in early modern England (Basingstoke, Hampshire, 
2000); E. Shagan, 'Rumours and popular politics in the reign of Henry VIII', A. Wood, 
'“Poore men woll speke one daye”: plebeian languages of deference and defiance in 
England, c.1520-1640', S. Hindle 'The political culture of the middling sort in English 
rural communities, c.1550-1700' and M. Goldie 'The unacknowledged republic: 
officeholding in early modern England', all in The Politics of the Excluded ed. T. Harris 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire, 2001), pp.30-98, 125-94. 
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  J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere translated by 
T. Burger (Cambridge, MA, 1991), pp.1-50; C. Calhoun, ‘Introduction’ in Habermas 
and the Public Sphere ed. C. Calhoun (Cambridge, MA and London, 1992); J.A. 
Downie, 'Public and Private: the myth of the bourgeois public sphere' in A Concise 
Companion to the Restoration and Eighteenth Century ed. C. Wall (Oxford, 2005), 
pp.58-79 provides a comprehensive critique of Habermas. 
2
  P. Lake and S. Pincus, ‘Rethinking the public sphere in early modern England’, 
Journal of British Studies XLV (2006), p.274. 
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terms.
1
 Of course, the frustrations unleashed in the Long Parliament 
represented more than this: the chief proponents of Personal Rule were 
arrested or fled into exile, while most of the political nation remained 
aloof – hardly indicative of a smoothly functioning political system. Yet 
Charles's critics planned reforms to the constitution, law, finances and the 
church, most of which would have strengthened the English state – which 
suggests their objection was not to the existence of royal power, but to the 
manner of its exercise.
2
 So what went wrong in the 1630s? 
 Some placed the onus for breakdown on Charles, whose belief that 
the prerogative lay above criticism undoubtedly complicated the political 
process. However, while all long-serving monarchs argued with their 
subjects over key policies, most did not meet the outright defiance he 
encountered.
3
 The irony was that his greatest success caused his chief 
problem: peace and alterations to the legal and financial basis of the state 
relieved the Crown of the pressing need to negotiate with its critics over 
his ambitious programme of reforms to church and state. However, the 
resulting lack of dialogue during the 1630s persuaded Charles that he 
faced no significant opposition, even as it convinced his critics that a 
measured response would not suffice.
4
  
What follows is a study of the financial tensions within a dynamic 
political system between James’s accession and the collapse of Charles’s 
                     
1
  M. Kishlansky, Parliamentary Selection: social and political choice in early 
modern England (Cambridge, 1986), pp.12-21; Russell, PEP, chapter 1. 
2
  Russell, FBM, 237-73. There are, perhaps, parallels with the Rockingham 
Whigs’ campaigns against Lord Bute in 1764 and Lord North in 1782. 
3
  It is excessively crude to say that revisionists blame Charles for the Civil Wars, 
but a focus on the short term highlights the King’s flaws as a politician. 
4
  A.D. Thrush 'The Personal Rule of James I, 1611-1620' in Politics, Religion 
and Popularity in early Stuart England ed. T. Cogswell, R. Cust and P. Lake 
(Cambridge, 2002), pp.84-102 argues that James attempted to establish his own 
‘Personal Rule’ in the 1610s, but financial weakness did not permit him to dispense 
with Parliament entirely, as Charles did in 1629. 
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Personal Rule in 1640, looking backwards, where necessary, into 
Elizabeth’s reign, or earlier. It focuses on the mechanisms of a flawed, but 
usually viable political system at a time when the Crown and the political 
nation considered a range of options about their future, the long-term 
consequences of which were not always apparent – and even when they 
were, difficult choices were often avoided or postponed. There was more to 
early Stuart politics than meets the eye of many historians – issues where 
debate was suppressed, or not even started; my aim is to bring some of these 
‘hidden transcripts’ into the open, using debates about fiscal reform as a 
way into a broader consideration of the stresses of modernisation in early 
Stuart England. 
In addition to its primary focus, this study touches upon two other 
historiographies: it has relevance to debates on the ‘origins of the English 
Civil War’, although it concentrates on the regime which collapsed in 1640, 
not what followed; it also engages with the debate on the origins of the 18
th
 
century fiscal-military state, offering a political explanation as to why there 
was no thoroughgoing fiscal modernisation under the early Stuarts. 
 
Sources and Methodology  
 Differing approaches to the historiography of early Stuart England 
are partly founded upon contrasting source materials: the official 
memoranda and parliamentary speeches favoured by revisionists tend to 
employ consensual language; whereas post-revisionists who focus upon 
polemical literature, such as printed tracts, sermons, libels and newsletters, 
are more likely to perceive debate as adversarial.
1
 This study will combine 
a range of these conventional sources with financial data and other sources 
                     
1
  Lake and Pincus, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere’, 286-9. The difference 
between these approaches is apparent in Russell, PEP and Cogswell, Blessed 
Revolution. 
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less widely used by political historians. 
 Much recent scholarship has focussed on the processes of 
governance, particularly the negotiations involved in the making and 
implementation of policy at all levels.
1
 The activities of an extensive 
network of local lobbyists at Whitehall can be traced in urban and legal 
records. Londoners were long accustomed to air their views before Court 
and Privy Council, but under Elizabeth, provincial interest groups 
developed regular contacts which afforded them leverage over economic 
and social policymaking.
2
 The significance of legal precedents such as 
Bate’s case (Chapter 5), has long been appreciated by constitutional 
historians, but more routine lawsuits, contextualised in the records of 
corporations, trading companies and guilds, furnish important narratives: 
courtiers prosecuting those who purchased knighhoods, for unpaid fees 
(Chapter 1); the long prehistory of the controversy over customs rates 
among the London merchants (Chapter 5); the controversy between the 
London brewers and the Board of Greencloth over purveyance (Chapter 
3); while harassment of the Turkey merchants over non-payment of 
currant duties in 1628-9 provoked a serious confrontation between Crown 
and City (Chapter 5).  
 One important consideration highlighted by social historians in 
recent years is the fact that magistrates, deputy lieutenants and militia 
officers, churchwardens, constables and town aldermen held a tacit veto 
over the implementation of Crown policy at local level. The arrival of a 
letter, writ or warrant, constable, churchwarden, purveyor, pursuivant, 
patentee or soldier to be billeted required those whose assistance was 
                     
1
  For which see Braddick, State Formation and Hindle, State and Social Change. 
2
  HoP1604, II.242-62, 338-45, 488-94, 509-13; C.F. Patterson, Urban Patronage 
in Early Modern England (Stanford, CA, 1999). I am grateful to Helen Good for 
discussions about lobbyists. 
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commanded to make a choice between national imperatives and local and 
personal needs. It is sometimes possible to discern the responses of the 
'middling sort', which varied from compliance, through negotiation and 
evasion to outright refusal (Chapters 1, 3 and 4). None of this was new 
under the early Stuarts, but the expanding remit of the early modern state 
meant that such demands arrived with increasing frequency, and became a 
more serious issue in local politics.
1
 
 As mentioned above, one important aspect of early Stuart history 
which has been largely overlooked since the 1970s is Crown finances.
.
 
Money talks, and most Crown revenues paid into the Receipt of the 
Exchequer between 1580 and 1640 have been re-examined for this study, 
alongside the accounts of the Court of Wards, the duchies of Lancaster 
and Cornwall, and the main customs farms.
2
 Fiscal policy was one of the 
major flashpoints of early Stuart politics, but it is only once the figures are 
added into the debates that their significance becomes apparent. This was 
rarely stated at the time, because politicians preferred not to hold their 
monarchs to ransom openly, hiding behind the medieval dictum that the 
Crown should ‘live of its own’ in peacetime.3 It is difficult to believe that 
landowners who doubled or trebled their rents in a generation, merchants 
who made fortunes from risky trade ventures, or diplomats who saw the 
might of the Crown's rivals, could fail to perceive the magnitude of the 
Crown’s financial weakness. As little was done to address these problems 
before 1640, we should ask whether the political nation kept the Crown 
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  Hindle, 'The political culture of the middling sort' and Goldie, 'The 
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short of cash from ignorance, or design. 
 Finally, something must be said about the relationship between 
parliamentary debate and public opinion, perceptions of which have evolved 
rapidly over the last generation. Conrad Russell observed that before 1640, 
Parliament was an event rather than an institution, therefore ‘parliamentary 
history must be liable to constant revision in the light of new discoveries 
about events elsewhere’.1 If this downgrades the significance of 
parliamentary politics, it remains clear that the institution, if properly 
managed, could serve as the fulcrum about which policy decisions turned. 
Under Elizabeth, Parliament was managed by Councillors, courtiers and 
‘men of business’ such as minor bureaucrats, ministerial relatives and those 
with aspirations to public office.
2
 Even then, control of the Commons’ 
agenda sometimes slipped from official hands, and procedural changes 
made management even more difficult to manage under James: in 1610 and 
1614, there were protests against MPs who had offered the King a private 
undertaking to sway the voices of the rest.
3
 Yet this was the way parliaments 
came to be managed thereafter, with indifferent success, by the ‘patriots’ of 
the 1620s, or the Junto of 1640-2.
4
 
This state of flux encouraged the belief that rhetoric could alter the 
course of debates – as the number and circulation of parliamentary diaries 
testifies in the 1620s. Yet it is difficult to know how far rhetoric shaped 
opinion.
5
 Many doubtless arrived at important parliamentary debates with 
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their minds already made up, but a succession of eloquent speeches could 
build up a sense of momentum; if this technique had not worked, it would 
hardly have become a staple of parliamentary practice. During key debates 
the chamber was invariably packed to capacity, but the floor was usually 
dominated by a modest ‘stage army’ of ministers, courtiers and aspiring 
politicians. However, in the absence of a consensus, it was the silent 
majority who carried the day, and occasionally (the Lords on 24 May 1614, 
or the Commons on 19 March 1624) a vote went against the prevailing 
wisdom of the speeches.
1
 Yet for all the drama of a set-piece debate, 
Parliament made few irrevocable decisions in the heat of the moment, as 
legislation required multiple readings, and Commons and Lords needed to 
co-operate in order to sway the King, while principled rhetoric sometimes 
served as a smokescreen behind which the search for a practical 
compromise could be mounted. Nevertheless, where politicians insisted on 
having their way over a key issue such as impositions, Buckingham’s 
impeachment or extra-parliamentary taxation, the Crown held the option of 
veto or dissolution, albeit at a price. 
 
 
                                                            
Popularity in Pre-Revolutionary England (Cambridge, 2012). 
1
  C. Russell, 'Sir Thomas Wentworth and anti-Spanish sentiment, 1621-1624' in 
Political World of Thomas Wentworth, 62. For 24 May 1614 see Chapter 5; for 19 
March 1624, see Chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER I: The QUEST for CAPITAL 
 
 The persistent shortage of revenue in the period 1560-1640 (Graph 
0.1) forced ministers to embark upon a quest for capital which yielded only 
indifferent results: by the standards of northern and western Europe, 
England was very lightly taxed in 1560, a situation which had altered only 
slightly by 1640.
1
 Parliament, approached for a vote of direct taxation to 
cover extraordinary expenses almost every time it met,
2
 tended to discount 
pleas of royal need when uttered with monotonous regularity, and the funds 
it voted rarely covered the expenditure for which it was allocated – usually 
war or diplomacy.
3
 In the 1570s, Lord Treasurer Burghley achieved a 
modest annual surplus, accruing a war chest of £300,000 by the time 
hostilities with Spain broke out in 1585; this reserve was severely depleted 
by Leicester's campaigns in the Low Countries, and exhausted by 1597.
4
 
Thereafter, Crown finance was dominated by deficit and debt, which was 
difficult to service, as ordinary revenues were devoted to funding recurrent 
expenses. After 1603, there were concerted efforts to increase existing 
revenues (detailed in Chapters 2-5), but many of these were stymied by 
vested interests. So where did the Crown seek additional funds?  
 This chapter will examine two aspects of early Stuart finance which 
provoked significant political controversy. The first is efforts to raise loans 
from the capital markets in London and abroad, which highlights the 
Crown's failure to convince private investors of its credible commitment to 
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debt service. The second concerns the sale of titles of honour – used here an 
example of the many revenue projects of the time – where most of the cash 
raised ended up in the pockets of courtiers and entrepreneurs, rather than the 
Exchequer.
1
 The economic and social aspects of both these initiatives have 
been studied before,
2
 but this chapter will also consider the political 
implications: in choosing whether to invest in government debt, titles of 
honour, or any other project, individuals make implicit judgements about 
government policy and probity; while those who already hold such 
investments must judge whether the inflation of such assets devalues their 
existing holdings. 
 
The Crown and the London Capital Market, 1575-1628   
 Historically, English monarchs secured large-scale credit from two 
sources: Italian and Flemish bankers; and London merchants. The Tudors 
borrowed heavily on the Antwerp exchange during the war years of 1544-
58, but Thomas Gresham paid off these loans by 1574, and Elizabeth never 
borrowed abroad again: her questionable legitimacy affected her 
creditworthiness, and Philip II, as the chief customer of most European 
financiers, ensured that she was denied funds. After the Army of Flanders 
captured Antwerp in 1584, many Flemish financiers moved to Amsterdam. 
It would have made strategic sense for them to bankroll the English, but 
Elizabeth’s high-handed treatment of her allies in the 1580s left an 
unpleasant legacy, and Dutch investors preferred to lend to the provincial 
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estates of Holland and Zeeland, which they dominated politically.
1
  
 The early Stuarts made only one attempt to raise capital at 
Amsterdam, pawning the Crown jewels in November 1625. Charles hoped 
to raise £300,000, but the Dutch demanded extra security and lent him only 
£7,000 directly, a stark demonstration of their lack of faith in the English 
Crown. The Elector Palatine – then an Anglo-Dutch pensioner – secured a 
further £11,400, while Buckingham pawned £40,000 of his own jewels. 
Dutch scepticism was vindicated when it took a decade for the last of these 
loans to be redeemed, and the Stuarts did not borrow at Amsterdam again 
until 1689.
2
  
 The only domestic centre with sufficient liquidity to serve the state’s 
capital needs was London, which handled up to 75% of overseas trade.
3
 Yet 
the Crown had uneasy relations with the City, being unable to offer 
creditors a reliable return on capital invested in government debt.
4
 In the 
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Dutch Republic and Bourbon France, high risk was usually offset by high 
interest rates, but until the Exchequer developed revenue streams not tied to 
ordinary expenditure – customs receipts, in the first instance – the English 
Crown had no means of guaranteeing payments to private investors.  
******** 
 By 1600, many European states were raising capital from domestic 
lenders via interest-bearing bonds – an integral part of Venetian finances 
since the twelfth century, adopted by the French and Dutch in the sixteenth.
1
 
However, the Tudor state constituted a poor credit risk: the Crown could not 
be sued for debt in its own lawcourts; its record of repayment was irregular; 
and foreign and domestic threats reduced royal creditworthiness.
2
 The 
French Crown resolved similar problems by raising money on the credit of 
the Paris Hôtel de Ville in 1522 and 1536, and issuing bonds paying annual 
interest (rentes) from 1544. The Tudors used the London corporation to 
guarantee loans from foreign creditors, but borrowed only occasionally on 
the domestic market, and for short periods: £22,666-13-4 in 1522; £28,000 
during 1554-8; and £10,000 in 1563. However, Elizabeth’s exclusion from 
Antwerp after 1570 obliged her to resort to London for funds more regularly 
(Table 1.1).
3
 
 In the 1570s, London’s economy, while dwarfed by those of 
Antwerp, Seville or Venice, was worth over £1M annually, and growing 
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rapidly; the Crown’s problem was how to access this capital.1 Over the 
ensuing 60 years, the corporation acted as a contractor, rating contributors 
and holding royal guarantees of repayment. Various groups were 
approached for loans: the largest was the freemen or ratepayers (40-50,000 
strong), but the collection  
 
Table 1.1: Crown loans from the City of London, 
1575-1628 
 
Date Sum raised Incidence of loan 
1575 £28,873 
£1,127 
Freemen 
Livery companies 
1588 £47,852 Livery companies  
1590 £15,000 129 wealthy citizens 
August 1598 £20,000 Livery companies 
November 
1598 
£60,000 Wealthy citizens 
August 1604 £14,924 Livery companies 
1608 £63,000 400 wealthy citizens 
1610 £100,000 Aldermen 
1617 £96,467 280 wealthy citizens 
1625 £60,000 Aldermen & Common Councillors 
July 1626 £20,000 Aldermen 
August 1626 £17,000 Livery companies 
January 1628 £60,000 Livery companies 
August 1628 £65,000 Livery companies 
 
Sources: See text; Outhwaite thesis; Ashton, Money Market; TNA, E401; LMA, Reps., 
Jors. 
 
and repayment of many small sums must have been an administrative 
nightmare, and this option was used only once, in 1575. The commonest 
resort was to the wealthier guild members – several thousand individuals – 
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but many of these were shopkeepers, who held most of their assets as stock, 
not capital, and could only be approached occasionally. Thirdly, the City 
Chamber and livery companies controlled vast charitable assets, but any 
default on their obligations left their membership personally liable for the 
debt. Finally, the corporation could appeal to its own membership, and other 
wealthy merchants (around 500 men), but their goodwill was also 
finite.
1
Ultimately, none of these options provided a permanent solution to 
the regime’s financial problems, because the question of repayment 
remained unresolved. 
******** 
 In 1575, £30,000 was assessed on the freemen, with the livery 
companies covering a shortfall of £1,127.
2
 The companies lent £47,952-10-
0 in the autumn of 1588, while £15,000 was borrowed directly from 129 
wealthy citizens in 1590 (Table 1.1). Controversy arose over a loan of 
£20,000 in August 1598: the aldermen proposed to charge (wealthier) 
householders in every ward; but the Common Council voted to raise money 
via the livery companies. Ominously, this sum was repaid nine months late. 
In December 1598, the Queen sought £150,000 towards Essex’s expedition 
to Ireland, mortgaging Crown lands as security. The loan was assessed upon 
wealthy individuals, but while the corporation rated ‘mean men’, and the 
Privy Council grilled recalcitrants, only £60,000 was raised.
3
  
 Despite the corporation’s repeated appeals for restitution, this final 
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Elizabethan loan was never repaid. In January 1603, the City was offered 
prize goods in lieu, on condition that a further loan of £20-30,000 would be 
advanced; eventually, in August 1604, the livery companies raised £14,924-
10-0. Several companies raised the money in unusual ways, which suggests 
this new levy provoked controversy: two met their quotas from their 
common treasury; three borrowed from wealthy merchants. The 
Fishmongers assessed 126 of their members, over half of whom declined to 
lend their own capital, leaving their governing body – most of whom also 
declined to pay – to underwrite the loan by advancing company funds to 
bridge the shortfall, and collecting interest from the defaulters.
1
 King James 
promised repayment of the 1604 loan when ‘the commodity of our affairs 
may give us means to discharge her [Elizabeth’s] credit’, but Parliament’s 
decision not vote supply in 1604 (Chapter 4) gave him a pretext for delay. A 
‘great number’ of lenders demanded repayment in October 1604; the 
corporation called for possession of mortgaged Crown lands, but were 
(again) offered prize goods in lieu. The 1604 loan was repaid, with two 
years’ interest, in 1606-7.2  
 The controversies over the loans of 1598 and 1604 eroded the City’s 
confidence in the Crown. The next loan, in 1608, raised £63,000 from 400 
wealthy citizens, half the sum originally requested; but Salisbury created a 
good impression by repaying this promptly, a year later.
3
 However, when 
James sought a further £100,000 in 1610, only the aldermen were assessed – 
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the livery companies were probably discouraged from contributing because 
the loan coincided with the assessment for the first tranche of the £60,000 
they were raising towards the Londonderry plantation. Repayment of the 
1610 loan was, in theory, predicated upon the customs, but was actually met 
from general Exchequer funds, in 1613-14. In the summer of 1614, after the 
failure of the Addled Parliament, there were calls for a loan of £100,000, but 
with the Cockayne project disrupting the cloth trade, Lord Mayor Sir 
Thomas Myddelton persuaded James to accept a benevolence of £10,000 
instead, half from the City Chamber, the rest from the livery companies.
1
  
******** 
 In January 1617 James asked for £100,000 for one year, to fund his 
visit to Scotland. Having declined jewels as security, the City accepted a 
bond under the Great Seal, plus the nebulous ‘royal word and promise’. The 
capital was raised from the aldermen and other rich merchants, but almost 
all the 280 lenders required the corporation to pledge its own credit, the 
same guarantee the Parisian bureau de ville offered purchasers of French 
Crown rentes.
2
 As in 1598-9, the Privy Council disciplined refusers, 
ordering five to attend the King in Scotland – whereupon four paid 
promptly – but it still took eight months to raise £96,466-13-4. This 
sluggish response earned a rebuke from the Council, and compared 
unfavourably with the East India Company’s second joint stock issue of 
January 1617, which raised £200,000 in weeks (see below).
3
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 Few expected prompt repayment of the 1617 loan: an Oxford don 
was questioned by the Privy Council for his Paul’s Cross sermon suggesting 
‘that kings might steal as well as meaner men… by borrowing and not 
paying’. Meanwhile, the corporation moved from guarantor to underwriter, 
lending £3,300 to those reluctant to venture their own capital.
1
 In fact, it was 
15 years before most lenders saw any return on their investment, and many 
only did so then because they were prepared to sell their debt, at a discount, 
to speculators prepared to invest in Crown lands. So England's first market 
for government debt evolved as a means of coping with the Crown's 
inability to establish its credible commitment.  
 In March 1618 the Crown paid one year’s interest, the only 
compensation most investors saw for over a decade. Plans to recoup the 
principal from customs revenues came to nothing, appeals for further loans 
during 1621-2 received short shrift, presumably because the trade slump of 
that year made customs receipts unattractive as collateral. In February 1623 
the City Chamber paid various aldermen £7,850 – five year’s interest on 
loans of £15,700. Humbler lenders lobbied for repayment in the autumn of 
1624, but only £10,400 of the principal was cleared before James’s death.2  
 In April 1625 Charles called for a fresh loan of £60,000. A new 
monarch could hardly be refused, but only 20 aldermen and 100 common 
councillors contributed; these loans, and those outstanding from 1617, were 
notionally secured against a mortgage of Crown lands. Over half of the new 
loan (£31,000) was borrowed from the City Chamber by the lenders, 
suggesting low investor confidence, a dismal assessment which was 
vindicated in November, when Charles failed to repay either principal or 
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interest.
1
 In June 1626, after the angry dissolution of Parliament, appeals for 
another £100,000 were rebuffed; but following threats to the City’s charter, 
the aldermen raised £20,000 for the Ordnance and the Navy, which was 
recouped from the petty customs.
2
 This, and a further £17,000 advanced to 
hire ships for the Royal Navy, exhausted the Crown’s credit with the City; 
Londoners expressed discontent by paying only 17% of their quota for the 
Forced Loan (Graph 4.7).
3
  
 Negotiations to repair Charles’s credit began in November 1626. 
Under the ‘Royal Contract’ concluded fourteen months later, Crown lands 
worth £12,500 per annum passed to the City, to clear accrued debts of 
£230,000, and to raise a further £125,000 (Chapter 2).
4
 The corporation’s 
offer to pay 6% interest on the £60,000 raised from the guilds in January 
1628 left those companies which had borrowed from private creditors 
(usually at 7-8%) slightly out of pocket. However, companies which 
assessed their membership directly for the advance experienced greater 
problems, as deadlines for payment were very tight – the wardens of five 
small companies, having failed to deliver £1,108 promptly, were briefly 
incarcerated.
5
 There were cases of outright refusal in other companies,
1
 and 
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some refractories petitioned at the start of the 1628 Parliament: a scrivener 
who complained on 27 March was apparently released promptly, as his case 
was dropped; the draper and Alderman John Chamberlain – sacked from the 
bench, fined £300 and imprisoned – petitioned the Commons, and then sued 
a writ of habeas corpus in King’s Bench.2 Nicholas Clegate, one of six 
vintners detained for refusing subscriptions totalling £275, petitioned 
Parliament (26 March) after the Privy Council denied him a writ of habeas 
corpus. The corporation claimed their right to assess rates was analogous to 
that of parliamentary taxation – although if this were the case, as Sir Edward 
Coke observed, refusers should probably have been distrained rather than 
imprisoned – but MPs condemned Clegate’s imprisonment on 25 April. A 
petition to the King was pre-empted by the prisoner's release, but he was 
still seeking compensation for his losses in 1641.
3
  
 Probably because of these complaints over refusers of the 1628 
advances, the City committee handling the Royal Contract estates resolved 
to settle the outstanding debts in reverse order: the 1628 loans were repaid 
first (in 1629), while from December 1627 the annual interest rate for the 
1617 and 1625 loans was reduced from 8% to 5%, and redemption of these 
debts only began in 1630.
4
 Even then, those who offered additional cash to 
purchase Crown lands were repaid first; others, often those in acutest 
financial straits, sold their bonds to speculators at well under par. In 1632, 
                                                            
135; Accounts of the Worshipful Company of Founders, 289; GL, 2208/1 (account for 
YEM1628). 
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  GL, 5570/2, pp.652, 655, 657. 
2
  LMA, Rep. 42, ff.55v-7, 64v, 183v; C&T Charles, I.314; PP1628, II.144, 181, 
185-6. Chamberlain’s fine (for resigning as alderman) was later reduced to 100 marks: 
LMA, Rep. 43, f.14v. 
3
  LMA, Rep. 42, ff.59v-61v, 96r-v, 99r-v; Rep. 43, f.74; Rep. 55, f.62v; LMA, 
Remembrancia 6/144-6; GL, 15201/2, pp.438-44, 447, 452-3, 455; APC, 1627-8, p.287; 
PP1628, II.119-20, 127-8, 132, 139, 181-5, 380-2; III.76-8, 208-9, 217-18; IV.51; J.R. 
Jones, ‘The Clegate case’, English Historical Review, XC (1975), pp.262-86. 
4
  LMA, Jor. 34, ff.191v, 203r-v, 265, 295v; LMA, Rep. 42, ff.167r-v, 202-3; 
LMA, CLA/44/1/7A&B; Ashton, Money Market, 142. 
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the Crown claimed this discounting breached the ‘unexpressed trust’ under 
which any surplus from the land sales was to be repaid to the Exchequer. 
Meanwhile, to add further insult, the Londonderry plantation was 
prosecuted in Star Chamber for failure to observe covenants specified in the 
grants of 1610. The City surrendered Irish estates worth £5,000 a year in 
1637, and was fined a further £12,000 to cover alleged misconduct over the 
Irish plantation and the Royal Contract.
1
  
 The chequered history of the Crown’s relations with the City explains 
why appeals for contributions to the Bishop’s Wars fell upon deaf ears. In 
March 1639, Recorder Sir Thomas Gardiner persuaded the aldermen to 
solicit the ratepayers, but only £5,000 was raised, which Lord Mayor Sir 
Maurice Abbot reckoned ‘unworthy to be presented from so rich a city’; the 
Common Council voted to deliver this sum to the King with a grievance 
petition, but Charles refused them an audience.
2
 In June 1639, shortly after 
Charles signed a truce with the Covenanters at Berwick, the Privy Council 
sought a loan of £100,000, to be repaid from the new soap and wine duties. 
Abbot and two-thirds of the aldermen refused to lend, and even those who 
agreed would not accept the contentious duties as security. The Common 
Council voted to give Charles a benevolence of £10,000 from the Chamber 
receipts, but the aldermen refused a motion to add a further £5,000 to this 
sum.
3
 In March 1640, Lord Mayor Sir Henry Garway approached the 
wealthiest City merchants for loans, but only £7,000 was raised, while seven 
                     
1
  Ashton, Money Market, 144-9; Moody, Londonderry Plantation, 211-67, 355-
69, 380-9; Strafforde Letters ed. W. Knowler (2 volumes, London, 1739), I.374. 
Speculators subsequently offered to buy the plantation at much higher rates, see J. 
Ohlmeyer ‘Strafford, the “Londonderry business” and the “New British History”’ in 
The Political World of Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford 1621-1641 ed. J.F. Merritt 
(Cambridge, 1996), pp.209-29. 
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  V. Pearl, London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution (Oxford, 1961), 
pp.94-6; BL, Add. 11045, ff.5v-8. 
3
  Pearl, London, 96-9; BL, Add. 11045, ff.31, 43v. 
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aldermen who refused to rate their wards were prosecuted in King’s Bench. 
Four months later, Garway circumvented the Common Council by 
summoning the aldermen and two representatives from each ward to 
consider another loan, but this assembly denied it had the power to levy a 
rate, and efforts to raise money from the livery companies produced nothing 
before the King’s defeat at Newburn.1  
******** 
 The Crown’s mishandling of relations with the City damaged its 
credibility as a borrower, but even if this glaring shortcoming is overlooked, 
government debt compared poorly with other investment opportunities 
(Table 1.2).
2
 Land was, as ever, the safest investment, but delivered a 
disappointing annual return; private moneylending produced up to 10% 
return on capital invested (8% from 1624), minus the transaction costs of 
chasing defaulters.
3
 While such yields were unspectacular, these 
investments were negotiable: investors could access their capital by selling 
or mortgaging land; or by assigning (good) debts to their creditors. By 
contrast, the unpredictability of the Crown’s relations with the City meant 
that there was no secondary market in government debt until the Royal 
Contract linked loans to land sales in 1628 – and even then, it was heavily 
discounted (see above).
4
  
 For an investor seeking capital growth, trade offered the best profits, 
albeit with risk. Lionel Cranfield, who made his fortune as a Merchant 
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  Pearl, London, 99-104. 
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  Stasavage, States of Credit, 72-81 analyses the econometrics of investor choice. 
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  G. Clark, ‘The Cost of Capital and medieval agricultural technique’, 
Explorations in Economic History XXV.265-94; AHEW, IV.674-94; V.ii.170-98; 
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Adventurer, reckoned the cloth trade to Germany and the Low Countries 
yielded 20% annual return on capital invested.
1
 Except during wartime, this 
was a low-risk trade, conducted over short distances, with high-volume 
sales to regular customers. Larger profits involved longer distances and 
 
Table 1.2: Investment options in Jacobean England 
 
Investment Annual return on capital 
invested 
Risks 
Land 5% Low 
Private moneylending 10% (8% from 1624) Transaction costs 
Loans to Crown Write off to 10% Unpredictable  
Trade Write off to 80% Variable 
Customs farming 15-40% Low (in peacetime) 
 
Sources: discussed in text. 
 
greater risks: in the 1580s the Muscovy Company yielded 0-30% per 
annum, but its diversification into Arctic whaling operations was much 
more remunerative, returning annual profits averaging 42% during 1609-
16.
2
 The most lucrative – but risky – trade was that conducted by the East 
India Company. One early expedition suffered total loss, but otherwise 
profits were astronomical: between 85% and 234% per voyage during 1600-
12, an annual return on capital invested of 30-80%.
3
 Thus when the 
company floated a joint stock in 1613 it raised the £100,000 initial stake in 
two weeks, while the second joint stock of January 1617 raised twice as 
much, almost as swiftly; James was (rashly) advised to appropriate some of 
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  BL, Lansdowne 152, f.175. This memorandum of 1615 took no account of the 
chaos caused by Alderman Cockayne’s project. 
2
  W.R. Scott, The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-
Stock companies to 1720 (3 volumes, 2
nd
 edition, Gloucester, MA, 1968), II.45-54; 
Chamberlain Letters, I.482. 
3
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the latter stock for his own purposes.
1
 
 Under James, merchants often diversified into customs farming, 
reaping profits comparable to those from overseas trade, without the 
associated risks of currency fluctuation, fraud, shipwreck or piracy (Table 
1.3). The growth in trade and customs revenues during the Jacobean peace 
(Graph 5.1) enriched consortia of bureaucrats, courtiers and capitalists, who 
simultaneously ran much of the nation’s trade, farmed most customs 
revenues, and advanced large sums to the Treasury on the security of Crown 
land sales and customs (Graph 1.2, Graph 5.3). These entrepreneurs handled 
up to half the annual revenues of the early Stuart state, affording them a 
systemic influence to which Parliament or the City corporation could hardly 
aspire. 
Table 1.3: Profits from customs farms, 1604-12 
 
Farm Term Annual profit (% of turnover) 
Great Farm 7YE X1611 £26,479-18-1 (17.14%) 
Sweet wines 6YE M1612 £11,673-10-4½ (35.44%) 
Currants 5YE M1610 £3,253-13-0 (16.76%) 
Unwrought cloth 
licences 
7YE M1611 £458-6-8 (31.43%) 
 
Sources: Kent HLC, U269/1/OEc6-7, 10, 18; HMC Hatfield, XXI.252. 
 
King James acknowledged the political debt he owed these men in January 
1621: ‘my customs are the best part of my revenue, and in effect, the 
substance of all I have to live on’.2 It is likely that those who raised a storm 
over customs and impositions were aware that the rule of law might be 
superseded by the allure of capital – Chapter 5 will focus on the political 
controversies which erupted around these questions. 
                     
1
  Chamberlain Letters, I.488; II.53; CSP Colonial EI, 1617-21, pp.133, 222; 
TNA, SP14/90/54; Ashton, Money Market, 76. 
2  
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54 
 
Sale of Honours  
 The early modern state was bombarded with a constant stream of 
revenue projects formulated by bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, optimists and 
charlatans, who promised the Crown a significant income, in return for a 
grant of monopoly rights and a share of the profits to the projector. Most 
schemes were never implemented, while few of those that were yielded 
significant income for the Exchequer. This provoked extensive complaints 
in Parliament, particularly in 1601 and 1621, thanks to which monopolies 
have received extensive scrutiny from historians. Yet while we know a great 
deal about these controversies, less information survives about the 
implementation and profitability of patents, the very factors which explain 
their unpopularity. In most instances, the projectors reaped the lion's share 
of the spoils, while the Crown bore the opprobrium for approving projects  
 
Table 1.4 Estimated yield from sales of honour, 1603-29 
 
Type of honour Number Revenue Beneficiaries 
Knighthood 3100 £120,000 Courtiers 
Baronetcy 92  
199  
£100,485 
£46,000 
Exchequer 
Courtiers 
English peerages 144 £46,000 
£254,000 
Exchequer 
Courtiers 
Irish & Scottish peerages 35 £45,000 Courtiers 
TOTALS  £146,485 (24%) 
£465,000 (76%) 
Exchequer 
Courtiers 
 
Source: Stone, Crisis of the Aristocracy, 127; TNA, E401. 
 
of questionable social or economic value. This section will examine one 
category of projects, the sale of honours, which yielded the Exchequer 
around 25% of the revenues raised (Table 1.4), but did significant damage 
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to the Crown's relations with its own social elites. 
******** 
 In early modern England, unlike much of Europe, noble status was 
conferred by social convention rather than privileges defined by the 
monarch.
1
 Contemporary theorists identified the English elites as the gentry 
and peerage, yet disagreed over the empirical qualifications required for 
gentility. The barrister John Ferne exemplified the conservative viewpoint:  
 the worthy merits of any man born of unnoble parents cannot make 
him a perfect gentleman, although thereby he may condignly 
deserve by law to possess both ensign and title of gentleness… (I 
say a gentleman of blood, endued with virtues is to be preferred 
before all others in the receiving of a dignity, offices or rule in the 
commonweal). 
 
Sir Thomas Smith offered a less exclusive definition: 
 whosoever studieth the laws of the realm, who studieth in the 
universities, who professeth liberal sciences, and to be short, who can 
live idly and without manual labour, and will bear the port, charge 
and countenance of a gentleman… shall be taken for a gentleman. 
 
Claims to gentle status were regulated by the royal heralds, who awarded 
fresh grants of arms, recorded existing pedigrees and (from 1552) issued 
public disclaimers of those who could not furnish the requisite ancestry.
2
 
These powers could have sown discord among the elites if implemented 
strictly, but heralds bolstered their income through a liberal definition of 
gentility, and a Jacobean project to charge fees for the ratification of 
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  M.L. Bush, Noble Privilege (Manchester, 1983), pp.27-64; J. Dewald, The 
European Nobility, 1400-1800 (Cambridge, 1996), pp.15-107; The European Nobilities 
in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries ed. H.M. Scott (2 volumes, Harlow, Essex, 
2006). 
2
  J. Ferne, Blazon of Gentrie (London, 1586), pp.22-3; T. Smith, De Republica 
Anglorum ed. M. Dewar (Cambridge, 1982), 72; J.P. Cooper, Land, Men and Beliefs ed. 
G.E. Aylmer and J.S. Morrill (London, 1983), pp.43-77; L. Stone, The Crisis of the 
Aristocracy (Oxford, 1965), pp.66-9; F. Heal and C. Holmes, The Gentry in England 
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armigerous status was not implemented.
1
 Even Ferne, champion of the 
virtues of lineage, waived his exacting social standards in one instance – his 
own – insisting that barristers required no proof of gentle ancestry. In 
practice, this argument would have been rejected by the heralds; and thus 
the pedigree Ferne’s father registered artfully concealed his descent from a 
Staffordshire yeoman.
2
  
******** 
 The rise in gentry numbers during the 16
th
 century increased 
pressures for social differentiation beyond the degree of esquire. 
Knighthoods and peerages were the exclusive preserve of the Crown and its 
plenipotentiaries,
3
 but the Tudors, particularly Elizabeth, dubbed knights 
sparingly (Graph 1.1). This was a source of frustration to many ambitious 
families: in 1601 Joan Thynne informed her husband ‘my brother [Henry] 
Townshend shall be knighted; if it be true I can be but sorry that your 
standing and credit at Court cannot procure you as much grace as he were 
[in]’.4 The impact of Elizabeth’s policy can be seen in Yorkshire, where Sir 
George Savile of Thornhill was the last head of a gentry family known to 
have been knighted by the Queen in person, while serving as sheriff of 
Yorkshire in 1587. Of the 15 Yorkshire sheriffs the Queen pricked 
thereafter, only four were knights at the time of their appointment. The rest 
were from prominent families – two were heirs to peerages – but only two  
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  Stone, Crisis of the Aristocracy, 69-71. 
2
  HoP1604, IV.244; TNA, C142/313/69; Doncaster Courtier ed. A. Brent 
(Doncaster, Yorkshire, 1994), p.22; Ferne, Blazon of Gentrie, 38-44. Ferne’s uncle’s 
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4
  Two Elizabethan Women: correspondence of Joan and Maria Thynne, 1575-
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p.19. Townshend was not actually knighted until 1604: Shaw, Knights, II.133 
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more were knighted before 1603. The situation altered swiftly after James’s 
accession: within two years, all except William Wentworth were knighted, 
ennobled or dead (Table 1.5).
1
 
 
Table 1.5 Yorkshire Sheriffs (1586-1602) and their 
Honours 
 
Year of  
Shrievalty 
 
Name 
Year of 
Knighthood 
Other 
Information 
1586-7 Sir George Savile 1587 Baronet 1611 
1587-8 Robert Aske  Died early 1590s 
1588-9 Sir Richard Mauleverer 1584  
1589-90 Sir John Dawnay 1580  
1590-1 Philip Constable 1603  
1591-2 Richard Goodrick  Died 1601 
1592-3 Sir William Mallory 1560  
1593-4 Ralph Eure  3
rd
 Baron Eure 
1594 
1594-5 Francis Vaughan  Died c.1599 
1595-6 Sir Christopher Hildyard 1578  
1596-7 Francis Boynton 1603  
1597-8 Thomas Lascelles 1600  
1598-9 Marmaduke Grimston 1603  
1599-
1600 
Robert Swift 1603  
1600-1 Francis Clifford K.B. 1605 4
th
 Earl of 
Cumberland 1605 
1601-2 William Wentworth   Baronet 1611 
1602-3 Thomas Strickland K.B. 1603  
 
Sources: List of Sheriffs (List and Index Society IX) compiled A. Hughes (New York, NY, 
1963), p.163; W.A. Shaw, Knights of England (2 volumes, London, 1906); Complete 
Baronetage ed. G.E. Cokayne (5 volumes, Exeter, Devon, 1900); Dugdale’s Visitation of 
Yorkshire ed. J.W Clay (3 volumes, Exeter, Devon, 1917), I.54. 
 
 The cascade of knighthoods James showered upon his English 
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  Shaw, Knights, I.155, II.85, 100-1; List of Sheriffs, 163. John Savile of Howley 
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subjects in 1603 (Graph 1.1) were intended to manufacture instant loyalty to 
the new dynasty, but his actions created as many problems as his 
predecessor’s inaction. Only weeks into the reign, the (un-knighted) courtier 
Philip Gawdy unfairly sneered that most of the northerners dubbed at York 
were ‘of much ess worth’ than Elizabeth’s knights; in fact, almost all of the 
21 Yorkshiremen honoured on this occasion were heads of county families.
1
 
However, the situation changed after James arrived in London, when the 
recently dubbed Sir William Woodhouse offered to procure his Norfolk 
countryman Henry Gawdy a knighthood for £50; instead, Gawdy paid 
‘somewhat roundly’ (over £500) to distinguish himself from the common 
herd of 432 knights bachelor created at the Coronation, by securing a 
knighthood of the Bath.
2
 James restrained his generosity somewhat 
thereafter, but was never as discriminating as Elizabeth in his choice of 
knights. In 1617 it was said (in London) that he dubbed so many 
Yorkshiremen on his journey to Scotland, that ‘there is scant left an esquire 
to uphold the race’. This was unfair, as the 24 Yorkshiremen knighted that 
summer included John Hotham and Marmaduke Wyvell, recent inheritors of 
large estates, and local officials including Sheriff Michael Warton, William 
Ingram and William Ellis of the Council in the North, Lord Mayor Robert 
Askwith and Recorder Richard Hutton of York.
3
  
 While complaints about the humble origins of Jacobean knights were 
often unfounded, the cost of the honour was undeniable: a list of fees, 
formalised in 1604, stipulated payment of around £50 to a long list of 
courtiers, from £5 shared among the Gentlemen Ushers to 10s. for the Court 
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  Letters of Philip Gawdy (Roxburge Club CXLVIII) ed. I.H. Jeayes (London, 
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2
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Jester.
1
 Sir Thomas Lake admitted these were an ‘over-great… exaction’, 
but in 1612 and 1624 the courtiers involved pooled their resources to sue 
dozens who had refused payment.
2
 The private traffic with courtiers, 
bureaucrats and tradesmen in order to secure a knighthood was also 
perceived as undignified. In 1606 Arthur Ingram (not yet knighted himself) 
was dealing in nominations wholesale, valuing half a dozen at £373-1-8; 
while in 1611 Queen Anne’s secretary William Fowler sued Thomas 
Humphrey, knighted at James’s Coronation, for payment of £100.3   
 This disreputable trade was exposed in 1618, when the courtier Sir 
George Marshall sued his brother-in-law Sir William Pope for payment for 
his role in securing Pope’s nomination as a Knight of the Bath in 1603. 
Pope denied the allegation, insisting his wife had approached Lord 
Chamberlain Suffolk (one of the official selection committee); the case 
looked set for dismissal until the King personally vouched for Marshall’s 
role to Lord Chancellor Bacon, who awarded the plaintiff a fee of 1,000 
marks in November 1620.
4
 Five months later Pope petitioned the Commons, 
when a dozen MPs (with only one dissenter) attacked the sale of honours in 
general. James abandoned Marshall, claiming that he ‘knoweth not how the 
letter [to Bacon was] gotten from him, condemneth the course and giveth 
consent to the taking off the file the decree’. The execution of Marshall’s 
decree was suspended indefinitely by royal order on 1 February 1622 – not 
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  CSPD, 1603-10, p.284; HMC Hatfield, XXI.142; Northamptonshire RO, 
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  Shaw, Knights, II.115; HMC Sackville/Knole, I.123; TNA, REQ2/397/36. See 
also TNA, C2/Jas.I/F2/54. 
4
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quite the official erasure James had originally conceded. The decree was 
re-examined by the Commons in 1626 and 1628, but James's action 
ensured that Marshall never got his money.
1
  
******** 
 While courtiers reaped the financial benefit of knighthood 
nominations, the Crown’s financial problems encouraged new proposals to 
channel profits from the sale of honours to the Exchequer. The order of  
 
 
 
baronetcy was inaugurated in 1611 as a revenue-raising device, with a price 
of £1,095 (Graph 1.2).
2
 This was justified by making the title hereditary,  
by granting baronets precedence over the ever-expanding cohort of knights, 
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  PD1621, I.342; CJ, I.599; C33/141, f.542; PP1626, III.145, 150, 152; PP1628, 
III.469, 475. See also CD1621, II.329-30, 333; III.111-16; IV.283-5; V.106-9, 123-6, 
357; VI.151-7, 397; VII.596-8.  
2
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and by undertaking to create a maximum of 200 titles. As a gesture towards 
social exclusivity, candidates were required to certify that their paternal 
grandfathers had been armigerous, and that they were worth at least £1,000 
a year, social qualifications which were still being enforced in 1623, when 
Sir Thomas Harris, Bt. of Boreatton, Shropshire was prosecuted in the Earl 
Marshal’s court for concealing his plebeian origins.1 
 The first tranche of baronets, closely vetted by the earls of Salisbury 
and Northampton, were created in 1611-12; they included seven 
Yorkshiremen. William Wentworth, the only Elizabethan Sheriff not 
honoured since James’s accession, was granted seniority on 29 June, ahead 
of Sir George Savile of Thornhill (whose heir was Wentworth’s son-in-law), 
and Wentworth’s youthful neighbour Sir Francis Wortley. Sir Henry 
Belasyse and William Constable took precedence in the North and East 
Ridings respectively, while Sir Marmaduke Wyvell, a relative of the 
Yorkshire magnate Lord Scrope, secured a grant on 25 November 1611.
2
 
The other Yorkshire baronet of 1611, Sir Henry Savile of Methley, was 
nominated by Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Julius Caesar (his father-in-
law), who wished both to ensure the financial success of the scheme, and 
also to provide an hereditary dignity for his newborn Savile grandson. Sir 
Henry, meanwhile, was preoccupied with his social standing: 
 for my place amongst my countrymen I desire neither to be first nor 
last; I can be content to follow Mr. [William] Wentworth & Sir 
Henry Belasyse, for any other I yet hear of I may without any great 
                     
1
  Stone, Crisis of the Aristocracy, 78-9, 84-5; P. Croft ‘The Catholic Gentry, the 
Earl of Salisbury and the Baronets of 1611’ in Conformity and Orthodoxy in the English 
Church c.1560-1660 ed. P. Lake and M.C. Questier (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2000), 
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pedigree requirement. 
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  Complete Baronetage, I.30, 43-4, 48-9, 55, 103. Yorkshire baronets are listed in 
P. Roebuck, Yorkshire Baronets 1640-1760, pp.367-9, who overlooks the order of 
precedence laid out in Complete Baronetage. 
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incongruity be ranked afore them. 
  
The implication of the letter was that Caesar should secure him precedence 
over Sir George Savile, head of his own family, while allowing him to 
deny any accusation of self-promotion. In the event, Sir Henry was ranked 
last among the six Yorkshire baronets created on 29 June.
1
 
 At Whitehall it was held that the privileges the new honour 
conferred ‘seem somewhat in sound, and [yet] are nothing in substance’, 
but their impact in the provinces was divisive, as baronets vaulted ahead 
of knights on public commissions. The barons, whose younger sons were 
to have been outranked by the new order, secured precedence after 
complaint to the Privy Council in April 1612, a seniority which was 
extended to Privy Councillors and the Westminster judges. In Yorkshire, 
Sir Henry Belasyse and Sir Henry Savile demanded precedence over the 
Justices of the Council in the North, but the assize judges, deputed to 
investigate in 1614, ruled against them, whereupon they pleaded ‘rather to 
be put from the Council than to serve the King to his prejudice and their 
own dishonours’. The Council’s next commission in 1616 restricted the 
Justices’ precedence to judicial and public functions, precisely the 
occasions on which the baronets wished to establish their superiority.
2
  
 The one group offered no relief was knights, whose dignity had 
been summarily superseded. On 23 May 1614 the Commons debated a 
petition which condemned baronetcy as ‘a temporal simony and 
dishonourable to the state’. Secretary Winwood protested that this 
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constituted an attack on the prerogative, but the issue was referred to a 
committee stuffed with knights, and when Sir Anthony Cope (Bt.) 
complained of this partiality, Sir Jerome Horsey (knight) quipped, ‘he 
speaks for his penny’. The early dissolution quashed this investigation, but 
complaints against baronetcy resurfaced in 1621, during the Marshall v. 
Pope investigation. Secretary Calvert made it clear that James’s offer to 
compromise over Marshall’s case was conditional upon termination of the 
investigation into baronets, and the cause was dropped, ‘not without some 
muttering that it was a grievance to the gentry’.1  
 
 
 
 The status of baronetcies was affected when sales were revived in 
1618, as the Crown started waiving payment of the £1,095 fee to the  
Exchequer (Graph 1.3), and procurement became the exclusive preserve of 
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enterprising courtiers and social climbers. Most of the fresh creations were 
nominated by members of the Villiers affinity, who must be presumed to 
have reaped the financial rewards – anecdotal evidence suggests the price 
was quickly discounted to around £250. Sales were still brisk in 
Yorkshire, where the original seven baronets were joined by a further nine 
in 1618-22. However, none save Sir John Hotham was from a leading 
county family, and several eminent Yorkshiremen, having missed the 
opportunity to claim precedence in 1611, eschewed the honour altogether, 
including Sir John Savile, the Fairfaxes, the Slingsbys, Sir Christopher 
Hildyard and even Sir Arthur Ingram, erstwhile peddler of knighthoods.  
 Tales of snobbery relating to baronetcies began to circulate freely. 
In 1620 Sir Samuel Tryon sought a baronetcy to secure precedence over 
his brother-in-law, the London Alderman Sir Sebastian Harvey. When his 
overtures via Sir William Alexander, the Scottish Secretary of State, 
foundered because of difficulties in proving the gentle origins of his Dutch 
ancestors, he turned to his brother-in-law Sir Francis Crane, who had 
purchased the nomination of four baronetcies from a Household servant. 
John Barker of Suffolk had his suit delayed by his younger half-brother, 
who wanted precedence for his own baronetcy; while Hugh Myddelton 
had the Wardrobe official Sir Bevis Thelwall procure his patent in secret, 
so he could claim it had been a personal reward from the King, for 
services rendered.
1
  
 In Cheshire, baronetcy became the political badge of one gentry 
faction – their rivals acquired Irish peerages (see below). In Yorkshire, 
however, social tensions did not align with political rivalries so neatly. 
During the 1626 Parliament Sir John Savile took a crafty swipe at his 
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rival, Sir Thomas Wentworth (2
nd
 Bt.), with a motion that baronets should 
be rated at £100 minimum for subsidies. However, in 1628, it was 
Wentworth’s ally William Mallory who proposed a minimum subsidy 
rating of £50 for baronets: he was backed by Sir Thomas Hoby and two 
baronets; but Wentworth protested that only aliens and recusants had been 
burdened with such quotas. The motion was adopted, but Sir Robert 
Phelips’s report commended the role of certain baronets in opposing the 
Forced Loan, and at the vote, ‘to that clause for English baronets, the 
House cried, away with it’. Wentworth, one of the baronets to whom 
Phelips had referred, and doubtless the orchestrator of this rejection, 
allowed himself a moment of self-congratulation: ‘I should have been 
sorry to have gone from this House with any mark of displeasure upon 
me’.1 
******** 
 In the second half of James’s reign, disputes about status shifted from 
knights and baronets to peerages. In 1603-4, James distributed titles among 
those who assisted his uncontested succession, but made only a handful of 
creations for money or upon inheritance of estates (Graph 1.4). This 
changed abruptly with the rise of the ambitious but (initially) untitled 
Villiers family at Court: during 1616-29, eighty individuals were ennobled 
or elevated within the English peerage, most of whom were either members 
of the favourite’s affinity, or paid him handsomely for the honour. The older 
nobility bitterly resented this dilution of their order, but it was impossible to 
criticise this abuse of the prerogative without offending James.  
 At the start of the 1621 Parliament, the English peers discovered an 
avenue of protest which touched the King’s honour less directly: the sale of  
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Irish and Scottish peerages to Englishmen who held neither land nor office 
in either kingdom. Where English peerages fetched £8,000 to £10,000 
apiece in 1620, Buckingham’s servants accepted £1,000 to £2,000 for a 
‘foreign’ barony or a viscountcy at this time. As an agreement made after 
James’s accession allowed English holders of ‘foreign’ titles to claim 
precedence over Englishmen of lower rank, purchasers could leapfrog 
their rivals at a substantial discount.
1
 This grievance took practical form 
after James sold two Scottish viscountcies and four Irish baronies to 
Englishmen between May and December 1620.
2
 The Venetian ambassador 
wondered whether this was done ‘to render the old ones [English peers] 
less proud’, but instead, it prompted the English barons to circulate a 
grievance petition at the start of the 1621 Parliament. This was signed by 
33 barons – almost every member of the baronage present at Westminster 
who was not a Privy Councillor or Household official – and six English 
earls, whose eldest sons lost precedence to the Scottish viscounts.
3
 
According to the French ambassador, Buckingham, learning of this 
petition before it was presented, accused the ringleaders, the earls of 
Salisbury and Dorset, of plotting to oppose the prerogative, which they 
vehemently denied. In the Lords on 20 February, Prince Charles pressed 
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Lord Hunsdon to surrender the petition; he declined, and Lord Sheffield 
even suggested it should be forwarded to the Commons. That afternoon, 
Dorset surrendered the original to Prince Charles and the Council. The 
King, interviewing each signatory individually on their knees, was 
infuriated when they claimed parliamentary privilege, and the earls of 
Oxford and Southampton were later recalled to have left in tears. 
Buckingham, it was said, argued that Dorset and Salisbury should be sent 
to the Tower, but James correctly judged that the impetus of the protest 
had been dissipated, and the petition was laid aside without further royal 
intervention.
1
 
 The old nobility’s sense of grievance still simmered, bursting out 
briefly in the Lords on 8 May 1621 when the Earl of Arundel opposed 
allowing Sir Henry Yelverton to speak in mitigation of the crimes for 
which he had been impeached. While arguing that due process should be 
followed, Lord Spencer (a Jacobean creation) unkindly recalled that two of 
Arundel’s own ancestors had been attainted in similar circumstances. The 
earl retorted that ‘my ancestors have suffered and it may be for doing the 
King and country good service, and in such time as (when) perhaps the 
lord’s ancestors that spake last kept sheep’; he was committed to the 
Tower for this insult. This was hardly a simple clash of old and new, as 
Arundel, who aimed to spare the King embarrassment at Yelverton’s 
hands, found himself lionised by adherents of the parvenu Buckingham, 
and was rewarded with an appointment as Earl Marshal, which allowed 
him to revive the Court of Chivalry.
2
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 Parliament had no sooner adjourned for the summer than James 
exercised his prerogative power again, by awarding the Welsh courtier Sir 
John Vaughan an Irish barony. However, when further Irish peerages were 
created in 1622, two of the four Englishmen nominated did not receive 
their grants. In May 1624, MPs debated whether to allow Viscount 
Grandison precedence over two English barons named in the subsidy bill. 
No vote was taken on this question, but in the lists of subsidy 
commissioners, no ‘foreign’ peer was permitted to outrank any English 
peer. Six more Englishmen secured Irish peerages in 1624-5, but Charles’s 
advancement of numerous English barons to earldoms at his Coronation 
may have defused tensions.
1
 One of the articles of Buckingham’s 
impeachment charges of May 1626 urged the King to bestow titles ‘upon 
such virtuous and industrious persons as had merited them by their faithful 
service’, a form of words which was deliberately circumspect, as witnesses 
were reluctant to testify against the favourite. The prospect of a futile 
clash led the Commons to confine themselves to a single allegation on this 
point, that Lord Robartes had been bullied into buying his title.
2
  
 In the first four years of his reign, Charles awarded two Scottish 
baronies, two Irish baronies and 14 Irish viscountcies to Englishmen, 
while Baron Vaughan was raised to the earldom of Carbery, and Sir 
William Pope created Earl of Downe. Early in the 1628 Parliament, John 
Holles (Earl of Clare in the English peerage since 1626) reported ‘the 
barons purpose a fling against the new English-Irish nobility’, but the 
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controversy over the Petition of Right caused this issue to be laid aside.
1
 
Buckingham’s assassination removed the chief promoter and beneficiary 
of peerage sales from the political landscape, and the English House of 
Lords took up the cudgels over ‘foreign’ titles on 9 February 1629, when 
Lord Fauconberg made ‘a temperate and discreet motion’; nevertheless, 
the debate stagnated until Lord Montagu broke the ice: 
 If this courtesy to them be now taken for a right by those that are 
advanced to the nobility of those nations, residing and abiding 
amongst us, to the disinherision of all the nobility of England, for 
our places are our inheritance, to them it may not remain so much as 
a courtesy. 
 
After much discussion, it was unanimously agreed to petition the King that 
‘no foreign nobility hath any right of precedency before any peer of this 
kingdom’. Yet one commentator observed, ‘the King cannot in honour 
grant it; if he do, the barons will not only take place of these viscounts, but 
their sons are resolved to do it’. The difficulties this petition might cause 
were illustrated when a fresh patent for the ennoblement of the 
Yorkshireman Sir Thomas Fairfax as an Irish Viscount was discovered in 
the Signet Office; his defender was none other than Fauconberg.
2
  
 The petition delivered on 17 February asked Charles not to grant 
‘foreign’ titles to Englishmen in future; warned against giving strangers a 
voice in the Irish Parliament; criticised the new peers as being ‘of meaner 
quality, in whom little cause appears but ambition to precede others’; and 
urged him not to devalue the honours system, which might invite 
‘contempt to nobility itself’. Charles asked for time to consider his answer, 
but reminded the peers that ‘there is a greater difficulty to reverse a thing 
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that is done, than to prevent it’.1 By this time, the Irish viscount George 
Chaworth was urging other ‘foreign’ peers to hasten to London, warning 
that loss of precedence would leave them without any status at all. On 24 
February Chaworth and three other Irish viscounts – Savile, Lumley and 
Monson – delivered a counter-petition which insisted that the ‘foreign’ 
nobles were ‘anciently barons of this realm, or gentlemen of the best rank, 
even from the Conquest’, and asked for time to consider their response; 
Charles enigmatically gave ‘no answer but a smile’.2  
 After the angry dissolution of Parliament, Chaworth spread a 
damaging rumour that the English peers had planned to censure ‘foreign’ 
honours on 10 March – the similarity to Eliot’s protestation of 2 March 
(Chapter 5) was clearly designed to alarm the King. Not every ‘foreign’ 
peer rallied to the cause: Viscount Scudamore opted to stay in 
Herefordshire; Viscount Kilmorey insisted he should be exempted from 
any censure, having owned Irish estates since the 1590s; while Downe and 
Carbery believed their earldoms raised them above this controversy. 
However, Viscount Monson – all too eager to defend his honour – had to 
be restrained from duelling with Lords Mandeville and Paulet, for having 
jostled him at Westminster Abbey.
3
  
 With advice from Attorney-General Heath, Chaworth, Savile and 
Lumley drafted a carefully-worded petition, submitted in April, which 
appealed to ‘your Majesty’s care to preserve your own undoubted 
prerogative and the honour of your own acts’. At this time, Arundel was 
said to be the ‘mortal adversary’ of the ‘foreign’ peers, while Lord Keeper 
Coventry and Lord Treasurer Weston denigrated the Irish peers’ petition 
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before the King. Heath advised his clients to pursue a less direct approach, 
as Charles was ‘naturally slow & loves not to be hastened’. Thus Savile 
gave the King a list of precedents relating to ‘foreign’ peerages – 
including the 1621 petition – while the Countess of Denbigh 
(Buckingham's sister), whose younger son had recently inherited the Irish 
earldom of Desmond, and whose husband was the only dissenter from the 
Lords’ petition delivered on 17 February, gave the King a breviate of the 
Irish peers’ case.1 Charles resolved the dispute with an Order in Council 
on 28 June: Irish viscounts were granted precedence in theory, but 
removed from public office in practice, and none was thenceforth to be 
included on local commissions without special order.
2
  
******** 
 In 1658, Gervase Holles recalled that his uncle John Holles, Earl of 
Clare, had called the sale of honours ‘temporal simony’. 
 I once took the liberty… to ask him why he would purchase himself, 
seeing he condemned the King for selling. He answered that he 
observed merit to be no medium to an honorary reward, that he saw 
divers persons who he thought deserved it as little as he (either in 
their persons or estates) by that means leap over his head, and 
therefore seeing the market open and finding his purse not 
unfurnished for it, he was persuaded to ware his money as other men 
had done.
3
 
 
Such views were not merely the product of rueful reminiscence: in 1621 the 
lawyer Christopher Brooke likened Sir George Marshall’s sale of 
knighthood to payment of fees for arranged marriages, which were invalid 
at law ‘because the contract was to procure affection, which cannot be 
valued’. The affection Brooke questioned was James’s, and the King’s 
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willingness to vouch for Marshall in Chancery (and then to deny his action 
when challenged) suggests a cynical disregard for the honours system, of 
which his subjects were abundantly aware. It was Charles – for all his 
reputation for insensitivity – who rectified the situation: his adroit 
handling of the confrontation over the sale of Irish peerages proved to be a 
watershed, and the unrestrained sale of honours was not resumed until the 
eve of the Civil War.
1
 
 
Conclusion  
 Credit and projects became politically sensitive issues for opposing 
reasons. The payment of interest on government debt should have been one 
of the highest priorities for the Crown's tax revenues, as this would have 
encouraged private investors to start treating them as negotiable 
instruments, circulating at a cash value which reflected public confidence in 
the government’s solvency. However, until 1613 investors could expect to 
be repaid tardily, if at all, usually without interest. This meant that the Privy 
Council had to apply a significant level of compulsion to procure 
compliance, and that a secondary market in government debt never 
developed. The investors of 1617 and 1625, promised better treatment, were 
disappointed: having received almost no dividends until 1628, they were 
then paid in land, and unless they had the resources to 'double up' their 
contribution, they were expected to cash in their debts at a discount, 
depriving them of much of the interest they were due. 
 The problem with projects was precisely the opposite: the Crown 
ascribed an exclusively financial value to commodities many regarded as 
social assets. No-one disputed that the Crown had the right to confer 
honours, to fine recusants, to control the manufacture and trade of 
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commodities such as grain or cattle, or the maintenance of infrastructure 
such as roads, bridges, lighthouses, inns and alehouses.
1
 Yet when the 
enforcement of such regulation was subcontracted to private individuals – 
often courtiers – who focussed on maximising their own profit and ignored 
issues of the public good, outrage quickly ensued; hence the number of 
projects which flourished for a few years, but were then suppressed. 
 What do these failures tell us about attempts at fiscal reform? 
Revenues were neither sufficiently buoyant nor well-managed to allow the 
Crown to borrow its way out of trouble; while innovative projects, even 
where they produced occasional windfalls, were unlikely to resolve the 
long-term problems of low revenue yields, either. The Crown's best 
financial brains, such as Dorset, Salisbury, Caesar, Cranfield and Weston, 
realised that major structural reforms were needed to secure significant 
increases in the Crown's existing revenues, and it is to these we must now 
turn. 
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CHAPTER II: CROWN ESTATES 
 
 The Crown’s ancient demesnes produced around £42,000 a year 
under Henry VII, a figure dwarfed by the revenues from the ex-monastic 
and chantry estates acquired during 1536-48, which yielded perhaps 
£136,000 annually.
1
 This new endowment, if properly managed – the court 
of Augmentations was established to circumvent the cumbersome ‘ancient 
course’ of the Exchequer – had the potential to liberate the Tudor state 
from its dependence upon Parliament for extraordinary finance. The 
squandering of this opportunity was a fiscal and political failure all too 
rarely commented upon by historians.
2
  
 In fairness, contemporaries rarely discussed mismanagement, an 
omission which is the more remarkable because important aspects of such 
shortcomings must have been common knowledge: immediately prior to 
the Crown’s seizures, many clerical landlords sealed long leases of their 
estates at discounted values, depressing rents for decades thereafter; huge 
alienations of these estates occurred during the French and Scottish wars 
of 1542-62; while the heavy burden of pensions due to ex-monastic 
inmates depressed the Crown’s net land revenues for a generation after the 
Dissolution. This last consideration can be quantified: in 1551, net receipts 
for the court of Augmentations were only 40% of gross land revenues; in 
1560, the Exchequer received 67% of ex-monastic gross revenues; and 
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only in 1572 did this proportion rise to a more conventional 85%. The 
death of clerical pensioners improved net revenues without any 
administrative effort, which bred complacency. Thus net yields rose 
sharply under Elizabeth, but gross revenues increased only slightly: land 
revenues of around £115,000 per annum in 1560 rose to £142,000 in the 
later 1590s; but sales reduced this figure to £123,000 in 1641.
1
  
 By European standards, the Crown estates were a disappointment: 
in Denmark, profits from demesnes and Sound tolls enabled Christian IV 
to evade constitutional restrictions imposed upon him in 1596; while in 
France, the duc de Sully sought to redress decades of abuse by 
repurchasing royal demesnes in 1607-10.
2
 The English Crown’s failures 
must also have been glaringly obvious to private landowners, whose 
incomes doubled or trebled during 1560-1640, while royal land revenues 
stagnated. Two lords treasurer, the earls of Dorset (1598-1608) and 
Salisbury (1608-12) – themselves improving landlords – attempted to 
apply a range of modern management practices to the Crown estates: the 
first option was to increase annual rental income through acquisition, new 
agricultural techniques or rent increases; secondly, low rental value could 
be offset by maximising revenues from windfalls such as tenurial reforms, 
entry fines, profits of manorial courts, timber resources and mills; third, 
tenants could be obliged to compound for some real or notional 
shortcoming in their lease; finally, land could be sold, preferably at rates 
which reflected the purchaser’s hopes for increased revenue potential. This 
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chapter will explain why the first three options proved unworkable for the 
royal demesne, leaving land sales as the only viable policy during the 
crisis years of 1542-62, and again with increasing frequency after 1590.
1
 
 Until recently, it was difficult to undertake a systematic examination 
of the politics of the royal demesnes, because there was no coherent study 
of the early modern Crown estates as an economic, social or institutional 
entity. In 1992, this important question was addressed by a volume on The 
Estates of the English Crown, 1558-1640, which still dominates the field.
2
 
Many of its conclusions about the shortcomings of royal estate 
management policies, the handling of land sales to preserve existing 
revenue, and the reactions of Crown tenants and others to shifting 
initiatives are adopted here, but this chapter also examines policymaking 
and the incidence of political controversy over the Crown estates, issues 
considered only briefly in the 1992 volume.
3
 Two important conclusions 
should be noted at the outset: first, the statistics for revenues, where they 
can be accurately charted,
4
 show that the Crown’s fiscal and political 
imperatives sometimes contradicted each other: defective title 
proceedings, which generated revenues averaging a little over £6,200 a 
year during 1603-40, were hardly worth the complaints they provoked;
5
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whereas initiatives such as tenurial reforms and land sales had huge 
economic and social impact, but were barely noticed in political debate. 
Secondly, it is difficult to believe that the same political elites who 
pursued improvements to their own estates with vigour were completely 
ignorant of the scale of mismanagement or undervaluation of the royal 
demesne; in fact, their silence suggests an awareness of the scale of the 
profits they stood to make from the Crown’s shortcomings, either as 
tenants or as purchasers of Crown lands. 
 
Annual Rentals  
 Land rentals were the mainstay of the Crown’s ordinary finances, 
funding much of the royal Court, and providing rewards to courtiers, either 
in cash, or in the form of Crown leases at preferential rates, which were 
usually sold on to the sitting tenant. As private landowners were well aware, 
rents could be increased in several ways, although Queen Elizabeth and her 
ministers proved unable or unwilling to exploit many of the opportunities 
open to them. 
  The most effective way in which the Crown could have increased its 
annual revenues was by improving its own estates, in emulation of many 
private landowners. As the royal demesnes were not cultivated directly, 
micro-economic agricultural innovations such as manuring, new crops and 
four or five year annual rotations offered no benefit.
1
 However, larger 
capital projects were undertaken in partnership with private entrepreneurs: 
disafforestation and fen drainage, where successful, realised huge profits for 
entrepreneurs, and provided the Crown with large tracts of newly-improved 
land, but most were quickly sold rather than used to enhance land revenues.
2
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The Crown took over the drainage of the Great Fens from the Earl of 
Bedford's syndicate in 1638, in hope of significant revenue increases, but 
technical problems and opposition from the fenmen meant that the project 
did not realise a profit for decades.
1
 Other projects had some success: 
following considerable capital investment, the Yorkshire alum works, the 
New River Company and the Cardiganshire silver mines all returned annual 
profits for the Crown;
2
 while the Duchy of Lancaster’s support for the free 
miners of the Derbyshire Peak District, against the wishes of local 
landowners, yielded the Crown the ‘ninth dish’ (11%) of lead ore 
production, worth around £1,000 a year.
3
 
 As feudal overlord, the Crown could claim the forfeiture of an estate 
by escheat if a subject died without heirs. The most conspicuous example 
under the early Stuarts was that of the Dudley estates formerly held by the 
Elizabethan earls of Leicester and Warwick, which were seized by the 
Crown after the illegitimate heir, Sir Robert Dudley, fled to the Continent 
in 1605. However, as most escheats originally derived from the Crown 
estates, and many were redistributed to other courtiers, such acquisitions 
made little long-term difference to land revenues.
4
 In the century to 1550 
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the Crown made huge gains from the attainder of traitors, but there were 
fewer seizures thereafter. The lands of the Neville earls of Westmoreland 
remained with the Crown after the 1569 rebellion, but the Percy estates 
were returned to the family, and the Howards eventually regained most of 
the patrimony forfeited at the execution of the Duke of Norfolk in 1572. 
Under James, Sir Walter Raleigh’s estate at Sherborne, Dorset was seized 
by the Crown and sold to the favourite Robert Carr, Earl of Somerset; 
recovered after his disgrace, it was then assigned to John Digby, Earl of 
Bristol in lieu of his ambassadorial expenses.
1
  
 Medieval monarchs habitually replenished their estates through acts 
of resumption revoking earlier Crown grants, usually those made during a 
royal minority or by an earlier regime; the last such English statute was 
passed in 1515. In Scotland successive royal minorities ensured regular 
revocations, most recently in 1587. Charles inaugurated a fresh revocation 
there in 1625, but as many of the lands involved were held by Scottish Privy 
Councillors the scheme encountered stiff opposition, and was only 
implemented in a diluted form.
2
 No equivalent was attempted in England: 
most Crown lands alienated since 1540 had been sold rather than given 
away; and any prospect of a resumption raised fears about the tenure of all 
former Crown lands, most notably in Parliament in 1555. However, two 
loopholes were exploited by the Duchy of Cornwall: in 1606 some of 
Elizabeth’s Crown land sales were reversed upon a judicial ruling that 
tenure of the ‘assessionable’ lands entailed upon the Duchy in 1337 could 
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only be overturned by statute; while at Charles’s creation as Prince of Wales 
in 1616 existing Duchy leases were voided, on the grounds that no Prince 
could bind his successors. This yielded £14,500 in entry fines, but infuriated 
Duchy tenants, and the legal loophole was blocked by statute in 1624.
1
 
Parliament rarely broached the topic of resumptions: Sir Robert Phelips 
considered the prospect in a draft speech of 1625; and in the following year, 
when Charles pressed the Commons for an increase in supply, two speakers 
urged resumption as an alternative, but this option was not seriously 
pursued.
2
 
 Routine management of the Crown estates was neglected under the 
later Tudors, and while this glaring failure was obvious to various projectors 
who urged reform, it hardly featured on the political agenda of the day. 
Reform was urged by the revenue commission of 1552, and the 
incorporation of the court of Augmentations into the Exchequer in 1554 
provided an obvious opportunity to restructure, but little happened during 
the next half century. In an age where private landlords began to 
commission professional estate surveys in order to assess and exploit the 
full potential of demesnes, manorial dues, mills and timber, this 
constituted a scandalous neglect.
3
 For all his fascination with maps, Lord 
Treasurer Burghley never commissioned a general survey of the Crown’s 
assets, as the 1552 commission had recommended. This was an important 
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oversight, as the 1535 Valor Ecclesiasticus of church lands, and the 
chantry certificates of 1548-9 omitted precise information about acreages, 
yields and tenures, making it difficult to formulate a coherent investment 
strategy. Internal rivalry within the Exchequer further hampered 
policymaking: there were protracted tensions among bureaucrats over 
control of the Receipt; the auditors and Lord Treasurer’s Remembrancer 
failed to communicate over collection of rent arrears; and Exchequer 
auditors resented the activities of the private surveyors commissioned by 
the Crown after 1603.
1
 The political impetus for reform was also lacking: 
Burghley’s generation, mindful of the peasant revolts of 1536-7 and 1549, 
avoided any initiative which might provoke social unrest.
2
  
 Bureaucratic inertia was compounded by legal difficulties. Demesne 
lands provided the easiest prospects for revenue increase, as the issue of 
several hundred leases a year was handled by a commission dominated by 
the Treasurer and Chancellor of the Exchequer. Burghley and Mildmay 
cannily insisted that new leases shift the often substantial onus for building 
repairs onto Crown tenants, but generally preferred to use Crown lands for 
patronage purposes rather than as a financial resource. Many tenants 
renewed their leases at the ancient rent by surrendering their existing lease 
before the term was fully expired, while in the second half of Elizabeth’s 
reign courtiers were commonly granted reversionary leases of Crown estates 
at a discount, which would then be passed to the sitting tenants at market 
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rates, while the courtier pocketed the difference. Thus around 1600 many 
properties were still leased at rents set by the last monastic owner in the 
1530s, which – after three generations of inflation and poor estate 
management – fell far short of their potential. Leases for 21 years or three 
lives (the usual terms for Crown estates), which commanded entry fines of 
4-7 years’ rental (16-25% of total yield) on the open market, paid fines 
worth only 5-7% of the rental value to the Crown, while copyhold lands, 
which habitually returned less than 10% of their market value to the 
Crown, were hedged about with customary restrictions which were 
peculiar to each manor, and costly and difficult to overturn at law.  
 Profit margins were also eroded by administrative shortcomings: fees 
and repairs often outweighed rental yield; much of the profits from manorial 
courts and mills was pocketed by local officials; and heriots due upon the 
death of customary tenants were not collected.
1
 Local officials on the larger 
Crown manors sometimes used their position to pursue a private agenda: 
Sir John Savile, his father-in-law and son, stewards of the lordship of 
Wakefield for 70 years, allowed the conversion of encroachments into 
copyholds at £1 entry fine and the ancient rent of 4d. an acre, a fraction of 
market value. This built up their own political affinity, explaining much of 
the family’s electoral influence in early Stuart Yorkshire.2  
 The widening gap between Crown rents and market values is best 
charted from sale prices, which reflect buyers’ views of the real economic 
potential of their purchases, expressed in multiples of the annual Crown 
rent. Arable land in lowland England was usually priced at 20 times annual 
yield (in modern parlance, a 5% annual return on capital invested), the value 
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at which most Henrician sales of monastic lands took place.
1
 As shown in 
Graph 2.1, at the start of Elizabeth’s reign Crown lands fetched a modest  
 
 
 
premium, around 25-35 years’ purchase, while sales in the last 15 years of 
the reign reached 35-40 years’ purchase. Those of 1608-15 took place at 
similar rates, but one-third of sales by private treaty during this period also 
carried a perpetual feefarm equivalent to the existing rent, which effectively 
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added another 20 years’ purchase to the price.1 This was standard practice in 
the later 1620s, when some contracts doubled the ancient rent; a sale at 40 
years’ purchase plus a double feefarm (another 40 years’ purchase) implied 
that the ancient rent was worth only 25% of market value – a dismal 1¼% 
return on capital invested.
2
  
 Such figures indicate a spectacular collapse in land revenues under 
the early Stuarts; but are they credible? Sitting tenants were prepared to pay 
over the odds for their freehold in order to avoid the prospect of an asset-
stripping speculator as their landlord, particularly in the 1620s, as the 
Crown became more diligent in putting land sales out to competitive tender 
(see below). Yet even if Graph 2.1 exaggerates the shortcomings of land 
revenues in the 1620s, and the actual yield of the lands sold was nearer 2% 
annually, the Crown was still receiving a pitifully low rate of return on its 
vast landed assets; an increase to a 4% annual yield – still unimpressive by 
the standards of the private sector – would have turned the Jacobean deficit 
into a surplus. This was what Dorset and Salisbury aimed to achieve with 
their ambitious plans for tenurial reforms in the first half of King James’s 
reign. 
 
Casual Revenues  
 Systematic reform of the Crown estates began under Lord Treasurer 
Dorset, who commissioned surveys of land and timber resources from 1603; 
the Duchy of Cornwall inaugurated a similar process in 1607. Armed with 
this information, Dorset’s successor, Salisbury, was able to able to make 
strategic decisions about the future of the demesne. In May 1609, he 
                     
1
  The additional value of the feefarm rents is overlooked by Hoyle, ‘Introduction’ 
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2
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established an entail (‘annexation’) of the Crown’s best estates, which 
were not to be alienated without the assent of eight Privy Councillors – a 
weak safeguard, but the best available in the absence of a parliamentary 
statute. Other properties which the surveys had proved uneconomical to 
manage, especially rectories, mills and small ‘quillets’ of ex-chantry land, 
were offered for sale. However, from its inception, this carefully managed 
retrenchment was haunted by the spectre of mounting royal debts, 
reckoned at £600,000 (just over one year’s annual revenue) when 
Salisbury took office. His original plan was that this debt, and the annual 
deficit of almost £100,000, would be eradicated by the Great Contract, but 
the collapse of this scheme in the autumn of 1610 (see Chapter 3) meant 
that receipts from land sales were allocated to this purpose instead (see 
below). Yet even before this setback, changes to estate management 
focussed on short-term profits from casual revenues such as entry fines, 
copyhold confirmation and timber sales.
1
 
 The short-termist nature of estate policy became apparent only two 
days after the sealing of the annexation, when Salisbury contracted with a 
syndicate headed by John Eldred and William Whitmore to issue 60-year 
reversionary leases of Crown lands worth £2,000 per annum ancient rent. 
The Duchy of Lancaster had earned windfall profits of £10,000 at the end 
of Elizabeth’s reign by the cynical device of sealing leases of Crown 
estates about to be offered for sale, but in 1603 Lord Treasurer Dorset 
proposed a more fruitful policy of ‘taking small fines and doubling or 
trebling the rents’. However, this approach was rejected in 1609, when 
contractors were given no remit or incentive to increase rental income, 
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paying 22 years’ purchase (£44,000) for leases at the ancient rents, most of 
which were sold on to tenants.
1
 With much of the royal estate already let 
on long leases or reversions, this contract, and concurrent leases of other 
Crown lands by normal Exchequer procedures, exhausted the supply of 
quickly improvable estates, and between 1614 and the Civil War, the only 
significant receipts for entry fines came from the Duchy of Cornwall 
estates, which had been excluded from this contract (Graph 2.2).
2
  
 Dorset’s surveyors also reported that many copyholders might pay 
to improve the terms of their tenure: copyhold rents were usually fixed at 
4d. an acre, a fraction of their real worth; but the Crown could raise 
revenue either by increasing entry fines, or by allowing tenants to pay a 
fine to convert their tenure to freehold (‘enfranchisement’). On manors 
where copyhold leases for lives were the custom, the Crown was in a 
strong position, as it could fix the entry fine at will upon expiry of the last 
surviving life, much as it would for a leasehold. However, most of those 
who held copyholds by inheritance, tenant right or other perpetual tenures 
claimed to have their entry fines fixed by custom or legal decree. Dorset 
proposed to enfranchise perpetual tenants for a lump sum and a permanent 
feefarm, which would have produced a modest increase in rentals, but 
Salisbury altered this policy, opting for a confirmation of entry fines, 
which were to be calculated as multiples of the values at rack-rent, as  
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assessed by professional surveyors, rather than the ancient rent.
1
 Under 
Salisbury’s instructions, the Exchequer court ordered that copyholders by 
inheritance who failed to establish 100 years’ custom for their entry fines 
had to compound to fix their fines, which caused unrest at many manorial 
courts at Michaelmas 1608: libels about this issue circulated in the manor 
of Wakefield; while irate tenants appeared at Westminster to argue their 
case, persuading Salisbury to reduce his demands. In 1610 a statute 
offered pre-emptive confirmation for any compositions agreed with 
Exchequer and Duchy of Lancaster tenants over the next three years, while 
the Wakefield copyholders who had already compounded were covered by 
a separate Act. This initiative raised almost £20,000, although a separate 
drive for enfranchisement, launched after the failure of the Great Contract, 
petered out after Salisbury’s death in 1612.2  
 In 1615 Lord Treasurer Suffolk attempted to intimidate copyholders 
with the ‘Great Restraint’, a suspension of court proceedings on all 
Exchequer manors, which barred tenants from confirming inheritance or 
sale of their lands. This must have caused chaos in many communities, but 
tenants proved obdurate, and the scheme yielded the derisory sum of £80 
before being abandoned in 1618. However, a less confrontational initiative 
by the Duchy of Lancaster raised £8,900, while the tenants undertook to 
pay a similar sum upon receiving statutory confirmation (which did not 
happen before the Civil War). Meanwhile, tenants on several Duchy of  
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Cornwall manors confirmed their copyholds during 1619-21. Copyhold 
compositions were implemented on 43 of the Crown’s 300-odd manors, 
but enfranchisement only took place in the lordship of Bromfield and Yale 
in 1624, an agreement confirmed by statute in 1628 (Graph 2.3).
1
 
 Royal forests were governed by their own administrative structure 
and a prerogative-based lawcode, but their management involved a similar 
balance between annual yield and windfall profits. They produced little 
profit for the Exchequer before James’s reign, although a large but 
unquantifiable amount of naval timber was employed in the construction of 
the Elizabethan navy. Stocks of shipbuilding timber were sorely abused in 
the first half of James’s reign: Sir John Trevor, Surveyor of the Navy, 
inflated the price of timber he supplied to the royal dockyards by up to 20%; 
sold the ‘lops and tops’ of trees for his own profit; and embezzled timber to 
build a ship for the Newcastle coal trade, another of his business interests. 
This peculation ended with Buckingham’s appointment as Lord Admiral.2 
Salisbury, aiming to exploit the forests more systematically as a financial 
resource, hoped to raise revenue from fines for the spoil of woods, of which 
surveys provided ample evidence, but his efforts achieved little, and the 
subsequent dispersal of many woods as part of the Crown land sales put an 
end to such prospects. Grazing could be leased to local landowners and 
commoners, but the competing requirements of private livestock and royal 
deer created tensions, and forest officials habitually exploited their  
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bailiwicks for their own benefit, particularly once the prospect of 
disafforestation (mooted from 1612) removed the long-term benefits to be 
derived from good husbandry.  
 Timber sales were the most certain way of realising assets, although 
care had to be taken not to denude forests which might take decades to 
renew, and to ensure replanting.
1
 Little Crown timber was sold under 
Elizabeth, but once again Salisbury used surveys to identify and sell 
‘surplus’ timber worth £46,000 during 1609-14 (Graph 2.4). In 1617 Sir 
Giles Mompesson proposed to sell £100,000 of non-naval timber over four 
years: in six months he raised £7,270, but Crown officials protested at his 
usurpation of their jurisdictions, and his patent was not renewed; complaint 
was made about this abuse in Parliament in 1621, and it was terminated by 
Mompesson’s disgrace.2 Sales of charcoal timber for iron foundries in the 
Forest of Dean raised significant revenue from 1627: the project was 
promoted by the 1626 Revenue Commission, and the Earl of Pembroke 
secured the contract at 4,000 marks per annum, although the Grand 
Remonstrance complained of extensive sales to local Catholic 
ironfounders.
3
  
 
Defective Titles 
 Selling resources for cash rather than husbanding revenue potential 
raised considerable sums, but legal antiquarianism offered promising 
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alternatives, either by redefining private landowners as Crown tenants 
through the discovery of some real or notional defect in their title, or 
through reviving long-forgotten claims held by the Crown. Concealment 
hunting flourished in the 1550s, under patents for the discovery of chantry 
lands which had been hidden from the dissolution commissioners in 1548-9. 
Local inquiries, which often took evidence from informers rather than 
Exchequer commissions and juries, proved unpopular, and such grants were 
revoked by proclamation in 1572 and 1579. By then concealment hunters 
had uncovered a less onerous modus operandi: official records were 
searched for drafting errors in seizures and grants, the discovery of which 
thereby invalidated all subsequent tenures of those estates. The current 
holders of such lands were then ordered to produce their title deeds, which 
were scrutinised for further defects.
1
 Some concealment hunters specialised 
in church and collegiate lands, almshouses or corporation lands: during the 
1580s many London guilds were threatened with forfeiture of their lands for 
superstitious uses; while the Hull corporation contested an allegation that 
they had failed to maintain the town’s fortifications, which, if upheld, would 
have led to the forfeiture of lands worth £150 per annum granted for this 
purpose in 1552. Such claims were vigorously contested in the courts, and 
some loopholes were closed: in Cheney’s case (24 Elizabeth) it was ruled 
that hospitals and almshouses founded as chantries would not be liable to 
forfeiture; while a 1593 statute exempted most church lands from seizure by 
confirming Henrician foundations against any drafting defects.
2
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 The earliest concealment hunters were granted outright title to their 
discoveries, but the Crown soon claimed a share of this revenue: in 1581 the 
diplomat Sir Edward Stafford was granted 60-year leases of all 
concealments he discovered; while two years later Sir James Croft, 
Comptroller of the Household, was allowed to compound with tenants for 
the concealment, but any rent arising from the land was to come to the 
Crown. Towards the end of Elizabeth’s reign a rental income worth £1,632 
per annum was reckoned to have been acquired in this way. Stafford and 
many of his successors consigned the execution of their patents to the 
Chancery clerk William Typper, who with his son Robert dominated the 
administration of defective title proceedings for the next 50 years. No more 
than a few dozen landowners were successfully prosecuted each year, but 
hundreds more had their title called into question, leading to vociferous 
complaints.  
 In January 1600 the policy of increasing the Crown’s rental income 
was overturned when Elizabeth, acknowledging that subjects had been 
‘greatly vexed, sued and put to intolerable charges’, issued a proclamation 
inviting those whose tenures were threatened to avoid further proceedings 
by compounding for their titles at modest rates, usually 7 years’ purchase. 
This scheme, also administered by Typper, produced most of the £2,500 a 
year received for defective titles at the Exchequer over the next 21 years 
(Graph 2.3); while Typper pocketed £500 a year as expenses.
1
 Five years 
later, the Privy Council conceded that defective title proceedings ‘do breed 
great distraction and scandal’, and in 1606 Typper’s activities were included 
in the Commons’ grievances petition. Nothing was done about this 
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complaint, but in 1607 the London livery companies, with government 
backing, secured a statute confirming their endowments against 
prosecution.
1
 The Great Contract proposed to extinguish the Crown’s claims 
to defective titles after 60 years’ unchallenged tenure, and to allow subjects 
to plead ‘the general issue’, which allowed them to retain possession of their 
lands during defective title suits; the general issue proposal reappeared as a 
bill in 1614, when fresh complaints were made against Typper at its second 
reading in the Commons.
2
  
 Financial difficulties following the dissolution of the Addled 
Parliament produced a fresh crop of defective title patents. In 1617 the 
Scottish courtier Viscount Doncaster was granted concealed lands worth 
£200 per annum, a concession he quickly sold to Lord Treasurer Suffolk’s 
servant Sir John Townshend for £5,000. The price of 25 years’ purchase 
implied confidence in a quick return, and in three years Robert Typper, 
acting as Townshend’s agent, held 30 inquiries into hospitals and 
almshouses identified as chantry land. Townshend also acquired a share in 
Sir Thomas Somerset’s patent to compound with corporations for grants of 
tolls at markets and fairs, while in July 1620 Sir Giles Mompesson secured 
another grant of defective titles worth up to £200 a year: within six months 
his agent George Geldard, an experienced concealment hunter, had 
identified lands worth £40 per annum; while his papers suggest that he 
planned to target the endowments of the London livery companies.
3
 As most 
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of these titles were covered by legal precedent and statute, it is hard to know 
how Typper and Geldard hoped to proceed; they probably hoped to 
intimidate the tenants into offering composition. 
 The concealment hunters were frustrated by the 1621 Parliament: on 
19 February 1621 William Noy attacked Mompesson and Townshend; and 
three days later Solicitor-General Heath gave official sanction to an 
investigation. Mompesson, said to have undervalued many of his 
concealments to increase his profits, quickly fled into exile, but Townshend 
remained, and was examined by the Commons’ grievances committee. 
Numerous complaints were made about his threats to hospitals, while 
corporations protested about the quo warranto proceedings over market 
tolls. Townshend’s grants were noted to have contravened the rules laid 
down in the King’s 1608 Book of Bounty, while Cheney’s case was cited as 
a precedent for the exemption of charitable foundations from the Chantries’ 
Act. As the client of a long-disgraced minister, Townshend had few friends, 
and the Commons condemned his patents as grievances on 26 March, the 
same day on which Mompesson was sentenced in the Lords (Chapter 5); all 
concealment patents were revoked by proclamation on 10 July.
1
  
 The profits from defective title proceedings naturally collapsed in 
1621 (Graph 2.3), although the abrupt dissolution of Parliament in 
December, and the King’s return to a pro-Spanish foreign policy thereafter, 
offered some hope to patentees. A new concealment commission was issued 
only six weeks after the dissolution, and in July 1622 Sir William Heydon 
was authorised to collect £4,800 of arrears owing from an earlier patent.
2
 In 
July 1623 Townshend, hotly pressed for payment by investors who had 
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backed his earlier scheme, persuaded Doncaster to secure a fresh grant of all 
the hospital lands identified by Typper before 1621. The new patent 
included a clause permitting the refoundation of such institutions, which 
was presumably designed to mollify Parliament, but the Commons 
condemned it regardless on 15 Mar. 1624, and it was included in the 
grievance petition submitted to the King at the end of the session.
1
 King 
Charles endorsed this censure in 1625, and undertook to approve any bill 
the Commons passed to invalidate all such concealment proceedings. This 
was unnecessary, as in 1624 the Statute of Limitations already granted clear 
title to any concealments held without challenge for 60 years, while another 
Act of the same Parliament allowed Crown tenants to plead the general 
issue.
2
 Townshend, undaunted by these reverses, offered to find fresh 
concealments worth £1,000 per annum in the autumn of 1624, and advised 
the 1626 Revenue Commission about defective title proceedings. Two years 
later he was searching for encroachments upon the foreshore of the Lower 
Thames, while his patron, Doncaster, secured a fresh concealment patent in 
January 1630, which raised over £26,000 during the next six years, with 
Typper taking £3,100 of the proceeds as expenses.
3
 The only other scheme 
from which the Crown derived significant benefit after 1624 was the seizure 
of the Ulster estates of the London livery companies, worth £5,000 a year, 
which were forfeited in Michaelmas 1634 on the grounds that the investors 
had failed to fulfil the terms of the original grant (see Chapter 1).
4
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 While Elizabethan concealment hunters made some contribution 
towards increasing land revenues, the composition project inaugurated in 
1600 was a straightforward revenue-raising exercise: the sitting tenants 
were invariably given the chance to compound. Several other schemes were 
subsequently established to exploit specific legal loopholes in similar ways. 
In 1600 the Chancery examiner Otho Nicholson was granted a patent for the 
discovery of assarts
1
 and encroachments upon ancient forest lands in 
Northamptonshire; he quickly identified 650 acres, but the tenants 
petitioned to compound. Meanwhile, in 1604 Sir Thomas Leighton, who 
had been granted assart lands discovered in Feckenham Forest under 
Elizabeth, promoted a bill to confirm such titles. The tenants, knowing of 
the Northamptonshire inquiry, lobbied Parliament, where Leighton’s bill 
encountered official opposition in the Commons from the King’s Counsel, 
Sir Francis Bacon, and Speaker Phelips; it was rejected by the Lords. In 
1605 the assarts project was extended to cover the whole country, realising 
£37,000 over the next 10 years, 25% of which went to Nicholson as 
expenses (Graph 2.3). As with ordinary concealments, tenants were invited 
to compound, but if they refused Nicholson’s price, he was prepared to sue 
for possession in the Exchequer court.
2
 In 1614 James offered to drop this 
project in a speech to Parliament, and the patent apparently lapsed before 
Nicholson’s death in 1619, although it took some years to clear his 
accounts.
3
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 Another revenue opportunity arose as a consequence of the enclosure 
riots in the Midlands in the summer of 1607. The King, determined not ‘to 
suffer any toleration of that which may be any occasion to decay or diminish 
our people’, instituted an enquiry commission throughout the Midland areas 
most affected by depopulations, which raised £930 in fines and ordered the 
overthrow of a number of enclosures.
1
 Landowners were required to provide 
surety to raze their enclosures, and in 1610 Sir John Townshend was 
granted the profits arising from the forfeiture of 46 of these bonds; the 
extent of his gains is unknown, but they presumably funded the substantial 
land purchases he made over the next few years. Townshend also shared in 
the 1614 patent to compound for enclosure of rabbit warrens, and the Duke 
of Lennox’s 1618 patent to compound for breaches of the early Tudor 
enclosure statutes. These projects raised a mere £271 between them before 
the 1621 Parliament expelled one of the promoters, Sir Henry Britton, and 
procured the suppression of both grants.
2
  
 Official interest in depopulation revived in 1630, as part of the Privy 
Council’s drive for efficiency in local government. A test case was brought 
in Star Chamber in 1634, when Sir Anthony Roper was sentenced to pay 
£3,000 to the poor, £100 to rebuild cottages he had razed in Kent, and a 
further £100 to the informer. Fresh enquiry commissions active from 1635-9 
netted the Crown just under £28,000, but misgivings about the social costs 
of enclosure saved them from opprobrium in the Long Parliament: the 
Grand Remonstrance of 1641 condemned not the fines, but the enclosers, 
who were said to ‘have driven many millions out of the subjects’ purses, 
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without any considerable profit to his Majesty’.1 
 The most audacious defective title project of the Personal Rule was 
the campaign to compound with those found to have encroached upon the 
medieval boundaries of royal forests. This began as a by-product of rivalry 
between Lord Treasurer Weston and the Earl of Holland, Chief Justice in 
Eyre for southern England, who fined Weston’s dependents for cutting 
charcoal timber in the Forest of Dean in 1634. However, the wider revenue 
implications were also pursued: the next Eyre, for Waltham Forest in 
Essex, claimed competence over the maximum extent of the ancient 
bounds; and similar claims were subsequently made for the New Forest in 
Hampshire, Rockingham Forest in Northamptonshire, and the Oxfordshire 
forests. Punitive fines were imposed on landowners and commoners alike, 
as an incentive to compound at 20% of the value of the fine: even 
Mompesson was not forgotten, being fined £3,300 for timber sales under 
his patent of 1617. In Northamptonshire, the modest scope of the Jacobean 
forest jurisdictions were extended to cover half the shire, and it was feared 
that most of the nation would be declared ancient forest. The project 
eventually yielded £38,667 to the Exchequer, but the threat to tenures 
impelled the Long Parliament to confine forest jurisdictions to their extent 
in 1623, and to confirm all subsequent disafforestations.
2
 
 
Land Sales 
 With land revenues sluggish under Elizabeth and stagnant 
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thereafter, and concerted efforts to maximise casual revenues and 
defective titles of all kinds yielding an annual average of no more than 
£11,500 (a little under 10% of total land revenues), the obvious recourse 
to resolve the problem of royal indebtedness was land sales. Massive 
alienations helped pay for the wars of 1542-62, but Burghley rejected this 
policy: in 1576 Chancellor Mildmay promised the Commons that land sales 
were ‘not hereafter to be used, seeing that by the same the revenues of the 
Crown are greatly diminished, which it can no more bear’. However, war 
with Spain quickly dissipated the cash reserves Burghley had amassed in the 
1570s, forcing land sales in 1589-92; most of the £132,000 raised was spent 
on the Queen’s forces in France and the Low Countries.1  
 Burghley’s death and the disaster which befell the Irish garrison at 
Yellow Ford, both of which occurred in August 1598, allowed Lord 
Treasurer Dorset to pursue a more wide-ranging policy of land sales, which 
realised £372,000 in the last four years of Elizabeth’s reign, almost as much 
as the £425,000 collected in parliamentary taxation during the same period.
2
 
Land sales picked up again in 1607, when Salisbury’s client Sir Walter 
Cope formed a consortium to handle rectories, chantry lands and ‘quillets’. 
Salisbury accelerated the pace in order to pay off Crown debts, raising 
£410,000 during his four year tenure as Treasurer. Further sales occurred 
during the financial crisis which preceded the meeting of the Addled 
Parliament, but this policy was curtailed by Lord Treasurer Suffolk in 1615 
and halted altogether after his fall in 1618. The 1626 Revenue Commission, 
having pondered various schemes to pay for a war in the  
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absence of parliamentary supply, concluded £340,000 worth of sales during 
the war years, and assigned a further £230,000 of lands to the London 
corporation in settlement of existing debts (Chapter 1). Sales continued at a 
lower level until 1640, but the scale of Tudor and Jacobean alienations left 
the Crown unable to resort to further land sales during the Bishops’ Wars 
(Graph 2.5).
1
 
 Land sales raised £2 million for the Crown between 1598-1640, and 
wrought huge changes in estate management policy, but few of the 
implications of this upheaval were explicitly considered by politicians: 
when the Commons was asked for supply in June 1604, Dorset correctly 
predicted that ‘if the King have not a subsidy he must sell land’, but his 
argument swayed no-one.
2
 Purchasers rarely complained about the excellent 
value of their investments; while ministers were disinclined to draw 
attention to their policy failures; and apart from isolated calls for an Act of 
Resumption, the Commons avoided the issue. Even the Grand 
Remonstrance of 1641, otherwise comprehensive in its cataloguing of royal 
mismanagement, remained silent on this point. Writing in 1602, Sir Robert 
Johnson warned that uncertainty about the market value of lands offered for 
sale had cost Elizabeth dearly; ‘then was sold the pig in the panier’. This 
criticism was at least partly justified: plans to realise 50 or 60 times the 
ancient rent for the best properties sold in 1599 were quickly abandoned; 
and while larger properties retained their liability for wardship, when the 
need for cash was acute, key pricing considerations such as the duration of 
existing leases and the potential for improvement were ignored in order to 
procure quick sales.  
 Dorset’s estate surveys (see above) provided an accurate picture of 
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revenue potential, and Jacobean sales to private individuals undoubtedly 
exploited this information. However, whereas late Elizabethan purchasers 
had mostly been the sitting tenants, their neighbours, or scriveners acting on 
their behalf, 70% of the mid-Jacobean sales were handled by syndicates of 
courtiers, bureaucrats and City merchants, who received preferential 
treatment in return for cash advances to the Crown. The Eldred/Whitmore 
consortium for the sale of crown leases, for which detailed accounts survive, 
was presumably representative of the others, in that it was offered 
preferential terms at minimal risk to the investors. The Crown demanded 22 
years’ purchase for the 60-year leases, but the consortium, having taken two 
years to select its quota of lands worth £2,000 per annum at lease, during 
which a number of properties were exchanged or returned, realised an 
average of just over 31 years’ purchase through resale, a 37% profit; 
meanwhile, several investors made purchases for their private benefit as part 
of the transaction.
1
  
 Similar arrangements were reached with the ‘Royal Contract’ sales to 
the London corporation in 1628, when £355,000 of Crown land was 
alienated at 28 years’ purchase:2 the first tranche of sales by the City raised 
£111,000 at an average of 38 years’ purchase, while further sales in 1630-2 
raised £195,000 at 33 years’ purchase. Private sales concluded by the 
Crown Revenue Commission realised far higher prices (Graph 2.1), but at 
the time the bargain was struck in December 1627, Charles was facing 
bankruptcy, and his ministers leapt at the £120,000 cash advance the City 
offered, even agreeing to waive wardship rights by reducing all tenures to 
free socage for an extra £5,000.
3
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 One key Jacobean innovation was the inclusion of a perpetual 
feefarm charged upon the purchaser, equivalent to the ancient rent. £1,500 
per annum was reserved in this way during 1609-14, and feefarming 
became routine under Charles, when some lands were even charged with 
double the ancient rent.
1
 Sales in feefarm meant that the Crown surrendered 
nothing more than the opportunity to increase land revenues, a prospect 
which seemed remote after decades of mismanagement. As Charles was 
receiving, at best, a 2% annual return on the capital invested in his estates, 
but paying 8% interest to his creditors, the policy of land sales, which seems 
highly irresponsible at first glance, makes sense when viewed in a broader 
economic context. 
 Away from Westminster, Crown tenants were aware that sales would 
spell the end of low rents and easy terms. It is difficult to know how many 
acquired their own freeholds, as purchases were often made through 
intermediaries, but around 20% of the late Elizabethan sales were explicitly 
made to tenants, while a further 70% went to local men.
2
 Every sale 
involved some degree of co-operation with the tenants, whose interests 
purchasers neglected at their peril. In 1634, when the lordship of Ruthin was 
alienated to Sir Francis Crane in settlement of debts owed by the Crown, 
bids for the estate were received from the tenants, the local landowner Sir 
Thomas Myddelton and a syndicate from the Ordnance Office; Crane 
decided to keep the manor, whereupon the tenants opened negotiations to 
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confirm the fines for their copyholds.
1
 From 1626, three rival interests 
coveted the lordship of Arwystli and Cyfeiliog, Montgomeryshire: Sir 
Thomas Myddelton acquired the property in 1629 on the understanding that 
he would enfranchise the copyholders, but sold his interest to another 
landowner; his heirs were sued in the Exchequer by Attorney-General 
Bankes, and the case dragged on until the Civil War.
2
 In extraordinary 
circumstances, powerful men could even find themselves bested by tenants: 
in 1628 the copyholders of Pontefract applied to buy their freeholds from 
the London corporation, but Sir John Savile, Comptroller of the Household, 
lobbied to have the manor excluded from the Royal Contract, offering 40 
years’ purchase rather than the 28 the City had agreed; King Charles 
decided in the copyholders’ favour.3 
 
Conclusion  
 While Crown finances did not depend solely on landed revenues, 
the failure of the royal estates to match increases in private land rentals, to 
keep up with price inflation, or even to do much more than hold their own 
in cash terms, was the single most important cause of the budgetary deficit 
which plagued the early Stuarts. The last English monarch to manage the 
Crown estates effectively was Henry VII, whose servants Empson and 
Dudley had become bywords for ministerial rapacity: in 1621 it was noted 
that ‘Mompesson’ was an anagram of ‘mo[re] Empsons’; while in 1625 Sir 
Guy Palmes voiced the hope that Buckingham would be executed by the 
new King, as Empson and Dudley had been by the young Henry VIII. 
Politicians could criticise, but they had little to offer by way of reform: in 
                     
1
  TNA, C2/Chas.I/W87/1; TNA, E112/274/73; HoP1604, III.718-19. 
2
  TNA, SP16/69, ff.35-56v; NLW, Powis 11363; TNA, C66/2500/1; TNA, 
E112/276/34; NLW, Chirk F14060; NLW, Wynnstay L12-41. 
3
  LMA, CLA/44/5/28, ff.15v-19v. 
109 
August 1625 Sir Edward Coke advocated increasing land revenue by 
raising Crown rents, developing wastes, assarting forests and taking entry 
fines. Having served as a Treasury commissioner in 1618-20, he should 
have been aware that all of these projects had been tried out on earlier 
occasions, to little effect.
1
 
 Reform of land revenue required time, money and determination: a 
private landowner might spend a lifetime rebuilding, replanting, draining 
and enclosing, while disputing with manorial tenants over common rights, 
entry fines, heriots and other incidental dues. All these options (and more) 
were explored for the Crown estates, but individual initiatives were rarely 
followed through to completion. Historians have long been aware that the 
Crown managed its estates poorly, but a detailed consideration of the figures 
reveals the dismal scale of this failure: by the 1620s, land revenues were 
yielding around one-third of what could have been achieved by a ruthless 
private landlord, and perhaps half what any competent estate steward could 
have delivered. The political consequence of this failure was that the Crown 
squandered its best opportunity to balance the ‘ordinary’ (peacetime) budget 
without resort to Parliament. 
 Could this disaster have been foreseen, let alone averted? If any man 
could have conceived and implemented a wholesale reform of the royal 
estates, it was Burghley; yet as the premier statesman of the age, he faced a 
vast range of challenges, and the fact that this immense but potentially 
lucrative task hardly registered on his crowded agenda says something 
important about the priorities of the Elizabethan regime.
2
 First, such a policy 
could only be inaugurated in peacetime, with the assistance of a budgetary 
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surplus to fund long-term capital investments – and such surpluses as 
Burghley raised in the 1570s were hoarded against the prospect of a war 
with Spain. Secondly, Burghley opted to use the Crown lands as a source of 
patronage rather than revenue – so courtiers both great and obscure obtained 
leases on preferential terms, while royal tenants paid vastly discounted 
rents.  
 Tudor estate policy was designed to husband existing resources rather 
than develop their potential – a prudent strategy for the deflationary late 
Middle Ages. The currency devaluation of the 1540s prompted a sharp burst 
of inflation, which was continued thereafter by steady population growth. 
This abrupt change in the macroeconomic context was overlooked both by 
the reform commission of 1552, and by Burghley, who pursued deeply 
conservative social and financial policies, even as private landowners 
awoke to the benefits of more aggressive estate management. Burghley’s 
approach looked desperately outdated by 1598, but the vested interests of 
the courtiers and tenants who had benefited from the Tudors’ rentier 
attitude were by then too deeply entrenched to be overturned.
1
 James’s 
chronic inability to control his expenditure then forced Salisbury to convert 
Dorset’s careful reforms into an asset-stripping exercise, which continued 
intermittently until the assets ran out in the 1630s. The only exception to 
this trend was the Duchy of Cornwall, which, insulated from many of the 
pressures facing the Exchequer by its status as Charles’s personal appanage, 
proved better at maintaining its integrity.
2
 The glaring failures of estate 
management under the early Stuarts obliged the Crown to look elsewhere 
for revenues; the following chapters will examine the alternatives pursued, 
with varying degrees of success. 
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CHAPTER III: FISCAL FEUDALISM 
 
 Feudal revenues were prescriptive rights which predated statute law: 
purveyance derived from the tribute exacted by peripatetic Saxon kings; 
while wardship was a Norman device to ensure that the Crown did not lose 
the services of tenants-in-chief unable to perform military duties because of 
youth or lunacy.
1
 These revenues, which furnished 10-15% of the early 
Stuarts’ income, provided much of the revenue for the royal Households, 
while after 1610 wardship receipts grew particularly rapidly, at a rate 
exceeded only by customs (Chapter 5).  
 Controversy arose over the unequal incidence of feudal dues: 
purveyance for the royal Households fell disproportionately on parts of the 
country which lay on the Court’s annual itinerary; while wardship fell 
randomly upon those with underage heirs at their death. Corruption was also 
an issue: administrators made huge profits, particularly the Cecils and their 
clients in the Court of Wards, a fact many contemporaries tactfully forbore 
to comment upon, and historians often downplay in discussing the greatest 
political dynasty of Elizabethan England.
2
 The first two sections of this 
chapter will examine the incidence of purveyance and wardship, the 
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revenues raised and the hidden costs of these duties, and the attempts to 
reform or replace them in Elizabethan and early Jacobean England.  
 In 1610, Lord Treasurer Salisbury proposed to replace both revenues 
with an annual land tax, or other permanent revenue. The debates over this 
scheme, known as the Great Contract, have been scrutinised by political 
historians,
1
 but the financial implications of the proposed settlement – never 
fully worked out at the time – have not been discussed in detail by 
historians. It will be argued below that economic considerations were a key 
factor in the rejection of the Contract, it being impossible for either the 
Crown or taxpayers to compare the costs and benefits of the existing dues 
with those proposed for the new tax regime; the concurrent debate about 
impositions, which might have been included in the compensation package 
(Chapter 5), further complicated such calculations.  
 The collapse of the Contract, the boldest fiscal initiative of the early 
Stuart period, discouraged ministers from including Parliament in debates 
about fiscal reform until the 1640s. Historians, with the benefit of hindsight, 
sometimes regard the period after 1610 as the ‘last years’ of fiscal 
feudalism,
2
 but these dues remained a significant part of Crown revenues 
until 1640: administrative procedures were overhauled, vastly increasing the 
yields from wardship; while the county composition scheme for purveyance 
was extended to cover more goods and services. Finally, a new purveyance 
on malted barley, introduced in London, imposed a modest excise on beer. 
Significant thought they were, these increases were insufficient to bridge the 
annual deficit which had become the norm in early Stuart finances. The true 
scale of the opportunity foregone by the failure of the Great Contract only 
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became apparent after 1660, when feudal dues were exchanged for a 
lucrative general excise on beverages, which became one of the mainstays 
of the 18
th
 century fiscal state.
1
 
The Political Economy of Purveyance  
 Purveyance comprised the Crown’s right to commandeer and 
transport supplies for the royal Household, Wardrobe, Stables and stud 
farms, the Royal Navy, the King’s Works, the Ordnance and saltpetremen, 
and the councils in the North and the Marches. As recently as the mid-
sixteenth century, royal armies had been provisioned by such means,
 
but 
while billeting provoked controversy during the 1620s Charles never 
claimed purveyance for his troops.
2
 It is impossible to quantify annual 
receipts, as much of this revenue was received in kind as foodstuffs, fuel, 
building materials and transport services. Most accounts for the county 
compositions were lost with the dispersal of the pre-1640 records of the 
Board of Greencloth, and those of the Cofferer and Comptroller of the 
Household record only cash received from the sale of surplus goods, a 
modest proportion of a revenue worth £50,000 to £75,000 annually.
3
 
 Supplies for the Household were originally commandeered by 
purveyors who claimed pre-emption over other buyers in any market they 
visited, and the right to purchase goods at a fixed rate, the ‘King’s price’. 
The Crown also requisitioned transport for its supplies, and for the removal 
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of the Court from one venue to another. The value of these concessions 
fluctuated: inflation, a poor harvest or bulk purchases might send prices 
rocketing; while areas regularly frequented by the Court bore heavier 
burdens than elsewhere. Purveyance was also, as the French Ambassador 
noted, a regressive tax which fell heavily on smallholders: ‘a poor peasant 
has no sooner fattened a bullock, or half a hundred sheep, than these men 
the purveyors take them’. Finally, as the Board of Greencloth – which 
controlled Household finances – was quick to reject defective goods, 
purveyors invariably requisitioned more than their quota, selling any surplus 
in their own shops.
1
 Between Magna Carta and 1555 several dozen statutes 
were passed to curb abuses, but most were ignored: purveyors took bribes to 
avoid certain farms or markets, requisitioned goods only to release them for 
cash, or refused their legal obligation to pay cash for goods valued under 
40s. at the King’s price; while many expected a percentage from the funds 
they did disburse.
2
  
 Although remunerative, purveyance was contentious and 
cumbersome to administer, and the Crown considered various schemes to 
commute its rights. The first was a 1549 Act imposing a tax on sheep and 
cloth, which became a grievance in that summer’s peasant revolts, and was 
quickly revoked. The legal position of purveyance was re-established in 
1555, when a new statute codified previous legislation and made the 
paperwork more straightforward for local officials.
3
 Statutory arrangements 
were gradually superseded by local compositions, where shires contracted to 
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deliver supplies to the Court at fixed times, with penalties for defective 
goods. Those who compounded were spared the attention of purveyors for 
the goods they agreed to supply in kind – except during royal progresses – 
and received the Queen’s price for goods delivered, levying a local rate to 
make up the difference between this and the market price. However, 
inflation or bad harvests led some to break or renegotiate their agreements, 
while as late as 1590 Wales and one-quarter of English shires had not 
compounded at all. London was largely exempt from purveyance until a 
poorly drafted statute of 1536 created a loophole: the poulterers 
compounded with the Greencloth in 1564; wine merchants in 1579; and 
grocers in 1584.
1
 
 Composition notwithstanding, purveyance attracted controversy 
throughout Elizabeth’s reign: in 1563 the Queen vetoed a bill to make 
profiteering by purveyors a felony; while parliamentary calls for a national 
composition in 1571 and 1581 were ignored.
2
 In March 1587 a bill aimed to 
restrict the jurisdiction of the Board of Greencloth; Burghley’s clients 
intervened to have it redrafted, but it was ultimately vetoed by the Queen.
3
 
In February 1589 John Hare tabled a bill abolishing the Greencloth’s 
jurisdiction, and allowing purveyors to be sued for damages. Treasurer Sir 
Francis Knollys, ‘much nettled’, defended his department, observing that 
most grievances could be resolved by composition agreements, but after the 
bill passed, Knollys revealed that the Queen intended to undertake ‘due 
reformation’ of the Household herself. Four MPs were nominated to discuss 
reforms with the Privy Council and Household officials, but nothing was 
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accomplished before the dissolution.
1
  
 Burghley, who aspired to wrest control of the Household budget from 
the Greencloth, probably sponsored the 1589 bill: he secured Hare, its 
promoter, a lucrative position as Clerk of the Wards. The debate provided a 
pretext for Burghley’s 1591 reform commission, which led to sackings and 
prosecutions of purveyors.
2
 Twenty-six shires were then pressured to 
compound, and while it was objected in Norfolk that this procedure was 
‘without the compass of the law’,3 the threat of fresh visitations from 
purveyors eventually secured general compliance.
4
 In 1603 the Greencloth 
swiftly quashed notions that compositions had lapsed upon Elizabeth’s 
death, but one of James’s earliest proclamations warned purveyors to avoid 
‘any manner of oppression, grievance or wrong’.5  
 Secretary Cecil – who, like his father, had little influence over the 
Household bureaucracy – promoted radical reform of purveyance in the 
1604 Parliament: at the start of the session, his client Sir Robert Wroth 
attacked purveyors as ‘the hellhounds of England’. John Hare, Lawrence 
Hyde and others swiftly drafted a bill which condemned purveyors’ 
commissions as ‘contrary to law’, abrogated existing compositions and 
abolished the Greencloth’s jurisdiction over purveyors.6 Household officials 
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  CJ, I.151a, 153b, 937a; CD1604-7, p.22; E.N. Lindquist, ‘The bills against 
117 
rushed to protest: at the bill’s second reading on 3 April, Griffith Payne 
(purveyor to the Bakehouse and MP for Wallingford) objected to ‘the 
vehemency of the House’, whereupon his election was questioned, and he 
was suspended.
1
 An unnamed official (perhaps Sir Richard Browne, Clerk 
Comptroller of the Household and MP for Harwich) conveyed James’s wish 
‘that we shall not, or must not have any law to pass herein’, and the bill was 
replaced by a petition which recited grievances against cart-takers, 
complained about the illegal use of deputies by purveyors, and included a 
protest about Welsh composition. Despite further objections from 
Household officials, James allowed the Commons to confer with the Privy 
Council, and had a purveyor arrested for abusing his commission.
2
  
 Thus far, the 1604 debate resembled that of 1589, but on 8 May the 
Lords suggested a national composition of £50,000 ‘for all purveyances 
whatsoever’ – a reasonable bargain for country compositions and cart-
taking valued at £37,500, plus the London compositions and other 
purveyance. Hare offered £20,000 per annum, plus a subsidy by way of 
entry fine; Browne called for a better offer, but Hyde wondered whether any 
statute could abolish the prerogative right.
3
 The Exchequer official Robert 
Johnson suggested a bill restating existing legislation, while Speaker 
Phelips warned that if Hare’s bill were passed, ‘the King may, by a non 
obstante, dispense with it’, and Greencloth officials defended themselves. 
Extensive debate failed to reach a consensus: on 2 June Hare’s improved 
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offer of two subsidies was ignored; and the House was too divided even to 
endorse Wroth’s motion to seek improved terms from the Lords. 
Negotiations ended there, but the Commons’ Apology of 20 June, despite 
claiming that purveyance was illegal, left open the possibility of a national 
composition.
1
  
 The 1604 debate was largely a dialogue between Cecilians and the 
Greencloth, but debates over the precise terms for a composition suggest 
that public opinion also influenced MPs’ calculations. In November 1604 
Hertfordshire freeholders attached a petition to the collar of a royal hound, 
protesting that ‘we are not able to entertain him longer’. James took 
complaints against ‘thievish purveyors’ seriously: the Council announced 
reductions in cart-taking, and ordered the shires to raise a rate to augment 
the Crown’s meagre cartage fee of 2d. per mile; while several purveyors 
were prosecuted in Star Chamber before Parliament reconvened.
2
 However, 
attempts to secure a new composition for wax upset northern shires, while 
London and Bristol campaigned against the compositions for wine and 
grocery wares.
3
 
 Hare reopened the question of purveyance early in the next 
parliamentary session (24 January 1606), moving either to apply to the 
Lords for better composition terms, or to proceed by bill. The Commons 
chose the latter course, but the measure which emerged proposed abolition 
without composition. This was probably a bargaining position – James 
either had to reduce the £50,000 composition demanded in 1604, or veto the 
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bill – but on 31 January Sir Robert Johnson revived a more moderate 
alternative, his 1604 purveyance reform bill.
1
 The King urged MPs to 
discuss composition with the Lords, and the committee for Hare’s bill, 
having completed their scrutiny, agreed to suspend their labours pending 
negotiations. At the conference Hare recited the 1604 petition against the 
purveyors’ recent excesses, but offered to drop his bill in return for ‘the 
execution of such good laws as now stand in force’ – which would have 
abolished the King’s price and the Greencloth’s jurisdiction. Salisbury 
attacked those who presumed themselves ‘tribunes of the people’, but Hare 
protested that he spoke for the whole Commons; James rankled at this, and 
at the suggestion that ‘the times before me were golden, and these times 
iron’.2 This confrontation overshadowed Lord Treasurer Dorset’s report on 
Crown debts, which failed to put a price on composition, an omission which 
prompted the Commons to revive Hare’s bill, whereupon Salisbury warned 
that ‘the King’s necessity should not admit that this bill should pass’. Lord 
Chancellor Ellesmere’s spokesman Francis Moore urged a composition, but 
the obvious way to levy this charge, an annual land tax, proved 
unacceptable; and while Hare suggested ‘some other requital’, no-one could 
agree what this might be.
3
 James, grumbling that his subjects would see him 
starve, eventually indicated that a lump sum would suffice. The Commons 
procrastinated until immediately after Hare’s purveyance bill passed its third 
reading, and even then, MPs only resolved to hold a supply vote by the 
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narrowest margin, 140-139.
1
  
 The subsidy and two fifteenths MPs conceded on 18 March would 
hardly have persuaded James to relinquish purveyance, and King and 
Commons quickly fell to blaming each other for a failure both considered 
inevitable.
2
 The judges offered a way out, advising that the bill 
misinterpreted the law, and was ‘unfit to be further proceeded in’; Nicholas 
Fuller doubted whether a judicial opinion could bind a Parliament, but the 
Lords killed the bill on 11 April.
3
 There were tentative moves towards a 
compromise after Easter: a proclamation offered sweeping reforms of 
purveyance; on 3 May Johnson’s reform bill, long ignored, belatedly 
received a second reading; and Sir Edwin Sandys suggested raising the 
money to compound for purveyance via a scheme for draining the Great 
Fens. However, James quickly dismissed Sandys’s project, while in Star 
Chamber Ellesmere extolled the virtues of the prerogative in sentencing a 
purveyor for troubling Samuel Backhouse, MP for New Windsor. The 
Commons, meanwhile, ignored Johnson’s bill in favour of a new draft by 
Lawrence Hyde, apparently identical to Hare’s, which was rejected by the 
Lords on 17 May.
4
 
 The next parliamentary session was dominated by the Union, and 
when Sir Nicholas Saunders called for a bill ‘against the purveyors and cart-
takers’ on 27 November 1606, there were no takers.5 
 
                     
1
  TNA, PRO31/3/41 [Dujardin to Villeroy, 1/11 March 1605/6]; CJ, I.285-6; 
Bowyer Diary, 79-85; Wilbraham Journal, 82-6. 
2
  TNA, PRO31/3/41 [Fontaine to Villeroy, 23 March/2 April 1605/6]. 
3
  CJ, I.297-9; Bowyer Diary, 120-3; LJ, II.412b; Dudley Carleton to John 
Chamberlain ed. M. Lee (New Brunswick, NJ, 1972), pp.76-7; Croft, ‘Purveyance’, 29-
31; Lindquist, ‘early Jacobean purveyance’, 566-7. 
4
  Proclamations, I.136-41; CJ, I.304b; Bowyer Diary, 177; Carleton to 
Chamberlain, 82; HMC Hatfield, XVIII.131; Reportes de las Cases, 278-9; LJ, II.435b; 
Lindquist, ‘early Jacobean purveyance’, 567-8. 
5
  CJ, I.325b, 1005a. 
121 
The Political Economy of Wardship  
 Wardship and livery of seisin fell upon those – mostly gentry – who 
held any part of their estate directly from the Crown by knight service or 
other military tenure. Medieval landowners often evaded liability via trusts, 
but these were curtailed by the Statute of Uses (1536), while the alienation 
of ex-monastic estates under military tenures significantly increased the 
number of landowners liable to wardship. Adminstration, long divided 
between Chancery, Exchequer and the Household, was gradually subsumed 
into a specialist court of Wards, the functions of which were confirmed by 
statute in 1540. These reforms produced an impressive rise in wardship 
revenues, from around £1,000 a year in the 1520s to £15,000 by the 1550s.
1
  
 Wardship receipts, swollen by the sweating sickness epidemic of 
1557-8, peaked in the opening years of Elizabeth’s reign, but stagnated after 
Sir William Cecil took over as Master in 1561. During the next half century 
revenues barely covered standing charges of £15,000 a year (Graph 3.1), a 
disappointing performance given the growing number of those liable for 
wardship, and their rising incomes. Some speculated that large sums were 
being diverted into the pockets of Cecil and his servants, and the fact that 
many of these critics were Catholic does not invalidate their argument.
2
 The 
unofficial costs included, first, a multitude of fees: in 1607 Thomas Ottley 
of Shropshire paid £8-16-8 for his livery and 5s. for respite of homage, plus 
£3-5-4 to his attorney, and a staggering £32 to Wards,  
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Chancery and Exchequer officials.
1
 Secondly, there was embezzlement: 
county feodaries threatened investigation of those not liable to wardship, or 
made false returns in cases of contested inheritance;
2
 Receiver-General 
George Goring was £25,800 in arrears at his resignation in 1594, and his 
successor Sir William Fleetwood owed the court £18,822 when he was 
bankrupted in 1609.
3
 Finally, there was overt bribery: Sir George More paid 
£80 for the wardship of Edward Herbert of Montgomery, but laid out £800 
‘in the obtaining of it’, not an exceptional sum.4  
 Where did the money go? As with Crown lands (Chapter 2), courtiers 
and bureaucrats were granted wardships at discounted rates. Wards officials 
were best placed to benefit: Auditor William Tooke was a key broker under 
Burghley; and Richard Percival, the secretary who handled Salisbury’s 
wardship business, allegedly made £2,000 per annum from bribes and the 
profits of a dozen wardships. The chief beneficiaries were the Cecils 
themselves, a significant proportion of whose fortunes derived from the 
court of Wards.
5
 When Parliament discussed abolition in 1610, Wards 
officials claimed compensation of £30-40,000 per annum. They would 
doubtless have settled for less, but even the £20,000 considered in draft 
legislation (see below) would have equalled the Crown’s annual receipts 
prior to Fleetwood’s bankruptcy; the line A-B in Graph 3.1 is a crude 
attempt to estimate the gross revenue raised from wardship, including the 
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sums palmed by the Cecil affinity.
1
 Of course, this massive diversion of 
funds rewarded many underpaid royal servants, and funded the Cecils’ first-
class secretariat,
2
 but allegations of corruption can hardly be dismissed as 
unjustified.  
 Those liable to wardship were naturally resentful of such burdens: 
Dorothy Bacon feared the prospect for her sister’s children as ‘the burned 
child dreads fire’. Yet its incidence was capricious: only 30% of Yorkshire 
gentry families experienced a wardship in the 80 years before the Civil 
War.
3
 Matters were worst for the insane, unable to settle leases, jointures or 
annuities without a court order; such problems were occasionally 
circumvented by partition of estates prior to inheritance.
4
 Where the ward 
was unrelated to the guardian, unsuitable marriages and asset-stripping of 
estates were common, and prosecutions for fraud and waste were routine. A 
succession of untimely deaths could prove expensive, but for those whose 
guardianship was granted to their families, wardship was not an onerous 
burden. In 1586 Sir John Leveson secured custody of his stepson Edward 
Barrett, whose estates (worth £500 annually) he managed until 1607, 
spending only £312 on wardship charges – Barrett’s grandfather, Chancellor 
Mildmay, may have secured preferential terms – while he laid out £4,600 on 
dowries for Barrett’s aunts and sister, and £2,000 on his ward’s Grand 
Tour.
5
 
 Whereas Burghley encouraged debate about purveyance, he did not 
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wish to see his stewardship of the court of Wards questioned in Parliament. 
In 1586 the Commons rejected legislation voiding trusts designed to evade 
wardship, but John Hare pursued administrative reforms after his 
appointment as Clerk of the Wards in 1590.
1
 After Burghley’s death there 
was talk of restructuring the court, or even of replacing wardship with an 
annual composition fee, but revenues were increased in 1600-2 by the 
simple expedient of comparing petitioners’ valuations of the ward’s estates 
against feodaries’ official returns (Graph 3.1).2 In 1603 Cecil revived plans 
for a composition, but orders to compile a comprehensive list of Crown 
tenants created suspicion. Enquiries about another scheme – allowing 
landowners to nominate guardians for their children during their lifetime – 
generated some interest, largely among the parents of minors.
3
 Cecil’s client 
Sir Robert Wroth included composition for wardship in the reform agenda 
he presented to the Commons on 23 March 1604, and MPs, acknowledging 
the need to compensate Wards officials for loss of income, proposed to 
petition the King. The Lords agreed, relaying James’s wish that alienation 
fines and respite of homage should be included in the composition.
4
  
 Other disputes diverted attention from wardship, but on 11 May, 
when Hare offered £20,000 a year for purveyance, Sir Edwin Sandys 
unsuccessfully moved to include wardship in a general composition. Sir 
Maurice Berkeley raised same question five days later, when Hare (who, as 
a Wards official, can hardly have welcomed the proposal) persuaded the 
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House to make a separate approach to the King about wardship. The scheme 
Sandys presented on 26 May had changed little since March, except that it 
co-opted Cecil’s 1603 plan to survey all wardable lands for composition. 
However, Wroth now protested that it was ‘impossible that any good could 
come of this course’, urging an alternative measure to allow every man to 
compound for his children’s wardship in his will.1 His disapproval was 
reinforced by the Lords, who moved ‘to forbear any further dealing therein’, 
a plea later seconded by the King. This sudden reversal of official policy 
baffled many and provoked a formal protest, which developed into the 
Commons’ Apology. Cecil was clearly behind this change of heart, which 
was apparently prompted by a petition from Wards officials. It indignantly 
refuted charges of misconduct and warned against the surrender of ‘so 
principal a prerogative’, but conceded that if composition were to be 
considered, a bargain should be struck swiftly, for a minimum of £120,000 
per annum. This figure, around four times the Crown’s annual income from 
wardship and alienations, was clearly unrealistic, and it was laid aside once 
James expressed himself unwilling to barter two prerogative rights at once.
2
  
 Wardship did not resurface in the next parliamentary session, but in 
December 1606, Nicholas Fuller and William Holt sneaked it into the Union 
debates by observing that the abolition of escuage, a military tenure on the 
Scottish borders, would eradicate a form of wardship. The judges swiftly 
ruled that payment would continue even if the tenure were abolished. 
However, it was reported that Salisbury had been offered £50,000 
[presumably per annum] for composition. At the end of the session, the 
French Ambassador noted that wardship and purveyance remained the chief 
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grievances of the kingdom.
1
  
 
The Great Contract  
 Public criticism of feudal revenues sounded like ingratitude to the 
King. In rejecting proposals for the abolition of wardship on 26 May 1604, 
the Lords echoed James’s opinion in recalling that, at Elizabeth’s death, ‘we 
would have given half that we had, to have that we now enjoy’.2 Memories 
of this deliverance faded rapidly, particularly as the influx of Scottish 
courtiers, and new establishments for Queen Anne and Prince Henry, 
doubled the Household budget in the first year of the new reign. Costs were 
also swelled by the relocation from Edinburgh, and the plague outbreak 
which exiled the Court to Winchester in the autumn of 1603.
3
 Finally, 
James’s concept of kingship involved a level of generosity which 
consistently outpaced the cost-cutting efforts of his councillors, and 
survived the promise of self-restraint he made to Parliament in March 
1607.
4
 
 Despite an admonition from the Privy Council about the need for 
economy in July 1605, the Jacobean Court grew inexorably. Plans to reduce 
expenditure on diets in 1605 and 1607 were never implemented, while the 
Queen’s Council, though dominated by Cecil clients, failed to curb Anne’s 
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expenses. Prince Henry’s Household was briefly disbanded in 1604-5, but 
its expansion thereafter was unchecked by 1607 reform proposals.
1
 
Salisbury made retrenchment a priority upon taking office as Lord Treasurer 
in May 1608, aiming to pay off accumulated debt of £730,000, and a deficit 
of £100,000 a year, both of which undermined the Crown’s long-term fiscal 
prospects. In 1609 he inaugurated an entail barring alienation of the most 
lucrative Crown estates (Chapter 2), and a ‘Book of Bounty’ which imposed 
bureaucratic restraints upon royal grants to suitors. However, plans to settle 
duchy of Cornwall estates of £22,000 per annum on Prince Henry in 1610 
dissipated the benefit of Salisbury’s economies, leading him to devise a 
radical plan to surrender existing revenues in return for a substantial annual 
income.
2
  
******** 
 The Great Contract began with several memoranda delivered to 
James early in 1610, which dwelt upon reducing expenditure.
3
 The speech 
Salisbury made to Parliament on 15 February, however, focussed on raising 
revenue, for which he promised ‘a general redress of all just grievances’. At 
this stage, neither the ‘contribution’ expected from the subject, nor the 
‘retribution’ to be conceded by the Crown was specified, although the earl 
warned that attacks on impositions, wardship or penal fines would not be 
tolerated. On 19 February Chancellor Caesar suggested wardship and 
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purveyance as retribution, while five days later Salisbury called for 
£600,000 to settle Crown debts and provide a contingency reserve, and 
annual revenues of £200,000 to maintain the royal Households. He offered 
ten concessions as retribution, including a statute of limitations over 
concealed lands, purveyance composition, the waiver of old debts and 
reform of wardship and alienation fines.
1
 Although some of these items 
were valuable, the Commons insisted upon the abolition of wardship, which 
James conceded on 12 March.
2
 
 MPs doubtless balked at the scale of the proposed contribution, but 
James, too, may have had misgivings: it was only on 21 March that he 
signified his active consent to Salisbury’s plan, insisting that ‘the means of 
your King are the sinews of the kingdom both in war and peace’, excusing 
the prodigality of his first years in England, and (again) promising self-
restraint.
3
 The Commons responded with terms for wardship composition: 
all tenures to be reduced to free socage; wardship, liveries, respite of 
homage and alienation fines to be abolished; feudal aids (Chapter 4) to be 
fixed at £25,000. For this, MPs offered £100,000 per annum, a remarkable 
figure given that Crown receipts from these sources were reckoned at 
£40,000 annually.
4
 However, courtiers believed ‘that will not fetch it’: the 
Lords’ leisurely scrutiny of this proposal suggested hopes for a better offer; 
and James, ‘more averse’ to a deal after Easter, declined to surrender the 
honorific titles of military tenures along with the revenues.
5
 On 26 April, 
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James insisted that the £100,000 offered for wardship be added to the 
support already demanded, to which ‘excessive and exorbitant demands’ Sir 
Roger Owen responded ‘that silence best, or else… a message that we can 
go no higher’. There were rumours of a dissolution and Privy Seal loans, but 
James, though irritated, instructed Salisbury to ascertain what terms would 
be acceptable.
1
 
 On 4 May Salisbury advised the Commons that ‘though we asked 
£200,000, yet did we not say we would not take less’. 2 Discussions stalled 
until James gave permission to debate impositions (Chapter 5), whereupon 
Salisbury offered a revised tariff for the Contract (26 May): if purveyance 
(valued at £40,000 annually) were dropped from the deal, and the £60,000 
profit the Crown stood to gain from wardship were included in the £200,000 
support, then the Commons had to find another £140,000 annual revenue. 
This dubious arithmetic impressed no-one: Sir John Savile held the 
concessions on offer ‘not fit to [be] bargained for’; and John Tey insisted 
that only ‘a general statute of explanation of the King’s prerogative’ merited 
such a grant.
3
 Salisbury changed tack on 11 June, urging that grievances and 
‘the matter of support, which seems not to be understood of many’ be left to 
the autumn session, and proposing a grant of supply instead.
4
 Solicitor-
General Sir Francis Bacon’s report of this speech prompted a debate which 
apparently caught Crown spokesmen unprepared: Recorder Montagu asked 
for a single subsidy, whereas Chancellor Caesar wanted two. Furthermore, 
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Salisbury’s indication that grievances would not be considered until the 
autumn dampened enthusiasm for any grant. Caesar delivered a royal 
undertaking to answer the grievances before the end of the session, but 
sceptics managed to postpone supply ‘till the grievances be proceeded in’.1  
 After this fiasco, the Commons reconsidered the terms for support, 
pressing for a reduction in price and further retribution.
2
 At a conference on 
26 June, James settled for £140,000 plus the profits waived from 
concessions allowed as retribution (reckoned at £80,000), while Salisbury, 
supported by Ellesmere and Northampton, conceded additional retribution.
3
 
The Commons yielded nothing until James answered their grievances on 10 
July; he granted most of their demands, but delegated Salisbury to rebut 
their case against impositions (Chapter 5). As promised, the subsidy debate 
was rejoined on the following morning, when vigorous efforts to secure two 
subsidies were rejected in favour of one subsidy and one fifteenth. 
Following a private meeting between Salisbury and eight influential MPs, 
on 12 July the Commons agreed to offer £180,000 for annual supply. With a 
deal now seriously in prospect, Greencloth officials urged that any deal 
preserved their right to commandeer fuel and transportation for the 
Household – which was, inevitably, denied.4 When MPs presented their 
figure to the Lords with additional demands on 16 July, Salisbury supported 
the complaints from the Greencloth, and haggled over other details. 
However, he rode to Theobald’s that evening, where James rejected some of 
the minor demands but dropped his price to £200,000, which MPs formally 
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accepted on 20 July. At the prorogation on 23 July, the terms of the Contract 
were entered into the Lords’ Journal.1 
******** 
 This agreement, after six months of controversy, briefly created 
euphoria, but Dudley Carleton justly called it ‘preposterous’ because it 
ignored the question of where the money was to come from. In debates 
during the spring session of 1610, it emerged that the benefits to be gained 
from the proposed abolitions of duties would vary with each taxpayer, while 
the costs would fall upon different groups, depending on which of the 
suggested funding schemes was adopted.
2
 This meant that neither Crown 
nor taxpayers could be sure who would gain or lose financially under the 
Contract, which encouraged a sceptical reappraisal of the scheme over the 
summer. 
 In late March, when the Commons offered £100,000 a year for 
wardship, it was observed that ‘there will remain no small difficulty in the 
rating of everyone that hath wardable land’ – would the rate apply to all 
lands held by tenants-in-chief (as under wardship), or only to estates granted 
in capite? Salisbury favoured a land tax for convenience, but when James 
demanded £300,000 in April, the Commons protested themselves unable to 
raise ‘so huge a sum’ this way ‘without grieving a multitude of his 
Majesty’s poor subjects’.3 The rating debate revived on 26 June, when the 
Lords resolved to let the Commons broach the subject, although Salisbury 
now suggested laying ‘part of the burden upon those things the King hath 
nothing’ [i.e. impositions], and the rest upon land, ‘either by way of subsidy 
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the acre, or the 100
th
 part of a man’s estate’.1 MPs resolved to levy £100,000 
upon land, but Sir Robert Johnson asked whether this should be rated upon 
ancient rents, acreage, wardable lands, or by fixed quota on each township, 
and what proportion should be borne by the landlord and tenant. Sir Roger 
Owen recalled that Edward III’s demand for a quota tax in 1340 had been 
‘found so grievous as the King was [fain] to remit much of it’, while Sir 
Roger Wilbraham noted that ancient rents – the notional valuations cited in 
inquisitions post mortem – were ‘incertain & obsolete’ and recommended an 
acreage assessment. However, if the land tax paid for wardship, a flat rate 
per acre would unfairly penalise those who held no lands in capite.
2
 On 11 
July the Commons resolved to levy a rate of 2d per £ on the ‘racked value’ 
of all lands, but it was questioned whether this would produce the £100,000 
required.
3
  
 Purveyance involved different calculations: in 1610 those who lived 
near regular royal itineraries – the Home Counties, the Upper Thames valley 
and east Midlands – paid annual compositions equivalent to a subsidy, 
whereas other areas escaped more lightly (Graph 3.2). Thus northern and 
western shires pressed to exclude purveyance from the agreement, and when 
this was refused, they sought alternative compensation. Cornwall and Wales 
secured concessions over leases on Prince Henry’s estates, and the  
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abrogation of the Crown’s right to make law for Wales by proclamation.1 
More surprisingly, the Marcher shires were to be removed from the 
jurisdiction of the Council in the Marches, a project tacked to the Contract 
at the last moment by its chief advocate, Sir Herbert Croft. The Commons, 
fearful of jeopardising the Contract, resolved that this issue be ‘no breach 
or hindrance of the main bargain’, but Salisbury tamely concurred, an 
indication of his need for an agreement.
2
 Compensation for Wards 
officials also caused controversy: Richard Martin insisted this was 
included in the price for support (18 July); but Salisbury hinted at his own 
losses, and commended Wards Attorney-General Sir James Ley and Clerk 
John Hare as deserving of recompense. Draft legislation allowed a levy of 
2d. per acre for four years, which would have raised £400,000 – £20,000 a 
year at 20 years’ purchase. However, nothing was settled, and feodaries 
lobbied James on his summer progress, ‘because there is no proviso in the 
agreement which cares for them’.3  
 On 20 July, Sir George More belatedly reminded the Commons that 
‘ways and means for payment’ had not been settled. Martin recalled the 
£100,000 cap for the land tax, but Walter Gawen insisted the entire sum 
could be raised this way – yet the quota he recommended for Wiltshire was 
only half what his shire was paying for the subsidy then being collected.
4
 At 
Sandys’s behest, it was agreed that there would be no excises on beer or 
bread, and no poll tax – options suggested earlier – but details of the land 
tax remained unresolved. Meanwhile, the Lords reached different 
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conclusions. Salisbury urged that purveyance as well as wardship be 
charged to the land tax, ‘for if the King be left upon uncertain profits, the 
revenue may decay’, and on the final day of the session the Lords resolved 
that support should be ‘firm and stable’ and not ‘difficult in the levy’.1   
******** 
 Misgivings about the Contract surfaced over the summer, largely 
because of the Commons’ resolution that it be discussed at meetings of the 
subsidy commissioners, and the conclusions reported to the Commons in the 
autumn session.
2
 In Nottinghamshire, Sir John Holles found support for the 
abolition of purveyance and the tenurial inquisitions of feodaries, but noted 
the uneven spread of the costs and benefits: ‘everyone will find stuff to his 
fancy, though of much they suppose they have no use, and consequently not 
to be bargained for by them’. Others questioned the terms of the bargain: Sir 
Thomas Beaumont’s Leicestershire neighbours ‘assent to go forward… and 
to add something for supply, so that the impositions and other our 
grievances may be cast in’.3 At Court, there were ideological reservations 
about the surrender of prerogative revenues, and practical concerns about 
retrenchment. In August, Chancellor Caesar scrutinised the Contract’s 
financial consequences. He recalculated the net annual value of the 
‘support’ at £85,000, a sum easily raised ‘by improvement of those things so 
parted with by this bargain’ and by Household economies. The Crown’s 
debts and capital investments, he argued, could be funded from land sales, 
and only the planned contingency reserve of £150,000 need be abandoned. 
His assumption that land revenues could be increased by £84,000 a year 
seems questionable (Chapter 2), but he wisely warned that a fixed income 
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would be eroded by inflation, and that annual taxation would give 
Parliament a pretext for refusing peacetime supply.
1
  
 Diverging expectations among taxpayers, courtiers, Privy Councillors 
and the King became apparent when Parliament reconvened in October. 
Despite Salisbury’s forceful reminder that the existing agreement was 
merely ‘an entrance to a bargain’, the Commons, pleading poor attendance, 
focussed upon grievances.
2
 On 31 October James – having admitted his own 
misgivings about the bargain – chastised MPs for ‘slackness and many 
delays’ and pressed them to decide whether to proceed with the Contract. 
Caesar, Bacon and others backed his call, but sceptics questioned the 
Crown’s claim to impositions and whether prerogative dues could be 
abolished by statute. James curtailed this debate by demanding a supply of 
£500,000, ‘though it will be less than will pay his debts’, and urging a 
definitive decision about the means by which the annual support of 
£200,000 would be raised; he also insisted the Commons bear the charge of 
compensating the Wards officials.
3
 Salisbury, perhaps surprised by this final 
condition, waived any claim for compensation, but in the Commons, only 
Christopher Brooke spoke for supply, while no-one was prepared to 
concede support without the abolition of impositions; the Contract was 
voted down almost unanimously.
4
  
 After several days, James accepted the Commons’ decision – the 
delay suggests he required some persuasion. Ministers then launched a fresh 
campaign for supply: on 14 November Salisbury, Northampton and 
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Ellesmere undertook to levy no more impositions without parliamentary 
consent, and as further inducement, offered several of the concessions 
formerly attached to the Contract.
1
 Richard Martin spurned this 
compromise: ‘if the kingdom want, the King must needs be poor; if the 
kingdom be rich, the King cannot want when there is fit and just occasion 
for him to have it’. Samuel Lewknor, brother of the King’s Master of 
Ceremonies, who was perhaps speaking to a brief, recounted James’s 
favourite tale of Cyrus, the Persian Emperor whose wants had been relieved 
by his courtiers, and urged ‘that the King would be pleased to live of his 
own, and to resume his pensions and lessen his charge’. The courtier Sir 
George More advocated supply, but Sir Nathaniel Bacon disagreed: ‘the 
wants of the King drew on all these subsidies formerly granted, and must 
now draw on this’.2  
 Such criticisms echoed Salisbury’s personal opinions, but the public 
forum in which they were deployed gave James a convenient pretext for 
dissolution, which – surprisingly – he rejected. Instead, he met with 30 MPs 
privately, asking ‘whether they think it fit to relieve him’: Sir Nathaniel 
Bacon repeated his earlier speech, whereupon the King asked Sir Henry 
Neville whether ‘his wants ought to be relieved’. Sir Herbert Croft diverted 
attention by speaking about the Marches, but those present left considering 
themselves ‘well and graciously used’.3 Other MPs were upset at the 
prospect of an agreement being made behind their backs, but James insisted 
that there was no private undertaking, and promised a fresh initiative after a 
brief adjournment.
4
 The plan, apparently suggested by some MPs, was to 
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revive wardship composition, presumably as first mooted on 26 March. 
Salisbury seized the opportunity, but James, more sceptical, departed for the 
hunting field, leaving his ministers to clinch the deal, or take the blame for 
its collapse.
1
  
 In order to succeed, wardship composition had to be presented as a 
private initiative, and thus when the House reconvened on 21 November, it 
was not mentioned in the King’s message, which focussed on impositions 
(Chapter 5). Sir Robert Harley broached the subject of wardship, but his 
motion was swamped by calls for an order forbidding private meetings 
between MPs and the King – which suggests the House was reluctant to 
consider his plan.
2
 Eventually, on 23 November, the issue of wardship 
composition resurfaced. Once again, it was sidetracked by attacks on the 
favour James showed his courtiers, particularly the Scots: Beaumont 
complained about preferential treatment of the Scots over customs rates; 
Thomas Wentworth of Oxford observed that ‘we would be glad to hear of 
Spain, that the King spent all upon his favourites and wanton courtiers’; 
while John Hoskins bluntly insisted that ‘the royal cistern had a leak’, which 
could not be blamed on the English, the Irish or the Dutch. MPs then voted 
to end the discussion of wardship composition.
3
  
 James, at Royston, ordered an adjournment as soon as he heard of this 
vote. News of the obstructive agenda MPs planned to implement at their 
next meeting confirmed his intention to end the session; ministers disagreed, 
asking to meet at Theobald’s to argue their case, but James objected that this 
would raise misplaced hopes of fresh royal concessions. He was further 
angered by news of the anti-Scots rhetoric of 23 November, which he 
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considered ‘scandalous’, and ‘near to the point of treason’, while the French 
Ambassador noted disquiet at Westminster that James’s attendants at 
Royston were largely Scots.
1
 On 29 November Speaker Phelips adjourned 
an almost empty Commons for another week, apparently forestalling a 
motion barring MPs from private consultations with the King. Matters 
worsened when Sir Thomas Lake told James that MPs planned to petition to 
send the Scots courtiers home, a rumour the Bedchamber man Sir Robert 
Carr used to stoke his master’s latent fear of anti-Scottish xenophobia.2 
When the Commons met on 6 December, Speaker Phelips peremptorily 
delivered James’s order to end the session.3 
 Following the prorogation, James chided Salisbury for ‘being a little 
blinded with the self-love of your own counsel in holding together of this 
Parliament’; this has been interpreted as a general loss of confidence in the 
earl, but, taken in context, it seems to apply to the final weeks of the autumn 
session alone.
4
 James announced his intention to dissolve Parliament on 31 
December 1610, by which time his ministers were searching for alternatives 
to the supply and support forfeited with the Contract. City merchants 
refused to lend, and new Privy Seal loans were deferred until after the 1610 
subsidy was collected, but a temporary solution was found in baronetcies 
(Chapter 1).
5
 In January 1611 Salisbury offered his master another lecture 
about ‘the stay of bounty and the stay of your expense’, but the Household 
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budget resisted attempts at pruning until Cranfield took over the Wardrobe 
in 1618.
1
 
******** 
 Could the Contract have succeeded? The difficulties which surfaced 
in 1610 over price, the levying of support, compensation for officials and 
legal assurances over the surrender of prerogative rights had all been raised 
before, and the decision to resolve a multiplicity of grievances via a single 
agreement, while undoubtedly bold, was always likely to magnify such 
problems. The provisional agreement over the memorial of 23 July was a 
political triumph, albeit one achieved by ignoring the economic analysis 
which ultimately overthrew the Contract. The only spontaneous initiative 
undertaken by the Commons was that for wardship composition, at a far 
higher rate than that offered in either 1604 or 1606-7, and, ironically, the 
offer to revive this deal in November 1610 may have been made in earnest – 
Salisbury was not the only politician anxious to have something to show for 
so much effort.
2
 
 
Reforms and Restructuring, 1611-40  
 After the failure of the Great Contract, piecemeal reforms of both 
wardship and purveyance were pursued intermittently. Administrative 
retrenchment at the Wards followed Caesar’s advice of August 1610 that 
‘monies which heretofore were the objects of private men’s desires… be 
employed to the King’s proper use and benefit’. New instructions of 
February 1611 specified that the ward’s family should be given priority in 
bidding for custody (offered as part of the Great Contract on 24 February 
1610); that the preferences of the ward’s ancestor, where indicated, should 
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(as suggested in 1603) be heeded; that no wardship be granted at a discount 
‘in way of reward or benefit’; that the purchaser swear under oath that they 
had given no bribe; and that leases of wards’ lands be offered at ‘the best 
improved yearly rent’.1 These rules were designed to ensure that profits 
hitherto reaped by courtiers and officials came to the Crown, while 
wardship hunters – like purveyors – were only allowed to operate if the new 
rules were ignored.  
 The financial results of the 1611 reforms were impressive: receipts 
increased steadily (Graph 3.1), exceeding even Caesar’s optimistic 
projections. Almost all of this increase derived from entry fines for 
wardships (the red bars in Graphs 3.1 and 3.3) and annual rentals for wards’ 
estates (the green bars in Graphs 3.1 and 3.3), which grew by 377% and 
291% respectively between 1612 and 1638. Other income declined both 
relatively and absolutely: fines for sealing the leases of wards’ estates (the 
yellow bars in Graphs 3.1 and 3.3) dwindled after Salisbury’s death, while 
in the later 1630s, under the mastership of Sir Francis Cottington, fines for 
securing livery of seisin when the heir took possession of the estate (the 
blue bars in Graphs 3.1 and 3.3) collapsed. However, the growth of entry 
fines and rentals was so prodigious that revenues from the Court of Wards 
increased by 242% during 1612-38. During the Bishops’ Wars (1639-40) 
rentals and entry fines were squeezed even harder to meet the Crown’s 
urgent military needs, which, in tandem with a drive to collect arrears, 
raised revenues to over £90,000 per annum. This level could not be  
                     
1
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sustained, and complaints about administrative frauds in the Short and Long 
Parliaments inspired changes, particularly over the tutelage of Catholic 
heirs.
1
 However, abolition of the court was never seriously considered. 
Viscount Saye, one of the leaders of the parliamentarian Junto, served as 
Master of the Wards from 1641-6, and receipts, though latterly confined to 
areas under parliamentarian control, remained buoyant until its abolition in 
1646 (Graph 3.1). 
 Corruption was, of course, never eradicated from the court of Wards. 
Several of the impeachment charges laid against Cranfield in 1624 
concerned the alteration of these instructions to benefit his servants, but a 
hostile Commons indicted him only for an increase in livery fees, and the 
misuse of a signature stamp by his secretary.
2
 His successor as Master, Sir 
Robert Naunton, initially pruned such sharp practices as had developed, but 
by the end of the decade the wardship hunters were active again, and were 
apparently a factor in persuading the court’s most scrupulous attorney, John 
Winthrop, to resign.
3
  
 The steady increase in wardship revenues after 1612 might have been 
expected to have provoked renewed controversy in Parliament; but the 
reverse was true.
4
 A ‘grace bill’ of 1614 promised changes to the 
administration of liveries, but was criticised as a ploy to augment the fees of 
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Wards officials, and never emerged from committee.
1
 A bill penalising 
failure to make public proclamation of inquisitions post mortem received 
two readings in the Commons in June 1625, but the lawyer Henry Sherfield 
complained that it only served to increase fees, while Sir Edward Coke 
argued that the bill impeded the subject’s right to sue for possession in the 
common law courts.
2
 A similar measure reached the report stage in 1626, 
but the stalemate over Buckingham’s impeachment prevented its further 
passage.
3
  
 The revival of the Great Contract, or aspects thereof, was 
occasionally mooted in the debates on revenue reform which took place in 
the early years of Charles’s reign, but negotiations were never reopened. On 
11 August 1625 John Whistler urged the commutation of wardship in the 
Commons, a frivolous motion in the context of a supply debate to avert an 
imminent dissolution.
4
 On 25 Apr. 1626, Buckingham’s client Sir Nicholas 
Saunders objected to a motion to increase the existing vote of supply 
(Chapter 4), suggesting instead that the Great Contract be revived at the 
1610 price of £200,000. On the following morning, John Wylde, one of the 
Duke’s enemies, agreed that wardship could be commuted, and was 
seconded by Sir John Savile, who, overlooking his opposition to the project 
in 1610, now reminisced that ‘if the proposition concerning the court of 
Wards had not been neglected, the Crown had by this [time] received 2 
millions of money’. By 1626 Savile was moving into the favourite’s orbit, 
which suggests bipartisan support for the proposal. In a broader debate of 4 
                     
1
  PP1614, pp.233-5, 242-3; Bell, Court of Wards, 146. 
2
  PP1625, pp.238, 241; Jervis thesis, 59-60, which misidentifies Sherfield as 
Thomas Sherwill. The identification is clarified in HoP1604, VI.301. 
3
  PP1626, II. 25-6, 33-4, 39, 81-2; III.107; Jervis thesis, 64-5. The concealments 
bill, discussed in Jervis thesis, 60-1, 63-4, 68, was primarily concerned with the issue of 
concealed Crown lands (Chapter 2), rather than wardships. 
4
  PP1625, pp.567, 470. Jervis thesis, 58-9 takes the proposal more seriously. 
146 
May on improving the Crown’s revenues, two more of Buckingham’s 
opponents, Edward Bysshe and Sir Peter Heyman, endorsed commutation of 
wardship, but it is unclear whether this was mentioned in the resulting 
petition.
1
  
 Prospects for commutation continued to be explored after the 
dissolution of June 1626, when Savile joined the revenue reform 
commission, and undertook a pilot scheme to compound for small tenures in 
Yorkshire. However, the rival proposal of Sir Miles Fleetwood, Receiver-
General of the Wards, to promote composition for respite of homage cut 
across his plans, and the yield of both came to only a few thousand pounds.
2
 
Towards the end of the 1628 parliamentary session, Fleetwood 
recommended a fresh plan to the Commons, under which wardship, 
recusancy fines and forest fines would be commuted for up to £250,000 per 
annum. The Exchequer Auditor Sir Robert Pye, Sir Robert Phelips and Sir 
Thomas Wentworth – who all clearly perceived that this project could 
provoke endless haggling, as the Great Contract had in 1610 – persuaded 
MPs to delay this debate until the next session, where it failed to resurface. 
While this ill-defined project hardly got off the drawing board, it suggested 
one possible avenue of co-operation between the Crown and its critics in the 
1629 session, a prospect which was undermined by the dispute over 
Tunnage and Poundage (Chapter 5).
3
 
 Why did political controversy over wardship decline after 1610? 
Although aggressive initiatives over other forms of taxation met with storms 
of protest, successful pressure to increase wardship revenues did not 
provoke a backlash – a paradox historians have largely overlooked. 
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Wardship generated controversy a-plenty during the regnum Cecilianum, 
when gentry incomes were rising rapidly but the Crown’s yields were 
stagnant, a dismal performance which was undoubtedly due to increasing 
levels of corruption. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the gross income the 
Crown, bureaucrats and courtiers derived from wardship far outstripped the 
audited receipts; a line drawn on Graph 3.1 between the receipts in the 
1560s and those of the 1630s would provide a crude indication of the level 
of peculation. As the negotiations of 1604-10 suggested, most families were 
prepared to pay over the odds to ensure an unchallenged title to a ward’s 
estates and marriage. The instructions of 1611, by guaranteeing their rights, 
reduced the leverage courtiers and bureaucrats had previously enjoyed to 
solicit bribes, a fact which must have been obvious to contemporaries. Even 
if it is impossible to assess the figures for gross revenues with any accuracy, 
this hypothesis makes sense of a political paradox which is otherwise 
inexplicable. 
******** 
 Unlike wardship, purveyance continued as a serious bone of 
contention after 1610. The most cumbersome aspect of the Elizabethan 
county compositions was the delivery of goods in kind. Missed deadlines 
and defective goods created friction between the Greencloth, ratepayers and 
the contractors delivering their quotas. In March 1611 the Privy Council 
offered ‘to discharge… all compositions’ – including ‘petty purveyance’ of 
goods still taken in kind, and cart-taking – for an annual cash payment.1 
Nothing came of this initiative: Yorkshire apparently ignored it; 
negotiations with Kent, Leicestershire and Lincolnshire proved 
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inconclusive. It seems likely that the multiplicity of charges on each shire 
and the uneven burden made it difficult to secure agreement.
1
  
 Having failed with county compositions, the Greencloth turned to 
London. The most significant Household commodity exempt from 
purveyance was beer, excluded as a manufactured product. A royal brewery 
supplied the Household in the 1580s, but thereafter beer was purchased on 
the open market, until unpaid bills bankrupted the King’s brewer in 1614.2 
The Privy Council imposed a levy of 4d. per quarter upon malt used by 
London brewers from July 1614, despite complaints that it was an arbitrary 
exaction, and that London was exempted from purveyance under a charter 
of 1327. Recalcitrant brewers had their stock impounded by purveyors, and 
several were imprisoned in the Marshalsea for resisting these seizures. A 
trial seemed likely, but the case was eventually heard before the Privy 
Council, which upheld ‘his Majesty’s prerogative in this point of 
purveyance’.3 Threats of further proceedings for breach of the assize of beer 
persuaded the Brewers’ company to supply the Court with 2,000 tuns 
annually, for which they were assigned the 4d. composition, worth £3,700 a 
year.
4
  
 ‘Composition groats’ proved difficult to collect, both because of 
fluctuations in the brewing trade, and also because suburban brewers 
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resisted payment; in February 1616 the charge was reduced to £3,000.
1
 
However, ratings, based upon self-certification by brewers, were notoriously 
inaccurate, and in November 1617, shortly after the purveyor Christopher 
Smyth took over the beer contract, he filed the first of numerous lawsuits in 
the court of Requests. The Brewers’ company were also authorised to search 
private houses for unlicensed breweries, which they used to call their 
suburban rivals to account.
2
 Smyth ultimately sued most brewers for unpaid 
composition, which probably explains why four London brewers took over 
the contract when it was renewed in 1620. However, the terms remained the 
same, and a group of refusers petitioned the King for relief in the following 
spring. The Greencloth forced the company to disavow this petition in July 
1621, but in November the Brewers appealed to the Commons for relief. 
The Southwark brewer and MP Richard Yearwood complained of a 
‘composition in the nature of an imposition’, and Sir Robert Phelips feared 
‘this may lead the way to have a tax or excise on all our victuals’, but Sir 
Thomas Edmondes, Treasurer of the Household, insisted it had been ‘a 
voluntary composition’. Sir Julius Caesar moved to hear testimony from the 
Greencloth, but before this could be done the session was derailed by a 
dispute over foreign policy.
3
  
 The beer composition was not the only purveyance to receive scrutiny 
in the Commons. In 1614 Serjeant Robert Barker, MP for Colchester, 
sponsored a bill ‘against outrageous carriages’, apparently intended to 
regulate cart-taking; being poorly drafted, it was rejected at the second 
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reading. The Board of Greencloth subsequently negotiated with Essex JPs 
for a composition for carts, without success.
1
 In 1621 draft legislation, 
promoted by Middlesex and Buckinghamshire interests, awarded local 
magistrates oversight of cart-taking, ordered that carriers be paid in 
advance, and limited the length of their journeys, all of which recalled 
Hare’s tactics in 1604 and 1606. Its chief opponent was, predictably, 
Treasurer Edmondes, who protested that the bill would raise the price of 
cartage; as Sir Richard Browne had done in 1604, he moved to petition the 
King for reform. At the third reading on 25 May, Solicitor-General Heath 
observed ‘this bill takes away the King’s prerogative’ and signified James’s 
wish for consultation with Greencloth officials. Regulations about price and 
distance were apparently settled over the summer, but the bill was read only 
once in the Lords before the dissolution.
2
  
 In the winter of 1621-2, a shortage of coin bankrupted numerous 
purveyors, leaving the Household accounts £10,000 in arrears, and counties 
unable to fulfil their composition quotas.
3
 Lord Treasurer Cranfield, citing 
the parliamentary complaints of the previous year, revived the 1611 
initiative for commutation of all purveyance, and during the summer of 
1622 a commission negotiated with county magistrates.
4
 Fourteen 
compositions were concluded: Middlesex’s quota doubled to £1,800, and 
Surrey’s increased from £1,100 to £1,500, but this included cart-taking; 
Cornwall, Devon and Shropshire secured modest reductions in their 
composition. Some shires refused or declined to negotiate, while Berkshire 
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and Hertfordshire pressed unsuccessfully for the inclusion of purveyance for 
hawks, hounds and hunting horses. In Essex, the freeholders objected to a 
handful of magistrates speaking for the whole county, and doubts were 
expressed as to whether composition ‘were safe’.1 In February 1623, Sir 
William Hewitt was appointed receiver of such compositions as had been 
agreed, but he required a subsidy of £4,000 from the Exchequer in his first 
year, and his account closed heavily in arrears at Michaelmas 1624; the 
Elizabethan compositions were reinstated a year later.
2
  
 In 1624 the Commons briskly passed the cart-taking bill, which then 
received two readings in the Lords. Lord Steward Montgomery asked for a 
conference with the Commons on 15 April, but the presentment of 
Cranfield’s impeachment charges the following day diverted attention, and 
the bill was quietly forgotten.
3
 One of the charges brought against Cranfield 
involved the composition for grocery wares in the outports, but the 
investigation exposed no more than minor misconduct.
4
 Later in the session, 
the London Brewers revived their petition over composition groats, but 
when Clerk Comptroller Sir Simon Harvey was summoned to testify, this 
investigation was swamped by petitions against Harvey’s mishandling of 
county compositions. Treasurer Edmondes’s plea to refer Harvey to his 
colleagues on the Board of Greencloth failed to prevent his inclusion in the 
grievance petition, but he escaped punishment and was promoted the 
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following year.
1
  
 The dislocations of war relegated purveyance to a minor irritant under 
Charles. In 1626 a patent for purveyance of poultry for the royal hawks was 
condemned, while two years later a bill to reduce the trespasses committed 
by saltpetremen received two readings in the Commons.
2
 The counties 
bickered about their liabilities until the Civil War, but only the malt levy 
generated serious controversy. The brewers’ composition fell into arrears 
during Hewitt’s receivership, but a fresh consortium took over the contract 
in November 1624, when the composition was increased to £3,300. The 
plague of 1625 caused chaos in the London brewing trade, and while the 
Greencloth allowed the contractors a discount, the Brewers petitioned the 
Commons about composition once again in June 1626; nothing was 
resolved before the dissolution, although this modest effort cost the 
company £107.
3
 In September the Brewers offered Buckingham £1,000 to 
secure a similar reduction in their annual composition, but this was rejected. 
In the 1628 Parliament, the Westminster brewer and MP Joseph Bradshaw 
had some success in promoting a fresh petition, unsupported by his 
company. Sir Edward Coke considered it ‘dangerous to set an imposition 
upon a native commodity’, and another MP feared that this levy had served 
as the template for an excise on beer discussed by the Privy Council shortly 
before the session began. It was condemned, but the King ignored the 
grievance petition.
4
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373, 376; R. Cust, The Forced Loan and English Politics, 1626-1628 (Oxford, 1987), 
pp.76-7; P. Christianson, ‘Two proposals for raising money by extraordinary means’, 
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 After the end of the 1628 session, resistance to impositions by some 
Levant Company merchants (Chapter 5) apparently inspired similar 
recalcitrance among brewers. On 12 November, the Privy Council 
interviewed ‘divers refractory persons’, and demanded to know whether 
composition groats would be paid. The company initially resolved to 
withhold payment until the question had been examined by Parliament, but 
a delegation sent to the Privy Council either failed to convey this decision, 
or lost their nerve. At a fresh meeting of the company’s membership, 
reinforced by brewers from the suburbs, all but twelve of the 80 men present 
voted to resist the composition, but the company’s wardens declined to bear 
the cost of any initiative ‘concerning the payment of the groats’.1 Nothing 
was achieved during the 1629 parliamentary session, and the angry 
dissolution encouraged discretion. Nevertheless, the opponents of 
composition returned to the fray in September 1629, though once again at 
their own charge. The London corporation were persuaded to support their 
case for exemption under the 1327 charter, but the Privy Council rejected 
this plea on 10 December 1629. By way of consolation, the brewers’ 
composition was reduced to £2,762-10-0, but around one-third of those 
liable still refused to pay.
2
 
 
Conclusion  
 Political controversy over feudal revenues, particularly at the start of 
James’s reign, stemmed from their inequitable incidence. However, reform 
initiatives between 1586 and 1610 arose not from public discontent, but 
from the Cecils – and even with such powerful support, they were 
                                                            
English Historical Review, CXVII (2002) pp.363-6, 372-3. 
1
  APC, 1628-9, pp.228-9, 237, 295-6; GL, 5445/15 (23 December 1628; 15, 27 
January, 12 February 1628/9). 
2
  GL, 5445/15 (15 September, 12 November, 15, 30 December 1629); APC, 
1629-30, pp.205-6; LS13/169, pp.129-30. 
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complicated by the bureaucratic interests of Greencloth and Wards officials. 
For taxpayers, the chief priority was an equitable form of administration: the 
1611 instructions established that profits from wardship were to come to the 
Crown rather than courtiers or informers; while the widening remit of 
county compositions reduced the capricious activities of purveyors. The 
impact of these reforms was that the Crown’s net receipts increased 
significantly. As this produced little political controversy (except among the 
London Brewers), it can be assumed that the gross yield of feudal revenues 
did not increase – so the main losers from these initiatives were the Wards 
officials and purveyors whose income from fees, bribes and peculation was 
reduced. 
 Purveyance and wardship both featured in the Grand Remonstrance, 
but the Long Parliament did not accord priority to the abolition of either: 
purveyance was suspended by the Commons in December 1642; while the 
court of Wards yielded a healthy revenue for the parliamentarian cause until 
its abolition in 1646 (Graph 3.1).
1
 Cart-taking was revived for the royal 
Household in 1661, continuing until 1689, but wardship and purveyance, 
though both eligible for reinstatement in 1660, were commuted for a 
lucrative excise on beverages. Thus Salisbury’s hopes of 1610 for a fixed 
land tax were ultimately surpassed by an excise on beverages which grew 
dynamically.
2
  
 
                     
1
  Historical Collections ed. J. Rushworth (8 volumes, London, 1721-2 edition) 
IV.442, 446; CJ, II.886b; Bell, Court of Wards, 148-59; Aylmer, ‘Last years of 
purveyance’, 89-90. 
2
  SR, V.259-61, 310-11; Aylmer, ‘Last years of purveyance’, 91-2. 
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CHAPTER IV: DIRECT TAXATION  
 
Direct taxation has long been central to historiographical debates 
about parliamentary politics and the public sphere. Whig historians held the 
‘power of the purse’ to be a key factor in the Commons’ struggle to wrest 
control of the political agenda from the early Stuarts, but in the 1970s 
Conrad Russell warned against projecting the hostilities of the 1640s back 
into the earlier period. The early modern political system, he insisted, was 
motivated by the search for a workable consensus, and quarrels over supply 
should not be seen as attempts to hold the government to ransom.
1
 He 
further speculated – without much supporting evidence – that early Stuart 
politicians were unaware of the growing cost of the early modern state and 
contemporary warfare, and suggested that the Crown’s financial problems 
were caused more by ignorance rather than malice.
2
  
 Russell’s critics put the politics back into Crown finance by setting 
tax demands in their local context. Post-revisionist studies of the Forced 
Loan and militia finance show that contemporaries were keenly aware of 
the political and strategic implications of direct taxation, and carefully 
calibrated their responses.
3
 This chapter will extend this approach, 
                     
1
 H. Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (London, 1931), preface; W. 
Notestein, ‘Winning of the initiative by the House of Commons’, Proceedings of the 
British Academy XI (1924-5), pp.125-175; Russell, PEP, 3-11, 49-53. The Whig 
approach was defended against Russell’s criticisms by J.H. Hexter, ‘The early Stuarts 
and Parliament: Old Hat and nouvelle vague’, Parliamentary History, I (1982), pp.181-
215. 
2
 C. Russell, ‘Parliament and the King’s finances’ in The Origins of the English 
Civil War ed. C. Russell (Basingstoke, Hampshire, 1973), pp.103-4. His examples 
derive from debates about specific military initiatives proposed in 1624 and 1626, not 
war finance in general. Russell never developed his point, nor offered any alternative to 
the obvious explanation that an inadequate vote of supply carries an implicit critique of 
official policy. 
3
 R. Cust, The Forced Loan and English Politics, 1626-1628 (Oxford, 1987); T. 
Cogswell, Home Divisions: Aristocracy, the State and Provincial Conflict (Manchester, 
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considering the broad incidence of direct taxation, which fell not only 
upon the elites, but further down the social spectrum than any other Crown 
revenue. It will then examine each of the various forms of taxation levied 
during 1580-1640, when widespread evasion undermined the two main 
parliamentary taxes, the subsidy and the tenth and fifteenth, while the 
extra-parliamentary taxation the Crown sought to compensate for the 
shortfall in statutory revenues provoked overt resistance. 
 
The social impact of direct taxation  
Between 1580 and 1640 direct taxation furnished 20-40% of Crown 
revenues – the annual figures fluctuated widely, as the Crown’s demands 
and tax yields varied according to political, economic or strategic necessity.
1
 
Votes of supply comprised the ‘Alpha and Omega’ of almost every 
parliamentary session, particularly during wartime, although ministers had 
to broach the subject carefully.
2
 Furthermore, the revenues from direct 
taxation extended well beyond parliamentary subsidies: out of the £6.25M 
received at the Exchequer during 1580-1640, one-third came from non-
statutory exactions (Graph 4.1).  
 It was the incidence of direct taxation rather than the scale which 
made it a focus of political controversy: individual taxes were charged upon 
anywhere between 1% and 60% of the nation’s householders (Table 4.1). 
Because of this, levies which were innovative or coerced with excessive 
vigour by the Crown – particularly if not voted by Parliament – 
encountered widespread evasion. Tax rebellion has been studied by  
                                                            
Lancashire, 1998).  
1
  Figures taken from M.J. Braddick, The Nerves of State (Manchester, 
Lancashire, 1996), Table 1.3 (columns f and g); ESFDB database, /obrien/engd002.txt 
to 005.txt (accessed May 2014). 
2
  D’Ewes, 632. 
157 
 
158 
 
historians, but the sources for tax avoidance are often overlooked.
1
 
However, the only politically acceptable way to renege upon tax 
obligations was by procedural devices which were (intentionally) difficult  
 
Table 4.1 Incidence of direct taxation, 1603-40 
 
Tax Yield 
(approximate) 
Incidence  Number of 
taxpayers 
Subsidy  £55-70,000 Subsidymen 100,000 or more 
Tenths and 
Fifteenths 
£29,000 Ratepayers Several hundred 
thousand 
Privy Seal loans £45-110,000 Wealthier 
subsidymen 
2-5,000 
Feudal aids £20-25,000 Crown tenants-in-
chief 
Thousands 
Benevolences £27,500-73,000 Wealthier 
subsidymen 
Thousands 
Knighthood 
fines 
£176,000 £40 freeholders 
not knighted at 
Coronation 
10,000 
Ship Money £80,000 to 
£210,000 
Ratepayers Several hundred 
thousand 
 
Sources: discussed in text. 
 
to detect. From the 1580s, ministers ineffectually chastised assessors for 
conniving at evasion; their failure prompted fresh tax demands, and 
further incentives for evasion.
2
  
 Tom Cogswell argues that the key factor in the politics of tax 
                     
1
  M.L. Bush, ‘Tax reform and rebellion in early Tudor England’, History, 
LXXVI (1991), pp.379-400; Braddick, Nerves of State. The administration of direct 
taxation has been studied by R. Schofield. Taxation under the early Tudors, 1485-1547 
(Oxford, 2004) and M. Braddick, Parliamentary Taxation in Seventeenth Century 
England (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1994), but neither considers the political impact of their 
findings. 
2
  Braddick, Nerves of State, 155-67. 
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evasion was the aggregate incidence of all taxes upon personal wealth, 
national and local, in any specific year. The receipts for national taxes 
returned to the Exchequer (Graph 4.1) show little growth in yields across 
the period 1580-1640, except during acute wartime crises such as 1599-
1603 and 1625-9 (which produced temporary and episodic increases), and 
a sharp fall during the mid-Jacobean peace. The yield of local militia rates 
is more difficult to establish: Cogswell’s figures for Jacobean 
Leicestershire, and data for three other counties during Elizabeth’s wars, 
provide a shaky basis for extrapolation. However, these do suggest that 
while peacetime military charges were modest and sporadic, wartime 
levies constituted a significant additional burden on local ratepayers, 
particularly in crisis years such as 1588, 1599-1601 and 1626.
1
  
 Even when allowance is made for militia rates, direct taxation, 
which was theoretically supposed to support the costs of the Crown’s 
diplomatic and military initiatives, clearly proved inadequate in 1598-
1603; while the situation only worsened thereafter, as the Stuarts were out-
taxed and outspent by several Continental rivals.
2
 The fact that MPs who 
welcomed the Crown’s geopolitical initiatives were often reluctant to back 
their rhetoric with hard cash suggests that – contrary to Russell’s 
assumption – England’s elites were aware of the costs of an effective 
fiscal-military state, and keen to avoid such burdens wherever possible. 
This aim was assisted by the cumbersome machinery for tax assessment, 
as data gathered at local level about individual wealth was either kept from 
                     
1
  Cogswell, Home Divisions, 305-8 (especially Figure 5); N. Younger, War and 
Politics in the Elizabethan Counties (Manchester, Lancashire, 2012), pp.204-11. 
Cogswell’s decision to include purveyance and depopulation fines among his figures is 
disputable, as these were not related to military and diplomatic expenditures. 
2
  G.L. Harriss, ‘Medieval doctrines in the debates on supply, 1610-1629’ in 
Faction and Parliament ed. K. Sharpe (Oxford, 1978), pp.73-103. 
160 
 
the Exchequer, or recorded in ways which precluded an accurate estimate 
of net worth. Thus it proved difficult to centralise the assessment process, 
and when this was attempted from 1634, the county quotas imposed for 
Ship Money provoked endless rating disputes.
1
 
The mainstay of parliamentary taxation was the subsidy, assessed 
upon householders whose names were returned to the Exchequer. Subsidy 
lists purported to be a comprehensive listing of the propertied classes, but 
from the 1560s they became increasingly detached from economic reality, as 
assessors adjusted ratings to their own benefit. Thousands of taxable 
households were also silently excluded by the evolution of an unofficial 
‘bearer’ system: in some cases, the subsidy lists were filled by a rota system, 
while in others, half the sum assessed on each named taxpayer was borne by 
two or more other, unregistered, householders.
2
 So the surviving lists of tens 
of thousands of subsidymen probably recorded less than half those who 
actually paid. 
Fifteenths were charged as local rates assessed in a variety of formats, 
upon freeholders or tenants, residents or foreigners. It was widely 
complained that this tax fell more heavily upon the poor than subsidies – 
although charitable trusts alleviated the burden in some parishes – and this 
perception contributed to their demise after 1624.
3
 Their incidence was 
undoubtedly far broader than that of the subsidy, but central government 
                     
1
  A.A.M. Gill, ‘Ship Money during the Personal Rule of Charles I: Politics, 
Ideology and the Law, 1634 to 1640’ (Sheffield PhD, 1990), pp.259-83, 318-24. 
2
  R. Schofield ‘Taxation and the political limits of the Tudor state’ in Law and 
Government under the Tudors ed. C. Cross, D. Loades and J.J. Scarisbrick (Cambridge, 
1988), pp.227-55; M.J. Braddick, Parliamentary Taxation in seventeenth century 
England (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1994) pp.74-8. Each subsidyman usually had two 
bearers, but in 1627 four apiece were assigned for the Forced Loan in Scarborough: 
Scarborough Records, 1600-40 ed. M.Y. Ashcroft (2
nd
 edition, Northallerton, 
Yorkshire, 1993) pp.10-11, 182-3, 197-8. 
3
  Braddick, Parliamentary Taxation, 24-5, 61-2. 
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had no access to assessment data, which could have furnished an accurate 
survey of the nation’s landed wealth. 
 Demands for non-parliamentary taxation were more ad hoc, and were 
levied in a less systematic way. Some assessments were linked to subsidy 
lists: Privy Seal loans were charged upon wealthier subsidymen; 
benevolences probably had a similar incidence, though little information 
survives about assessments; while knighthood fines fell on subsidymen who 
had not been knighted – some 10,000 in 1630-4. All Crown tenants-in-chief 
were theoretically liable for feudal aids, but while some shires (particularly 
in Wales) assessed large numbers of smallholders, many, with the Crown’s 
encouragement, targeted wealthy landowners, who compounded at fixed 
rates. In most counties, only defaulters had details of their estates returned 
to the Exchequer, so it is impossible to be specific about its incidence, 
although it clearly ran into the thousands.
1
 Ship Money was assessed as a 
local rate, on a broader basis than tenths and fifteenths: in Essex, 60% of 
households were charged with contributions in 1637.
2
  
 
Assessed taxation 
 The Commons was indulged over supply debates because consensus 
over the necessity of taxation among elites improved the efficiency of 
revenue collection at local level. Nevertheless, while Parliament voted 
taxation regularly, subsidy yields declined precipitously between 1559 and 
1642 (Graph 4.2). An assessed tax charged at 20% (4s. in the £) on land 
                     
1
  TNA, E179/88/287; E179/93/340; E179/105/301; E179/222/391; 
E179/224/596; E179/245/4. 
2
  H. Langelűddecke, ‘“I finde all men & my officers all soe unwilling”: the 
collection of Ship Money, 1635-1640’, Journal of British Studies, XLVI (2007), 
pp.512-13, 521; W. Hunt, The Puritan Moment (Cambridge, MA, 1983), pp.13-15, 
using data from TNA, SP16/358. See also Gill thesis, 327-30. 
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and 13⅓% (2s. 8d. in the £) on goods, the subsidy was rated afresh with 
every grant, and yields should therefore have reflected the slow but 
consistent trend of economic growth. However, as early as 1586  
 
 
 
Chancellor Mildmay complained that ‘not the sixth part of that which is 
given by the statute doth come to her Majesty’s coffers’. A generation 
later, commissioners were attacked for ‘sparing themselves and others 
when justly they might have increased the subsidy without any oppression 
or grievance of the subject’. Assessors (usually parish elites) were 
criticised for ruling 
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 that men may not rise in the subsidy book… only the plain 
countryman and those of meaner sort, th’artificer & the tradesman 
cannot hide away their abilities. The wealthiest of the flock have 
both skill and goodwill to conceal their riches. 
 
In 1614 the Northamptonshire gentry made a plausible attempt at rebutting 
this case, noting the absence of industry in their shire, and the high 
proportion of lands owned by the Crown, noblemen (assessed separately), 
colleges (exempt) and absentee landlords.
1
 
 Institutional inertia was easy to identify, but difficult to reverse. From 
1593 JPs were repeatedly threatened with dismissal for rating themselves at 
less than the £20 a year in lands, the minimum statutory qualification for 
their office – by then a derisory income for a gentleman. Nor were peers any 
more public-spirited: by the 1590s the wealthiest of the nobility, with landed 
incomes around £10,000 a year, were being assessed at £600 or less in the 
subsidy rolls. Two other administrative changes also eroded subsidy yields: 
from 1559, London merchants were allowed to be rated upon their (usually 
modest) landholdings in rural shires, while from 1566 assessors were 
deprived of the right to examine taxpayers about their wealth under oath, 
making it impossible to challenge claims of poverty.
2
 Only the feeblest 
attempt was made to reverse this situation: in January 1598, a bill to make 
                     
1
  PPEliz. II.275; Montagu Muster Book (Northamptonshire Record Society VII) 
ed. J. Wake (Peterborough, Northamptonshire, 1935), pp.235-6; BL, Harley 188, ff.11v-
12, 15v-16, 28v-30. This tract was attributed to William Tooker, Dean of Lichfield (for 
whom see L.L. Peck, Northampton: Patronage and Policy at the Court of James I 
(London, 1982), pp.57-8). See also The Sermons of John Donne ed. G.R. Potter and 
E.M. Simpson (10 volumes, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 1953-62), IV.172. 
2
  Braddick, Parliamentary Taxation, 64-125; Braddick, Nerves of State, 91-5, 
209-13; F.C. Dietz, English Public Finance, 1558-1641 (New York, NY, 1932), 
pp.384-93; Shropshire Archives, 3365/2621 (Rowland Barker to Shrewsbury Bailiffs); 
NLW, 9057E/970-1, 974; 9058E/1011; A. Wall, “The Greatest Disgrace”: the making 
and unmaking of JPs in Elizabethan and Jacobean England’, English Historical Review, 
CXIX (2004), pp.319-20, 323.  
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wealth taxable ‘in the same parish where it lieth’ – the means by which local 
rates were usually assessed – was tabled, only to be rejected by the 
Commons at its first reading. Meanwhile, in the same session, the benefits 
of self-certification were so widely understood that Francis Bacon 
buttressed his call for a generous grant of supply by reminding MPs that ‘we 
know we live in a government more happy because free from extreme and  
 
Graph 4.3: Relative Yields of Subsidies, 1559-1641
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miserable taxes, the time being not to be compared to the days of Queen 
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Mary, when every man was sworn to the uttermost of his lands and goods’.1  
 Subsidy yields can be analysed by expressing each as a percentage of 
the previous subsidy (Graph 4.3). The abolition of the ratings oath in 1566 
produced an immediate drop of almost 9%, and a steady decline thereafter,  
which was only briefly reversed with the 1586 subsidy, collected under 
threat of the Armada. From 1589, votes of multiple subsidies and the 
incidence of alternative forms of direct taxation (tenths and fifteenths, 
Privy Seal loans, benevolences and local militia rates) had a greater impact 
on yields than the burden of any individual charge (Graph 4.1). Thus 
during the 1590s, famine and the cost of recruitment for Ireland and the 
Low Countries, much of which was borne by local rates, accelerated the 
decline of subsidy yields, although good harvests and military crises in 
Ireland secured modest increases in subsidy yields in 1599 and 1602 
(Graph 4.3).
2
 Elizabeth’s death and her successor’s prompt declaration of a 
ceasefire undermined the collection of the final wartime tax grant of 1601, 
as many taxpayers silently awarded themselves a peace dividend: the 
1601D
3
 subsidy (collected in 1604-5) yielded £67,660, a fall of 13.5% 
over the 1601B subsidy (collected in 1602, see Table 4.2); while yields 
from London, Norfolk and Somerset, three of the most highly taxed shires 
in the country, declined by over 20%.
4
  
 Peace did not dissipate wartime debts, but the medieval notion that 
                     
1
  D’Ewes, 582; PPEliz. III.232. 
2
  D. Dean, Lawmaking and Society in late Elizabethan England (Cambridge, 
1996), pp.41-8; M. Jurkowski, C.L. Smith and D. Crook, Lay Taxes in England and 
Wales, 1188-1688 (Richmond, Surrey, 1998), pp.163-9; P.E.J. Hammer, Elizabeth’s 
Wars (Basingstoke, Hampshire, 2003), pp.211-23; M.C. Fissel, English Warfare, 1511-
1642 (London, 2001), pp.222-3; N.A. Younger ‘War and the Counties. The Elizabethan 
Lord Lieutenancy, 1585-1603’ (Birmingham PhD, 2006), pp.212-30. 
3
  Multiple votes of subsidy are distinguished alphabetically: 1601A, 1601B etc. 
4
  Dean, Lawmaking, 48-9; Jurkowski et alii, Taxes, 169-70. 
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the Crown should subsist upon ordinary revenues during peacetime made 
it more difficult to justify extraordinary taxation. It was particularly 
impolitic 
 
Table 4.2 Instalments of subsidy receipts, 1602-7 
 
Subsid
y 
First 
instalment 
Due date Second 
instalment 
Due date 
1601B £48,679-9-4 30 June 1602 £26,272-2-0 28 Feb. 1603 
1601C £43,438-19-2 30 June 1603 £25,034-14-6 29 Feb. 1604 
1601D £43,659-6-8 30 June 1604 £24,001-5-9½  28 Feb. 1605 
1606A £43,368-18-5 1 Aug. 1606 £25,473-1-4 1 May 1607 
 
Source: TNA, E401. Receipts include arrears to 1630. 
 
to ask for further supply during collection of the 1601 subsidies, but 
overtures were made for a grant in June 1604, apparently at James’s 
behest, to demonstrate English resolve during the peace negotiations with 
Spain. Sir Francis Hastings, deputed to take private soundings among 
MPs, tactfully reported that 
 the remainder of an whole subsidy lying still… to be paid, the 
continuing of them long in payments of late years without small 
intermission, and the poverty the country is generally grown into 
thereby causeth the Commons to be loath to hear of a subsidy yet. 
 
Despite his advice, the question was put, but MPs declined to vote 
subsidies ‘in reversion’; the King then intervened to quash the motion 
before it was rejected.
1
 In 1606 two subsidies were granted without 
difficulty, but stormy scenes ensued when James demanded more. To 
smooth the process, the Commons was allowed to give a third reading to 
                     
1
  CJ, I.242a, 994-5; LJ, II.323a; TNA, SP14/8/69; CSPV, 1603-7, p.165; R.C. 
Munden ‘James I and the ‘growth of mutual distrust’: King, Commons and Reform, 
1603-1604’ in Faction and Parliament, 69-70; Letters of Sir Francis Hastings 
(Somerset Record Society LXIX) ed. C. Cross (Frome, Somerset, 1969), pp.85-6. 
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the purveyance bill (Chapter 3), despite which the motion to hold a vote to 
increase supply only squeaked through by 140 votes to 139.
1
 The Privy 
Council kept a close eye on receipts, and when these proved 
disappointing, commissioners were castigated for  
 careless and remiss proceeding in the assessment of the first 
payment of the last subsidy [1606A]… a thing so full of private 
respects and prejudice to his Majesty as we must needs tell you that 
it makes you unexcusable [sic] when it shall be brought into 
question. 
 
The irate tone of this letter apparently had some effect, as the yield of the 
second instalment of the 1606A subsidy showed an increase of 6% over the 
last payment of the 1601D levy (Table 4.2). This was an isolated 
improvement, so in 1609 the Council tried again. Portraying the King as 
‘loath to draw that from his loving subjects which the law doth give him in 
the rates of subsidy’, they urged that James saw the 1606 grant as ‘the first 
trial of all your goodwills in this kind’, and was dismayed that he received 
‘but two subsidies in value where there are three given him in name’.2 In 
1610 the question of supply became entangled with the debates over the 
Great Contract (Chapter 3): shortly after collection of a single subsidy 
began in October 1610 negotiations for the Contract broke down, and the 
yield fell again, to £69,000.
3
  
 Parliament failed to offer any supply in 1614, but in 1621 the 
Commons voted two subsidies for the assistance of the Elector Palatine, 
James’s son-in-law, whose territories faced occupation by Catholic forces. 
                     
1
  J. Cramsie, Kingship and Crown Finance under James VI & I, 1603-25 
(Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2002), pp.67-80; CJ, I.266, 285-6; Bowyer Diary, 30-1, 77-85; 
P. Croft, ‘Parliament, Purveyance and the City of London’, Parliamentary History IV 
(1985), pp.26-9; HMC Hatfield, XVIII.89-90; CSPV, 1603-7, p.329. 
2
  Bradford Archives, 32D86/38 ff.143-6; Northamptonshire RO, F(M)C223.  
3
  CJ, I.437-9, 448-9; Paulet diary, 14 June, 11 and 14 July 1610; PD1610, pp.55-
8; PP1610, II.144-5. 
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This grant, coming at the start of a session, required some explanation, and 
Sir Thomas Wentworth anticipated a rough ride when addressing 
Yorkshire’s subsidy assessors in April 1621. Admitting that ‘it may be 
objected that we have given away your money and made no laws’, he 
described some of the bills which had already passed the Commons, and 
highlighted Secretary Calvert’s ‘excellent service’ as knight of the shire, in 
order to allay fears that local interests were being overlooked.
1
 The 
popularity of the Palatine cause apparently buoyed receipts on this occasion: 
each subsidy produced around £71,500; while London’s contribution 
approached £6,000, a figure not seen since the end of Elizabeth’s reign 
(Graphs 4.2 and 4.3). Anglo-Spanish tensions escalated in the autumn of 
1623, when Prince Charles and Buckingham returned from Madrid set upon 
war with Spain. James, who preferred a diplomatic solution, initially 
demanded a grant of £780,000, which was quickly whittled down to 
£300,000, to be collected in a single year and allocated to defensive 
preparations.
2
 The yield from the first of these subsidies fell sharply (Graph 
4.3), suggesting that few believed that James would actually declare war, 
but the increasing tempo of military preparations stabilised receipts 
thereafter, albeit at a significantly lower level than in 1621; the 1624C 
subsidy, collected during the plague epidemic of 1625, produced only 
£63,000.
3
 
                     
1
  Wentworth Papers (Camden Society, 4
th
 series, XII) ed. J.P. Cooper (London, 
1973), pp.152-7; Bradford Archives, Sp St 11/5/3/1. 
2
  Kent HLC, U269/1/OE1375; T. Cogswell, The Blessed Revolution: English 
politics and the coming of war, 1621-1624 (Cambridge,1989); T. Cogswell ‘Phaeton’s 
chariot: the Parliament-men and the continental crisis in 1621’ and C. Russell ‘Sir 
Thomas Wentworth and anti-Spanish sentiment, 1621-1624’, both in Political World of 
Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, 1621-1641 ed. J.F. Merritt (Cambridge, 1996), 
pp.24-62; Russell, PEP, 185-6. 
3
  1624 subsidy yields are reconstructed from TNA, E359 and S.M. Healy, ‘Oh, 
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 When Charles’s first Parliament assembled in June 1625, fiery spirits 
in the Commons offered a mere two subsidies as a ‘free gift’, which pre-
empted official attempts to secure a more realistic contribution towards the 
imminent war with Spain, and led to an angry dissolution in August.
1
 In 
such unpropitious circumstances, yields held up relatively well: the first 
subsidy produced £63,550, and fresh complaints from the Privy Council 
about under-assessment lifted the second to almost £64,400. The 1626 
Parliament initially offered three subsidies and three fifteenths towards the 
war effort (around £280,000 at 1624-5 yields), but Charles demanded an 
increase. A deliberately vague resolution was passed ‘to augment and 
enlarge the supply already intended’, which prompted some MPs to waste 
time by calling to revive the Great Contract. Others echoed the Privy 
Council’s reform agenda: abolition of residency certificates; minimum 
ratings for JPs, knights, baronets and Irish peers; a return to Elizabethan 
subsidy yields; and even an increase in the basic rate of 4s. in the £ for 
lands. However, none of these proposals was adopted, and the grant was lost 
when Charles dissolved Parliament to save Buckingham from 
impeachment.
2
  
 In lieu of parliamentary supply, Charles raised a Forced Loan (see 
below) at five times the rate of the last subsidy of 1625, penalising counties 
such as Anglesey and Flintshire, which had obeyed Council orders to 
increase their assessments in 1625-6. In 1628 Charles, having grudgingly 
acknowledged the illegality of his actions, secured a vote of five subsidies. 
The commissions were dispatched with a copy of the 1563 subsidy rolls, 
                                                            
what a lovely war? Direct taxation and politics in England 1624-9’, Canadian Journal 
of History XXXVIII (2003), pp.452-7. 
1
  Russell, PEP, 225-7, 235-7, 241-59. 
2
  PP1625, pp.274-9; Russell, PEP, 219-27, 235-59; APC, 1625-6, pp.364-5; 
PP1626, II.381; III.61-3, 65-6, 74-80.  
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‘that it may appear how much a subsidy is fallen from that it was’, and 
instructions which summarised the official frustrations of the previous forty 
years: JPs to be rated at a minimum of £20; commissioners ‘to enquire of 
the number and value of every freeholder and men of ability in every town’; 
the bearer system to be discontinued, as ‘by this means a third part of the 
freeholders of the county are neither presented nor assessed’; subsidy quotas 
not to be filled up with absentees who would then certify payment 
elsewhere. For all this effort, enthusiasm for war had long since evaporated, 
and with the whole sum due for payment in a mere nine months, yields fell 
below £60,000 per subsidy. Further supply was anticipated when the 
Parliament reassembled in January 1629, but the session ended in chaos 
(Chapter 5) on 2 March 1629, the day after the last of the 1628 subsidies fell 
due.
1
 The government postponed collection of this subsidy for a month, but 
at the end of the year it had only realised the miserable total of £57,285.
2
  
 
Quota taxation 
 By 1629 the subsidy was neither an accurate nor an equitable 
assessment of national wealth. The obvious solution to these shortcomings 
was a quota tax, such as the assessment introduced in 1642. The concept 
was not new: in 1334 parliamentary taxation was standardised at one-tenth 
of the then current value of royal demesne and urban property, and one-
fifteenth of all other property. The national quota for this tax was set at 
£30,100 in 1468, and while some discounts were allowed thereafter, during 
1559-1625 yields varied by no more than 5% around a mean of £29,078 
                     
1
  APC, 1627-8, pp.516-17; 1628-9, pp.377-8; CSPD, 1625-6, pp.276, 307, 315, 
329; Healy, ‘Lovely War?’ 441-3.  
2
  A further £1,300 was collected during the 1630s (TNA, E401). 
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(Graph 4.2).
1
 Fixed quotas were a boon to the Crown, but a burden for those 
areas which had suffered economic decline since 1468. Attempts were made 
to work around the problem: parishes sometimes rated outsiders higher than 
locals; or provided charitable relief for poorer taxpayers, upon whom the 
incidence of this tax fell heavily; while in Norfolk (and presumably 
elsewhere) parts of the shire which were heavily taxed for the fifteenth were 
under-rated for the subsidy.
2
 These inequalities mattered little during the 
mid-16
th
 century, when fifteenths formed a relatively small proportion of the 
tax burden, but the rapid decline in subsidy receipts after 1585 placed a 
greater onus upon payers of the fifteenth. Tensions quickly surfaced 
between counties which were exempted from this charge, such as Cheshire, 
Monmouthshire, Wales and the northern borders; and those which paid 
almost as much for a fifteenth as a subsidy by the end of Elizabeth’s reign, 
including Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, 
Oxfordshire and Rutland: with two fifteenths normally voted for each 
subsidy, this meant that some shires were being taxed at up to three times 
the rate of others.  
 One way to alleviate high quotas for fifteenths was by driving down 
the subsidy assessment (Graph 4.4):
3
 in Norfolk, subsidy yields halved 
between 1602 and 1629, and in Lincolnshire they fell by a third. However, 
shires less heavily burdened also followed this approach: in Suffolk, Essex 
and Kent, where a fifteenth was worth around 40% of a subsidy in 1602, 
subsidy yields fell by almost as much as those of Norfolk. Complaints about  
                     
1
  A recalculation of the figure in Healy, ‘Lovely War?’ 443. 
2
  SR, V.146; Jurkowski et alii, Taxes, pp.xxxi-xxxiv; M. Jurkowski, 
‘Parliamentary and Prerogative Taxation in the Reign of Edward IV’, Parliamentary 
History, XVIII (1999), pp.271-90; Braddick, Parliamentary Taxation, 23-63. 
3
  In this graph, the value of a fifteenth as a proportion of a subsidy increases most 
rapidly in counties where subsidies were being sharply under-assessed  
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the inequitable burden of fifteenths first surfaced in the Commons during 
1606, when Sir Robert Wingfield of Northamptonshire protested that 
‘inequality in the subsidies and fifteenths [is] the greatest grievance’. Sir 
Robert Hitcham of Norfolk was the only other MP who backed him in this 
session, while the courtier Sir George More (from Surrey, where a 
fifteenth was worth one-quarter of a subsidy) moved ‘not to spare 
fifteenths, the corporate towns only against fifteenths, the general not 
against them’.1  
 When supply was discussed in June 1610, all but a handful of those 
in favour of a grant assumed that two fifteenths would be voted for each 
subsidy, but the details were left unresolved, allowing dissenters time to 
organise a counter-attack. On 11 July Sir William Maynard of Essex 
moved to dispense with fifteenths, ‘because they pinch the poor’, and was 
seconded by Sir John Mallory. Sir John Leveson called for a traditional 
grant of one subsidy and two fifteenths, but was countered by John 
Whitson and Edward Mercer, while Sir Edwin Sandys urged ‘fifteenths 
only in time of war, not for mere magnificence’. Sir John Harpur offered a 
compromise: ‘if gentlemen for their demesnes pay rateably, then a [single] 
fifteenth may be very well’; he was backed by Nicholas Fuller. However, 
John Tey, Sir William Strode and Adrian Stoughton all spoke against 
fifteenths, as, apparently, did Edward Alford: ‘one subsidy and pay 
presently’. The House voted by 149-129 to endorse Harpur’s suggestion of 
a single fifteenth.
2
  
 The utility of fifteenths was hotly contested during the 1620s. In 
February 1621 Christopher Brooke’s motion for a supply of two subsidies 
                     
1
  CJ, I.266b, 284b.  
2
  Ibid., I.437-9, 448; Paulet diary, 13-14 June 1610; PD1610, 55-8; PP1610, 
II.144-5.  
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seems to have been made on the assumption that the usual pair of fifteenths 
would be granted with each, but when Sir Julius Caesar, a former 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, spoke up for only two fifteenths, John 
Whitson, Sir William Strode and Sir Edwin Sandys rehearsed the contrary 
arguments they had made in 1610, and for the first time in almost a century, 
subsidies were granted without fifteenths.
1
 In 1624 the King’s opening 
speech still assumed a grant with double fifteenths, but by the time of the 
subsidy debate, official spokesmen and their ‘patriot’ allies agreed upon 
three subsidies and three fifteenths. In a lone protest, Edward Alford 
recalled ‘the last Parliament there could not be given any fifteenths in 
respect of the poverty of the meaner sort; what cause have they since to 
grow richer?’ In 1625, the situation was reversed: 
 Debate wavered a great while: some would have one, others two 
subsidies with the addition of one, others two, others four fifteenths. 
But the most were inclinable to no fifteenths at all, being very 
burdensome to the poorer sort, especially in towns and ancient 
boroughs… and pitched upon two subsidies.2 
 
The 1626 supply debate began with an offer of three subsidies and three 
fifteenths, the other half of the sum voted in 1624, but this provoked an 
intense debate, as MPs from shires where a fifteenth yielded more than a 
subsidy urgently sought to minimise their burden, whereas others could 
afford to consider the wider political agenda. Thus impassioned pleas from 
Lincolnshire (where a fifteenth yielded 132% of a subsidy in 1625 – see 
Graph 4.4) and Oxfordshire (134%) were answered by Sir George More 
(Surrey, 30%), who defied convention by insisting that they were a more 
equitable form of taxation than subsidy, and Christopher Brooke, who 
                     
1
  CD1621 II.85-91; IV.58; V.464-5; PD1621, I.48-9. 
2
 CJ, I.741; Holland diary, 19 March 1624; PP1625, pp.277-7.  
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claimed ‘fifteenths as ancient as Danegeld’. Sir Henry Whithed (Hampshire, 
53%), who had supported fifteenths in 1625, insisted ‘that the objections [to 
fifteenths] are answered by the statute’, though another Hampshire 
resident, Sir Henry Wallop, spoke against them. William Strode (Devon, 
13%), like his father in 1610, proposed to replace two fifteenths with a 
fourth subsidy, and urged that two of these subsidies be borne by wealthier 
taxpayers rated at £5 and above in the subsidy books. Crucially, in 
proposing fifteenths, Strangways and Eliot, not normally avid promoters 
of the Crown’s revenues, linked their motion to satisfaction over 
grievances (i.e. Buckingham). Their call was echoed by Sir Thomas Hoby, 
who was prepared to trade the Duke’s scalp for a confessional war, while 
the godly Exeter MP Ignatius Jourdain offered full payment in a mere six 
months if grievances were redressed; this linkage struck a chord with 
numerous speakers, and at the end of a long debate, the grant of three 
fifteenths was confirmed by voice vote, suggesting a substantial margin in 
favour.
1
  
 When the Privy Council fixed quotas for the Forced Loan in 1626, 
the fifteenth, from which one-third of the country was exempt, was naturally 
excluded as a template. In 1628 the supply vote had to match the quota of 
the Forced Loan as quid pro quo: some proposed four subsidies and two or 
four fifteenths, but Sir Francis Barrington urged a parliamentary grant of 
five subsidies, the same as the loan; ‘I denied the loan, but now in this way I 
will give as much as the [loan], because it is this parliamentary way’.2 This 
grant was duly adopted, and fifteenths were not voted thereafter, forcing the 
Crown to rely upon the dwindling subsidy as the mainstay of direct taxation. 
                     
1
  PP1626, II.376-83; Russell, PEP, 291. A close call would have required a 
division. 
2
  Cust, Forced Loan, 46-8; TNA, SP16/84/89; PP1628, II.297-319. 
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Extra-parliamentary taxation 
 Although parliamentary taxation disappointed as a revenue source 
under the early Stuarts, medieval precedents permitted the Crown to raise 
direct taxation without statutory approval; such revenues accounted for 33% 
of receipts from the laity during 1580-1640.
1
 Demands were grounded upon 
the subject’s obligation to provide contributions where time did not permit 
the summons of a Parliament, or existing grants of supply had proved 
inadequate, but the Crown had to argue its case in each particular instance, 
which gave the subject legitimate – albeit restricted – opportunities to 
express dissent.  
******** 
 From 1347, the most common form of extra-parliamentary taxation 
was loans raised from wealthier taxpayers. Lenders were usually promised 
repayment within a specified period, often guaranteed by a Privy Seal letter, 
but the system was abused by Henry VI and collapsed in the 1450s. Edward 
IV replaced loans with benevolences, collected on a similar basis but never 
intended to be repaid; these were outlawed by statute in 1484. However, the 
early Tudors revived both forms of taxation, with varying success: their 
demands provoked rebellions in 1497 and 1525; but similar levies raised to 
fund the wars of the 1540s produced substantial revenues, even though they 
overlapped with subsidy payments.
2
  
                     
1
  Figures from Graph 4.3. Excluding Ship Money receipts of £750,000, just over 
20% of remaining lay taxation came from non-parliamentary sources. 
2
  G.L. Harriss, ‘Aids, Loans and Benevolences’, Historical Journal, VI (1963), 
pp.1-19; H. Kleineke, ‘The Commission de mutuo faciendo in the Reign of Henry VI’, 
English Historical Review, CXVI (2001), pp.1-30; Jurkowski et alii, Taxes, pp.xlvii-
xlix, 49-50, 70-71, 73-109, 115-20, 126-8, 135-40, 153-4; R.W. Hoyle ‘War and public 
finance’ in Reign of Henry VIII ed. D. MacCulloch (Basingstoke, Hampshire, 1995), 
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 Elizabeth raised five loans from wealthier subsidymen at times of 
crisis, but the large sums demanded provoked evasion, and exposed frauds 
in the tax rolls. Repayment was never as swift as the 12-18 months usually 
promised, while failure to repay the 1597 loans undermined the credibility 
of the enterprise.
1
 James, having waived a vote of supply in 1604 (see 
above), raised £109,546-10-0 by Privy Seals in 1604-5, a handsome sum, 
but only 45% of the £244,500 originally rated.
2
 These loans were repaid in 
1607-9, from the receipts of the 1606 subsidies, an initiative which helped 
buttress royal creditworthiness.
3
 After the collapse of the Great Contract in 
November 1610, a further loan was announced in October 1611, on the 
grounds that ‘present occasions of public service… cannot attend the length 
of time wherein it might be raised by contribution from the generality of the 
subjects’. This loan was earmarked for Ireland, the navy and fortifications: 
those who had subscribed in 1604 were offered a one-third discount; while 
the newly created baronets, having already contributed to the Irish garrison, 
were released altogether. It raised £103,227, repaid in 1615-18. In May 
1613 further loans of £13,420 were raised from 86 peers, senior bureaucrats 
and London aldermen.
4
  
 While Elizabethan and Jacobean loans followed medieval precedents 
in being ostensibly voluntary, they were often controversial and sometimes 
coerced: the Privy Council had berated and imprisoned loan refusers as 
recently as 1557. The Elizabethan regime inclined to leniency, allowing a 
variety of plausible excuses such as death, poverty or removal from the shire 
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  BL, Lansdowne 68/25; Bacon Papers IV.28, 47-51; BL, Add. 34218, f.88. The 
Crown originally planned to repay the 1597 loans: Bacon Papers, IV.50-1.  
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  BL, Lansdowne 156, ff.74-86; TNA, E401/2584-5; BL, Add. 27877. 
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to which the demand was sent: 14% of those rated in 1604 were excused for 
such reasons. Counties were assessed by commissioners (deputy lieutenants 
from 1588), who were given a quota for their shire, scrutinised subsidy 
rolls and earlier loans to establish credible lists of lenders, applied 
pressure to potential recalcitrants, and made up any shortfall by sending 
out additional Privy Seals. The process was quite cumbersome: the 1604 
commissioners sent Privy Seals to 8,232 individuals, to the value of 
£244,000, in order to secure payment of £109,500 from 3,430 individuals.
1
 
Sir Arthur Atye, the collector for Middlesex, recorded some of the 
exchanges he had with recalcitrants, including the redoubtable Lady 
Dorothy Scott, who complained that her contribution towards the 1597 
loan had not been repaid, and that she had lately paid the first instalment 
of the 1604D subsidy. Atye responded that her excuses ‘were common, I 
thought, to all men that had Privy Seals’, and while admitting he knew 
nothing of her circumstances, he urged her ‘not to be the first’ to refuse. 
Elsewhere, towns such as Coventry spread the burden by using the same 
system of bearers employed for the subsidy.
2
 
******** 
 Another medieval project was revived in 1609, with the demand for a 
feudal aid from Crown tenants-in-chief upon the knighting of the King’s 
eldest son. This had not been levied since 1401-2, although a subsidy was 
conceded in place of another demand in 1504. The rates for this aid had 
been fixed at a modest level by statute in 1352, but the Jacobean initiative 
encouraged tenants-in-chief to compound rather than have their estates 
                     
1
  D. Loades, The Reign of Mary Tudor (2
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 edition, Harlow, Essex, 1991), p.341-
2; HMC Hatfield XVI.191; Bacon Papers, III.91; IV.28-9, 47; TNA, E401/2585; CUL, 
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  York City Archives, House Book 33, ff.285-7; Coventry Archives, BA 
H/C/17/1, f.154; BL, Cotton Titus B.V, f.18v. Lady Scott paid her £20. 
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surveyed.
1
 In western Kent, detailed surveys were made of precise acreages, 
which persuaded Crown tenants to compound for 50% of a subsidy, 
considerably better than the national average yield of 35%. In most cases, 
only those who failed to compound were certified into the Exchequer, 
except in Wales, where thousands of smallholders were charged modest 
sums, and several shires returned complete surveys. There was initial 
confusion over whether ecclesiastical estates were liable, and the clergy 
contributed only £700 of the £22,600 collected.
2
 This fiscal device caused 
some concern in Parliament the following spring, when one clause of the 
Great Contract capped the yield of such aids at £25,000. In 1612 a fresh aid 
was levied for the marriage of Princess Elizabeth. The implementation was 
somewhat different: refusers were certified into the Exchequer; but several 
English counties returned complete rolls of payers, which included large 
numbers of small contributors; on this occasion, several Welsh shires opted 
to compound for lump sums. Despite this administrative effort, the levy 
yielded only £21,900.
3
 
******** 
 In 1614, a benevolence (the first levied since 1546), was raised in lieu 
of the supply the Addled Parliament had conspicuously failed to offer the 
King. First mooted by Sir Robert Cotton and Sir Henry Marten in 1612-13, 
the idea was taken up by the bishops after the dissolution. James, fond of the 
tale of the Persian Emperor Cyrus – whose wants had been relieved by those 
who benefited from his generosity – was said to have been delighted ‘that 
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  Jurkowski et alii, Taxes, pp.xxiv-xxvi, 73, 129; HEHL, HM171, ff.1-10v, 15-
18; NLW, Clenennau 248. 
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  Staffordshire RO, D593/S4/59/2-17; TNA, E179/88/287; E179/112/582; 
E179/222/391; E179/224/596; E179/238/127; TNA, E359/5, mm.28-36; HEHL, 
HM171, ff.66-8; Shropshire RO, LB8/3/5A. 
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  LJ, II.660b; TNA, E179/85/111; E179/105/301; E179/106/13; Staffordshire 
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there were some persons who had feeling of his necessities’.1 However, the 
levy engendered little enthusiasm beyond Court circles: Sir John Wynn 
explained to his son (then in service with Lord Treasurer Suffolk)  
 I perceive… that my Lord Treasurer expecteth my gift to the King; 
let time wear the remembrance away and answer him with silence, 
but if he press you then you are to acquaint him with my late 
[law]suits, which were many & great, my late contribution to the 
King of XI hundred pounds for his wars in Ireland, my purchases & 
buildings, which all have cast me far in debt. I dealt with the country 
[Caernarvonshire] most earnestly & at sundry times in that behalf, 
but they had it not, neither gentleman nor yeoman.
2
  
 
Despite an endorsement by Chief Justice Sir Edward Coke, there were 
reports of this benevolence being ‘refused in divers counties westward’. In 
Kent, guarded support for the levy evaporated upon the suggestion that JPs 
subscribe a minimum of £20 apiece, while in Bedfordshire Lord St. John of 
Bletsoe was taken to task for presiding over a meeting at which ‘your 
coldness was noted and did harm’. He eventually donated £100, but his 
distant cousin Oliver St. John of Wiltshire achieved instant notoriety by 
citing the 1484 Benevolences Act as grounds for his refusal, and 
protesting that 
 it is against reason that the particular and several commons, 
distracted, should oppose their judgment and discretion to… the 
wisdom of their land assembled in Parliament, who have there 
denied any such aid. 
 
This letter was widely circulated, and its author hauled before the Privy 
Council. St. John delivered a public recantation in Star Chamber, following 
which several counties suddenly delivered their outstanding contributions, 
                     
1
  BL, Add. 72242, ff.27-30; Bacon Letters, V.78-80; Chamberlain Letters, I.542; 
HMC Downshire, 429, 458; Cramsie, Kingship, 25-8, 34-6. 
2
  Denbighshire RO, DD/WY/6627. ‘£1,100 for Ireland’ refers to Wynn’s 
baronetcy; he clearly hoped baronets might be exempted, as they had been in 1611/12. 
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but three years of effort realised only £63,500 from the laity, 10% less than 
the 1610 subsidy, and nearly 40% down on the 1611 Privy Seal loan. The 
government had clearly hoped for more, and in Shropshire, Staffordshire 
and the North Riding of Yorkshire none beyond a handful of gentry offered 
anything at all (Graph 4.5).
1
  
 Disappointment over the 1614 benevolence discouraged further 
recourse to extra-parliamentary taxation, and no further national appeal was 
made until 1620, when emissaries from King James’s son-in-law, the 
Elector Palatine, privately raised a benevolence for the defence of their 
master’s recent acquisition, the kingdom of Bohemia.2 Receipts were not 
recorded in the Exchequer, but scattered evidence suggests it yielded around 
one subsidy, more than the 1614 benevolence.
3
 In October 1620, news of 
the Hapsburg attack on Prague spurred James to collect a benevolence of his 
own, which raised £27,545 from 106 peers, bishops and bureaucrats, plus 
another 10,000 marks from the London corporation. However, Sir John 
Holles refused to be pressed to a contribution by the Privy Council, 
protesting that he had already sent one of his sons to Bohemia, while 
contributions from the provinces were later refunded.
4
  
 Parliament gave two subsidies in February 1621, but another voted in 
November was lost at the dissolution. In 1622-3, a fresh benevolence for the  
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  BL, Lansdowne 160, f.118; TNA, PRO30/53/7/7, 11; BL, Add. 34218, f.146v; 
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  Cogswell, Home Divisions, 34-7. 
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Palatinate produced lay contributions of £72,740, slightly more than the 
lost subsidy.
1
 However, the levy, while officially portrayed as a 
spontaneous gesture, began with the Council applying pressure on MPs to 
give generously to the cause they had offered their ‘lives and fortunes’ in 
their declaration of 4 June 1621.
2
 Refusers were lectured by the Privy 
Council, and when the King learned that Sir Francis Seymour, one of the 
‘most refractory’ MPs, had been spared, he ordered him ‘called again & 
put hard to it, & rather than he should escape the contribution, that he be 
sent into the Palatinate in person, that others may be scared by the 
example’. The most eminent refuser, Lord Saye, was imprisoned, while 
other parliamentarians contributed grudgingly, encouraging similar 
‘refusals and almost plain denials’ in a number of counties (Graph 4.5). In 
Caernarvonshire the gentry sounded out neighbouring counties before 
resolving upon a contribution worth one subsidy (which was never paid); 
while in the West Riding, outstanding arrears were still being chased a 
decade later.
3
 
 Charles’s accession in 1625 brought war with Spain, and further 
financial demands: that autumn the lieutenancy assessed Privy Seal loans 
amounting to £86,950, with London rated at a further £45,400. The levy was 
officially justified on grounds of urgent necessity, and the King’s 
presumption of ‘the love and affection of our people when they shall again 
                     
1
  BL, Egerton 2595, f.32v. Receipts for the 1622 Benevolence are recorded in 
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assemble in Parliament’. Nevertheless, it was a failure when compared to 
Jacobean equivalents, yielding just over £40,000. This was largely because 
it followed a plague epidemic and what Holles called ‘a chaos of miseries 
coming fast upon us… perpetual subsidies, privy seals, benevolences, 
projects, improve[ment] of customs, presses and levies for the sea, for the 
coasts, for Ireland… and all other extremities of a necessitous state’. 
Buckingham’s associate Sir George Paule warned Secretary Conway of 
discontent in London, while in the 1626 Parliament Sir Thomas Hoby 
protested that ‘aids for war ought to be but aids’. Many of those expected to 
implement the loan dragged their feet, partly because of existing burdens, 
but also, perhaps, in the hope that further parliamentary supply would lead 
to its abandonment, or at least to speedy reimbursement.
1
  
 Initial receipts reached the Exchequer in December 1625, and over 
the next three months the promise of a new parliamentary session 
encouraged half the shires in England and Wales to make remittances. 
However, the inauguration of impeachment proceedings against 
Buckingham by the Commons in early March boded ill for the survival of 
the Parliament, and payments slumped until mid-April, when it became 
clear that the King would allow the case against the Duke to proceed.
2
 
During this period, government and local elites repeatedly probed each 
other’s resolve: London, owed £211,000 for private loans to the Crown 
(Chapter 1), remitted only £1,600, an insignificant fraction of its quota; in 
Caernarvonshire, Sir John Wynn was reminded ‘if your money be once paid 
there is no redeeming of it back again’, and advised to offer a small sum and 
                     
1
  R. Ashton, The Crown and the Money Market, 1603-1640 (Oxford, 1960), 
pp.127-9; TNA, E34/58; TNA, SP16/8/34, 44, 86; SP16/18/101; Holles Letters, 309; 
HMC Cowper, I.230-1; PP1626, III.78. 
2
  Russell, PEP, 292-9. 
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petition for a reduction; while a delegation of Yorkshire MPs led by Sir 
John Savile (then rising in Buckingham’s favour) secured a discount of 60% 
of the county’s £10,000 quota. This last concession was granted in 
expectation of prompt collection of the remaining loans, and in the West 
Riding collection was consigned to Savile’s creatures, who were quick to 
cite refusers before the Privy Council. Sir Henry Savile, the former 
collector, denied expenses for his earlier labours and ordered to pay £30 
towards the levy himself, was outraged, asking ‘hath he [Sir John] had the 
good luck to befool a whole Council of State, to the King’s prejudice?’1 
******** 
 On 13 June 1626 the Commons passed a Remonstrance which 
censured the ‘new counsels’ behind unparliamentary taxation, and the 
abrupt dissolution two days later wrecked the collection of the Privy Seal 
loan.
2
 Remittances dried up within weeks, and the levy was superseded by 
a demand for a benevolence equivalent to the four subsidies and three 
fifteenths lost at the dissolution. Some counties attempted to negotiate: the 
taxpayers of Cumberland (where a subsidy was worth only £146) agreed to 
pay the whole sum, provided other burdens were lifted; while in Rutland 
the JPs set an example by offering three subsidies from their own pockets, 
but asked ‘that if other countries do not give at all, that then they might not 
be made a singular precedent’. However, many counties emulated 
Bedfordshire, where the subsidymen ‘much insisted that the parliamentary 
way of raising money was most equal and indifferent’ and refused to pay. 
Unhappily, this levy coincided with militia reforms costing between one 
                     
1
  Healy, ‘Lovely War?’ 444; Russell, PEP, 270-3, 279-81, 289-322; NLW, 
9061E/1395, 1412; APC, 1625-6, pp.421-2; TNA, SP16/26/32; Wentworth Papers, 
250-2. 
2
  PP1626, III.440. 
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and two subsidies in local rates, and instead of the £340,000 demanded, 
the Exchequer received a mere £845 from Middlesex, Surrey and 
Warwickshire, and a further £100 from the courtier John, Lord Vaughan. 
In August, as a complement to the benevolence, fresh Privy Seals for loans 
of £55,400 were sent to 49 lawyers and 150 gentry, many of whom were 
former MPs. Such punitive loans, for hundreds of pounds apiece, could 
not resolve the Crown’s financial problems, but merely exacerbated 
political tensions. Chief Baron Sir John Walter paid £200, but nothing 
more was received before both the benevolence and these fresh Privy 
Seals were rescinded by proclamation on 22 September.
1
 
 The cancellation of existing schemes had nothing to do with failing 
resolve; it cleared the way for a fresh demand, known to posterity as the 
Forced Loan,
2
 which Charles promised  
 shall not in any wise be drawn into example, nor made a precedent for 
after times… by our people’s affection now shewed to us in this way 
of necessity, they shall the sooner invite us to the frequent use of 
parliaments, being confident in the hearts of our people. 
 
Having thus raised the political stakes, the King ensured that the new levy, 
rated at five times the subsidy received a few months earlier, was 
implemented with unprecedented vigour: bureaucrats and lawyers were 
pressed to make early payment directly into the Exchequer, while Privy 
Councillors were dispatched across the country to ensure that the Loan 
received official support at local level.
3
 In southern England receipts were 
                     
1
  Cust, Forced Loan, 31-9, 158-64; HMC Cowper, I.280; SP16/35/10; Healy, 
‘Lovely War?’, 445, 454-5; Cogswell, Home Divisions, 122-6; TNA, E401/2442-3; 
E401/2586, pp.459-76; TNA, E34/58; Proclamations, II.108. 
2
  Contemporary accounts refer to the ‘loan of five subsidies’ or ‘loan for the 
King’. 
3
  BL, Add. 34324, f.256; HMC Buccleuch, III.306-10; Proclamations, II.110-12; 
TNA, SP16/54/28; SP16/84/89; Cust, Forced Loan, 46-52.  
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assigned to pay for troops billeted since the return of the Cadiz expedition, 
which encouraged high yields: Devon collected 83.95% of its quota, while 
commissioners in mainland Hampshire recorded promises for payment of 
75.54% of theirs.
1
 Outside the south of England, just under 72% of the 
original quotas eventually reached the Exchequer, a remarkable 
achievement in the aftermath of failures over the 1625 Privy Seals and 1626 
benevolence.  
 
 
 
 The rate at which these remittances arrived provides some indication 
of public opinion (Graph 4.6): the Loan was inaugurated almost everywhere 
between November 1626 and January 1627, but at Easter 1627 half the 
                     
1
  TNA, E401/2444 (Devon). The quota for mainland Hampshire was £9,938-4-2 
(TNA, E359/68), payment was promised for £7,514-16-8 (Hampshire RO, 
44M69/G5/48/54). 
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counties due to make payment to the Exchequer had returned nothing, and 
alarmist rumours of a fresh Parliament circulated. Nevertheless, the 
government’s resolve, indicated by the growing number of refusers 
convented before the Privy Council, was clear to all. Moreover, the Stuart 
war machine, almost moribund for a year, made energetic preparations to 
succour the Huguenots of La Rochelle. By the time the fleet sailed at the 
end of June, 62% of Loan quotas had been received, but thereafter any sense 
of urgency expired, while much of the £87,467 then outstanding was due 
from the most obdurate refusers. Receipts averaged £5,000 a month over the 
summer, but at the end of November the return of the defeated 
expeditionary force and the impact of the Five Knights’ case led to a 
collapse in receipts.
1
  
 Despite the furore raised in Parliament in 1628, Charles had every 
reason to feel vindicated by the receipts from Forced Loan, when almost 
three-quarters of the nation’s taxpayers contributed to a levy with no 
statutory basis and little prospect of repayment. While he was subsequently 
obliged to concede the Petition of Right, which prohibited the collection of 
loans and benevolences in the future, he discounted parliamentary protests 
as the machinations of a handful of troublemakers. Yet the Loan upset the 
political balance not merely in the half dozen counties where it failed 
(Graph 4.7), but in many others where ancient enmities were invigorated, or 
new resentments created: Londoners, still awaiting payment of earlier loans 
(Chapter 1), returned only 17% of their quota; while in Bedfordshire the St. 
Johns, who had dominated the county for 40 years, opposed the Loan, 
frustrating collection there; and in Leicestershire the Earl of Huntingdon,  
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  Healy, ‘Lovely War?’ 446-7; BL, Egerton 2715, ff.327, 341; M. Kishlansky, 
‘Tyranny denied: Charles I, Attorney-General Heath and the Five Knights’ Case’, 
Historical Journal, XLII (1999), pp.60-5. 
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hitherto a diligent Crown servant, refused to pay and was attacked by a 
clique of Buckingham’s crypto-Catholic relatives.1  
 Feelings ran particularly high in Yorkshire, where Sir John Savile had 
had Sir Thomas Wentworth, Sir William Constable, Sir Thomas Hoby and 
Sir John Hotham removed from local office in the summer of 1626. Savile’s 
appointment as a Privy Councillor in November 1626 was correctly 
interpreted as a move to bolster collection of the Loan in Yorkshire, which 
virtually obliged his enemies to pursue a course of obstruction. Hoby paid in 
London, but the other three evaded their initial summonses, and the county 
elites waited to see what would happen: at Easter 1627 the Exchequer had 
received nothing from Yorkshire, and the Loan teetered on the brink of 
disaster.
2
 The deadlock was broken by a combination of negotiation and 
main force: in the East Riding, Savile secured the assistance of Viscount 
Dunbar and other Catholics who had long chafed at their exclusion from 
public office; while Sir Thomas Belasyse in the North Riding and Sir 
Thomas Fairfax of Denton in the West Riding were persuaded to co-operate 
with offers of peerages. Meanwhile, over Easter, Constable, Hotham and 
Wentworth’s lawyer George Radcliffe were hauled before the Privy 
Council; Radcliffe promised his wife ‘when my opposition appears that it 
can do no good, I resolve not to stand out longer than is fit’, but his bluff 
was called when he was imprisoned. These examples finally galvanised 
waverers into paying: by the end of May half of Yorkshire’s Loan quota had 
arrived at the Exchequer; while Wentworth, now isolated, appeared before 
                     
1
  SR, V.23-4; Cogswell, Home Divisions, 137-60. This issue is examined in 
greater depth in Cust, Forced Loan. 
2
  TNA, C231/4, ff.206v-209v; APC, 1626, p. 353; Holles Letters 337-8; TNA, 
E179/214/389. 
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the Privy Council on 15 June and was consigned to the Marshalsea prison.
1
  
 Although earlier Privy Seal loans and benevolences had encountered 
opposition, the Forced Loan polarised opinion because Charles’s financial 
problems were the direct result of his dissolution of the 1626 Parliament. As 
Sir Benjamin Rudyard observed in March 1628, 
 this is the crisis of Parliaments, by this we shall know whether 
parliaments will live or die… Seems it a slight thing unto you that we 
have beaten ourselves more than our enemies could have done, and 
shall we continue so by our divisions and by our distractions?… the 
nearness of relation between the King and subjects is such as neither 
can have existence without the other.
2
 
 
Rudyard, who had not opposed the Loan, was troubled by the consequences 
of an open rift between the King and his subjects which went beyond the 
political elite. Dissent against the Loan took many different forms. Gentry 
refusers were summoned to London, where some were imprisoned, but 
many were simply ordered to attend the Privy Council, waiting weeks for an 
audience. Some were even sent home and recalled, perhaps a ploy to test 
their resolve, while Sir Humphrey May gave Constable ‘a long lecture’ 
about ‘not hearkening to his moderate advice in the Parliament’. Wentworth 
consulted widely before taking a stand against the Loan: his friends advised 
him not to bandy words with Savile’s local commission, but to come before 
the Privy Council; while even Wandesford, who avoided payment by hiding 
in his own home, advised ‘it is no time now to play at sharp with the 
Crown’. Refusers faced the Board alone: some made vociferous 
denunciations of the levy; but Wentworth was praised by Lord President 
                     
1
  Life and Correspondence of George Radcliffe ed. T.D. Whitaker (London, 
1810) pp.138, 157; APC, 1627, p.240; TNA, E401/1914; Fairfax Correspondence ed. 
G.W. Johnson (2 volumes, London, 1848), I.68-9; Strafforde Letters ed. W. Knowler (2 
volumes, London, 1739), I.37-9; Holles Letters, 350; TNA, SP16/60/52; SP16/65/12. 
2
  PP1628, II.58-60.  
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Manchester for his moderate critique. Those who reached this stage were 
unlikely to yield, but many were willing to exchange imprisonment for 
confinement in counties far from their homes, although some, including the 
five who eventually sued writs of habeas corpus, refused even this 
modicum of co-operation.
1
  
 Further down the social scale, the Privy Council had neither the time 
nor the resources to deal with individual subsidymen, and in Bedfordshire, 
Essex and Lincolnshire, where aristocratic refusers provided a lead, or 
Boston, Norwich and Gloucester, where godly corporations offered 
solidarity, the Loan encountered a broad range of resistance strategies. In 
Gloucester, one man not rated for subsidy made a voluntary contribution of 
£5, but 130 taxpayers (25%) escaped assessment, some by refusing or  
Table 4.3 Gloucester City & Inshire Forced Loan 
assessments, 1627 
 
Response Yield Proportion  
Payment received £572-3-4 51.08% 
Uncollected £272-13-4 24.34% 
Refused/absent £79 7.05% 
Living elsewhere £74-6-8 6.64% 
Dead/impoverished £100 8.93% 
Other £22 1.96% 
 
Sources: TNA, E179/116/531; TNA, E401/1914. 
 
absenting themselves from the meetings, others because of death, 
impoverishment or being rated elsewhere (Table 4.3). Some protested they  
had contributed to the 1625 Privy Seal loan, but were rated regardless, 
although this was not always the case elsewhere – one-sixth of the 
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  Fairfax Correspondence, I.68-9; Strafforde Letters, I.36-40; Holles Letters, 
II.350, 356; TNA, SP16/89/2; Cust, Forced Loan, 58-62; Wentworth Papers, 267-8. 
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Carmarthenshire Loan quota was assigned to repay Privy Seals. The 
aldermen of Gloucester clearly worked hard to implement the rating 
procedure, but all bar one then refused to pay the Loan itself; they were 
joined in their defiance by a further 25% of the local subsidymen, and only 
half the city’s quota of £1,120-3-4 ultimately found its way to the 
Exchequer. 
 The response was not much better in Hampshire: initial returns from 
Basingstoke division in January 1627 reveal 4 refusers (1%), an 
absenteeism rate of 11%, and a further 17½% of the Loan quota waived for 
technical reasons. However, troops had only recently arrived in the area, and 
matters were very different in Coldridge hundred in Devon, where 
outstanding billeting charges already amounted to more than the Loan 
assessment of £1,609, and 54% of subsidymen were owed billeting money. 
Here, only 4 individuals refused the Loan (½% of quota), while rates of 
absenteeism and non-residence (6%), poverty and death (10½%) were 
relatively low. However, it is unlikely that any cash left the area, such 
sums as were raised being redistributed locally to settle billeting charges.
1
 
******** 
 On 20 November 1627, shortly before the judges gave their verdict 
upon the Five Knights’ case, the Crown exhumed another revenue-raising 
expedient, fines upon landowners worth at least £40 per annum who had 
failed to respond to a general summons to be knighted at the Coronation. 
Originally instituted to raise troops, knighthood fines had become a fiscal 
expedient under the Tudors, raising £5,000 for Queen Mary in 1553. 
                     
1
  Cust, Forced Loan, 253-306; TNA, E179/220/127A; E179/116/507; TNA, 
E359/68; Hampshire RO, 44M69/G4/1/36/9; PRO30/26/59. The Gloucestershire and 
Hampshire calculations are based on cash receipts, those from Devon on numbers of 
taxpayers. 
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Thereafter, summonses were only made pro forma, although in January 
1626 two Shropshire men unexpectedly presented themselves for 
knighthood on the eve of Charles’s Coronation. In November 1627 (as the 
Forced Loan collapsed), the Exchequer was instructed to distrain those 
reported for failure to appear. The sheriffs’ returns proved hopelessly 
defective: six counties from northern England and another six from Wales 
made no returns; others returned only a handful of names, and 
Nottinghamshire none at all; while in Somerset Sheriff Sir Robert Phelips 
opted to return his old enemy John Poulett. Being a provocation to 
Parliament, the project was laid aside until 29 May 1628, when, doubtless 
in anticipation of an imminent dissolution, a composition commission was 
established; this was allowed to lapse after Charles accepted the Petition 
of Right a week later.
1
 Distraint was revived in the autumn of 1629, and 
while Attorney-General Sir Robert Heath brought proceedings against 145 
recalcitrants, by June 1630 the Exchequer had received compositions of 
£12,238 from 742 individuals, 80% of whom came from the Home 
Counties (Graph 4.8).
2
 
 From June 1630, much of the work of compounding was delegated 
to county commissioners (most of whom were already knights), who were 
instructed to assess men at two-and-a-half times their rating in the subsidy 
book. The first commission raised some £44,000 by the end of the year, 
but this achievement disguised a great deal of recalcitrance: thousands 
refused, argued over details or failed to appear; and some commissioners 
                     
1
  TNA, E159/466 (Michs), recorda rot.99; H.H. Leonard, ‘Distraint of 
Knighthood: the last phase, 1625-1641’, History, LXIII (1978), pp.23-4, 34-5; BL, 
Lansdowne 152, f.36; Lambeth Palace Library, MS3204, f.393; BL, Add. 34324, 
f.274v; Russell, PEP, 385-9. 
2
  Leonard, ‘Distraint’, 24-5. For an example of Exchequer proceedings, see TNA, 
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omitted to report refusers.
1
 Yields fell in anticipation of a test case brought 
by Edward Stephens of Gloucestershire, whose cause was argued 
 
 
 
in the Exchequer in February 1631. His counsel, Edward Littleton, 
conceded the legality of the summons and the fine, basing his defence 
upon technicalities: the sheriff had not included Stephens in his original 
return; the writ was poorly drafted and could not be executed according to 
its literal sense; the summons had not been served upon Stephens in 
person. With one eye on public opinion, Heath’s response dwelt upon the 
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  Leonard, ‘Distraint’, 25-9; TNA, E178/7154, ff.300-20; Bodleian, Carte 74, 
ff.193-4; TNA, E101/668/12.  
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legality of the demand – already conceded by Littleton – while Baron 
Trevor’s verdict stressed that ‘no gentlemen should think themselves 
champions for the country by taking away any right from the King’; it was 
also ruled that the specific form of the writ, having altered over the years, 
was unimportant.
1
 On the day after the verdict, new commissions were 
issued to the counties, increasing composition rates to three-and-a-half 
times subsidy assessments. The next four months saw receipts of £40,000 
from the shires, while another 800 individuals compounded for almost 
£20,000 at the Exchequer. Later commissions produced diminishing 
returns (Graph 4.8), but knighthood fines eventually yielded almost 
£176,000 – three subsidies at 1628-9 rates. 
******** 
 The final extra-parliamentary levy raised by the early Stuart regime – 
and by far the most successful, in financial terms – was Ship Money. The 
Crown had long exercised the right to commandeer merchant ships, while in 
1588 various ports provided ships for the summer without payment. No 
legal justification was offered for this demand, but the imminent threat from 
the Armada discouraged complaint, and in several cases the ports sought 
contributions from their hinterlands. A similar levy was made in 1596, while 
in February 1603 a national charge for coastal defence was proposed, only 
to be cancelled upon the Queen’s death. From 1625 the threat from Dunkirk 
privateers persuaded several East coast ports to provide the navy with 
contributions in cash and kind, and Sir John Savile assembled a squadron of 
six armed colliers for coastal defence. Plans for a national levy were revived 
in February 1628, as a means of postponing the forthcoming parliamentary 
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session; but wiser counsels prevailed, and the project was cancelled.
1
  
 In 1634 Charles’s desire to use the navy for diplomatic leverage led 
him to implement the Ship Money scheme. Each port and its hinterland was 
set a quota, roughly based upon yields from the 1628 subsidies, which was 
subdivided at the discretion of the sheriffs who executed the writ – as most 
counties assessed local rates in several different ways, this offered 
considerable scope for dispute. The scheme was extended across the nation 
in the following year, when, although commuted into a cash payment 
everywhere except London, the government argued that it constituted not a 
tax but a service, and was therefore not banned by the Petition of Right. As 
with the Forced Loan, the Privy Council was quick to remonstrate with 
refusers, while those who disputed the apportionment of quotas within a 
shire often received a sympathetic hearing, and sheriffs who collected the 
levy were allowed to recoup their expenses.
2
  
 Until the Bishops’ Wars, levels of compliance for Ship Money were 
remarkable, exceeding those for the Forced Loan (Table 4.4). However, 
once the new demand became an annual charge, procrastination became 
commonplace, particularly during the protracted hearings of 1637-8 over 
John Hampden’s legal test case: receipts for the 1636 writ came in more 
slowly than before, and yields for the 1637 writ fell by 5% (£10,000).
3
  
 Despite official pressure, Hampden’s case did not provide a 
wholehearted endorsement of Ship Money. The judges endorsed the 
                     
1
  Cust, Forced Loan, 49, 83-6, 130-5; A.D. Thrush, ‘Naval finance and the 
origins and development of Ship Money’ in War and Government in Britain, 1598-
1650 ed. M.C. Fissel (Manchester, Lancashire, 1991), pp.133-62; A.H. Lewis, 
Elizabethan Ship Money (Philadelphia, PA, 1928); TNA, E351/2595; C.W. Brooks, 
Law, Politics and Society in early modern England (Cambridge, 2008), p.201. 
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  K. Sharpe, Personal Rule of Charles I (New Haven, CT. 1992), pp.545-95; 
Langelűddecke, ‘Ship Money’, 533-7; Gill thesis, 165-9, 254-88, 317-29.  
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Crown’s case when asked for their opinion in advance of the trial, but 
Hampden was  
 
Table 4.4 Ship Money yields, 1634-40 
 
Writ date Quota   Receipts  Receipts as % of 
original quota 
20 Oct. 1634 £80,609 £79,385-7-9 98.5% 
4 Aug. 1635 £199,700 £193,309-12-0 96.8% 
12 Sept. 1636 £196,400 £189,526 96.5% 
9 Oct. 1637 £196,400 £179,509-12-0 91.4% 
5 Nov. 1638 £69,750 £56,427-15-0 80.9% 
18 Nov. 1639 £214,400 £44,809-12-0 20.9% 
 
Sources: M.D. Gordon, ‘The collection of Ship Money in the reign of Charles I’, 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (3
rd
 series, IV, 1910), p.143; Gill thesis, 57-
8, 62-3, 162, 350, 358-9, 595-603. London provided ships rather than cash for every writ 
except that of 1639. 
 
ultimately judged liable to pay the £1 he owed by the narrowest possible 
margin, 7-5. Moreover, Baron Vernon weakly claimed to be too ill to justify 
his verdict for the Crown, while Chief Baron Davenport and Chief Justice 
Bramston highlighted technicalities which proved ‘that the King might 
command the service, but he could not receive the money’. On these 
grounds, Justice Jones’s verdict that Ship Money was legal because it was 
predicated upon the maintenance of the navy was proven to be mistaken, so 
if Jones had spoken after Davenport he should, by his own logic, have ruled 
for Hampden, leaving the court deadlocked and the Crown unable to 
enforce its demand.
1
 The controversy aroused by Hampden’s case and the 
decision to raise an army against the Covenanters persuaded Councillors to 
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  State Trials ed. W. Cobbett and T.B. Howell (33 volumes, London, 1809-26), 
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reduce the 1638-9 Ship Money quota by two-thirds, but compliance still fell 
to 80.9%, while the final demand, implemented (after some hesitation) in 
the spring of 1640, realised only 20.9% of its £214,400 quota before the 
summons of the Long Parliament caused its abandonment.
1
  
 
Conclusion  
 For all the controversy arising from direct taxation in the decades 
before 1640, the sums raised were trivial, when compared with those 
levied during the Civil War and thereafter. Yet ignorance was not always 
bliss: in 1613 the Earl of Cumberland’s steward bemoaned the £200 
assessed upon his master for a Privy Seal loan; ‘if a man in his ordinary 
charge live always at the height of his means or above, he must needs fall 
far behindhand when these extraordinary occasions of charge happen’. His 
protest was perhaps disingenuous: as one commentator observed in 1608, 
‘the commonwealth, consisting of many private men’s wealths, is not so 
bare or unfurnished as it should not be able to answer a subsidy’.2 This 
point was repeated in the Commons in 1626, when Sir Thomas Hoby 
retorted that ‘if the King’s revenues may be handled as they were in Queen 
Elizabeth’s days, the subjects will give as they did in Queen Elizabeth’s 
days’.3  
 The fact that many of the elites who administered direct taxation, 
and some humbler taxpayers, were capable of weighing the economic, 
social and political merits of the various levies imposed upon them, and of 
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  P. Lake, ‘The collection of Ship Money in Cheshire during the sixteen-thirties’, 
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3
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calibrating an appropriate level of compliance or defiance, should come as 
no surprise to those familiar with the work of Cust and Cogswell. The 
broader perspective taken in this chapter suggests that all forms of direct 
taxation involved negotiation between the Crown, local elites and 
taxpayers, whereby the regime tendered its political credibility in return 
for financial credit. Taxpayers were willing and able to give short shrift to 
any monarch whose policies were perceived as controversial or over-
ambitious: Elizabeth’s foreign policy commitments of 1559-62 and 1598-
1603 tested public loyalty, James’s hesitant diplomacy at the start of the 
Thirty Years’ War frustrated his ‘patriot’ critics, and Charles misjudged 
the balance in 1625-9 and 1639-40. None of these controversies provoked 
riot or rebellion, but they did encourage taxpayers to evade their 
responsibilities, to the point where Charles found it difficult to meet the 
relatively modest financial challenge posed by the Covenanter rebellion.
1
 
His decision to opt for a military response in 1639-40 was not founded 
upon expectations of generous support from the nation’s taxpayers, but 
rather from hopes of extending his credit with the mercantile interests of 
the City of London, whose relations with the Crown form the subject of 
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V: CUSTOMS REVENUES 
 
 Between 1558 and 1640, many of the Crown’s ordinary revenues 
were underdeveloped, while reform was stymied by political, social and 
administrative considerations. With many revenues dedicated to funding 
recurrent expenses, the regime had limited options for raising extraordinary 
funds: the Crown estates proved immune to repeated attempts at reform 
(Chapter 2); feudal revenues increased considerably, but proved insufficient 
to meet all the Crown’s needs (Chapter 3); direct taxation, with or without 
parliamentary consent, was irregular in its incidence (Chapter 4); while 
private loans were difficult to raise (Chapter 1) in the absence of a 
budgetary surplus against which repayment could be secured. 
 So where did the money come from? The only revenue stream to 
grow dynamically during 1580-1640 was the customs, which yielded 
£80,000 annually in the 1580s (about 20% of Crown revenues), but 
£400,000 by the later 1630s – around 40% of Charles’s much larger income 
(Graph 0.1, Graph 5.1).
1
 Moreover, the consortia which farmed the customs 
from 1604 gradually replaced the London corporation and guilds as the 
Crown’s lenders of first resort, initially advancing cash in anticipation of 
land sales and subsidies, and subsequently offering short-term credit on the 
security of customs receipts (Graph 1.1). This arrangement allowed Charles 
to bridge the deficits which had bedevilled his father.
2
  
 Politically, rising customs yields and the ability to raise short-term 
loans on the security of these revenues provided Charles with an 
opportunity to pursue ‘new courses’ independent of Parliament or the  
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London corporation. This chapter suggests that such developments were 
not entirely unanticipated. Customs rates had been a potential flashpoint 
since May 1558, when increases were imposed without parliamentary 
sanction. Political and strategic imperatives made Elizabeth’s government 
reluctant to risk a confrontation, but the postwar trade boom after James’s 
accession allowed further tariff increases with minimal fuss from the 
merchants. However, lawyers and politicians, alert to the political 
consequences of taxation without representation, attacked impositions as 
an abuse of the prerogative, leading to a political impasse. Charles was 
forced to collect customs without any statutory approval, and rising 
tensions among merchants and MPs caused the angry dissolution of the 
1629 Parliament, which prompted the King to inaugurate the Personal 
Rule. 
 
The Reform of Customs, 1558-1606  
 Customs became a key issue of Jacobean politics with the verdict in 
Rex v. Bate (1606), which allowed the Crown to alter rates on imports and 
exports without parliamentary approval – revenues the Exchequer termed 
‘new impositions’. The impact of Bate’s case on contemporary perceptions 
of the prerogative has been discussed extensively by historians of the law 
and political thought,
1
 while the economic and fiscal consequences of the 
judgement have also been considered.
2
 Yet these ideological and practical 
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contexts must be studied in tandem to illuminate the politics of fiscal 
reform. 
 Customs tariffs had been a bone of contention since 1558, though 
both Crown and merchants were wary of direct confrontation over this 
issue, as a dispute which was ostensibly a matter of administrative 
convenience could swiftly turn into a confrontation over whether the 
prerogative or the law had ultimate jurisdiction over private property rights. 
The judges avoided this Gordian knot until 1606, when the Exchequer 
Barons promulgated an ingenious legal fiction which justified impositions 
on imports without infringing other property rights: as customs fell due 
before a cargo was landed, the valuation of such goods was deemed to lie 
outside the jurisdiction of the Westminster courts.  
 Following this judgement, the Crown had the good sense to avoid 
killing the goose that laid the golden eggs: customs were increased at a rate 
which made only modest inroads into profit margins, and merchants paid 
with little demur. However, any challenge to the sanctity of private property 
represented an affront to the common law, and it was largely lawyers, not 
merchants, who sustained the controversy after 1606, for political, not 
economic reasons.
1
 The impositions dispute only connected with wider 
concerns in the later 1620s, when the Crown’s failure to use increased 
customs revenues to protect trade during wartime encouraged some 
merchants to refuse payment of customs. 
******** 
 Customs became a significant element of Crown revenues in 1275, 
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when Parliament voted perpetual duties on wool, woolfells and hides. 
Edward III financed his wars from temporary grants of new tolls: tunnage 
on wine, and poundage, a 5% tax on other goods; from 1484, these rates 
were conceded for the duration of each reign. Merchants frequently 
undervalued their stock when calculating poundage, which led to the 
introduction of an official Book of Rates for London in 1507, and nationally 
in 1536.
1
  
 Tariffs were revised in May 1558, shortly after the loss of Calais, 
when poundage rates increased by an average of 118.8%. The duty on cloth 
– England’s main export commodity – rose by 457% (14d. to 6s. 8d. per 
shortcloth), which approached the value of the wool content (10s. per 
shortcloth, about 2d./lb.). The Crown insisted these increases adjusted for 
the inflation of the 1540s, but the failure to consult Parliament or the 
London merchants was contentious.
2
 The passage of Elizabeth’s Tunnage 
and Poundage bill in February 1559 provided an obvious opportunity to 
debate the controversy in Parliament, but, according to Chief Justice Sir 
James Dyer, the question was referred to the judges, who concluded that the 
right to restrain a subject from leaving the realm also extended to his 
goods.
3
 Diplomats were instructed to emphasise that the new rates still 
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  W.M. Ormrod, ‘The Origins of Tunnage and Poundage’, Parliamentary History 
XXVIII (2009), pp.210-17; N.B. Gras, ‘Tudor “Books of Rates”: a chapter in the 
history of English customs’, Quarterly Journal of Economics XXVI (1912), pp.767-71; 
Dietz, English Public Finance, 306-7; Tudor Book of Rates, pp.xx-xxii. 
2
  Braddick, Nerves of State, 49-52; A. Friis, Alderman Cockayne’s Project and 
the Cloth Trade (Copenhagen, Denmark and London, 1925), pp.49-50, 434-40; Dietz, 
English Public Finance, 207-9; Tudor Book of Rates, pp.xxv-xxx, xliv-xlvii; Hall, 
‘Impositions’, 209-11; D. Loades, The Reign of Mary Tudor (2nd edition, Harlow, 
Essex, 1991), pp.354-5. 
3
  Sir James Dyer, Reports of cases in the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Queen 
Mary and Queen Elizabeth ed. J. Vaillant (3 volumes, London, 1794), II.165b; D’Ewes, 
44-5. Dyer records no decision, but any misgivings from the judges would surely have 
been cited in 1606: William Hakewill, The Libertie of the Subject (London, 1641), 
206 
 
undervalued most goods, an assertion largely borne out by merchants’ 
accounts.
1
 While this ruling confirmed the increased customs on cloth 
exports, it offered no validation of the new import duties, which continued 
regardless. In 1559 the Crown prosecuted several Venetian merchants in the 
Exchequer court, for fines due upon breach of letters patent requiring all 
sweet wines to be landed at Southampton. This might have constituted a 
useful precedent for enforcement of the Book of Rates, but at Easter 1561 
the verdict went against the Crown, both for the restraint of trade and for the 
legality of the fines. A statute of 1563 reimposed this restriction upon alien 
merchants, but not denizens; yet there was no further attempt to challenge 
the new import tariffs.
2
 
 The fiscal impact of the 1558 Book of Rates was significant: customs 
receipts tripled to £80,000 a year, and although commercial disputes with 
Spain and the Dutch Revolt subsequently depressed the cloth trade, new 
markets were developed in eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. In 1577 a 
commission was issued to revise tariffs, but duties in the 1582 Book of 
Rates remained unaltered. However, many previously unvalued items were 
added, and in 1584 the cloth duty was increased by 20d. per shortcloth.
3
 
War hindered commerce after 1585, but revenues initially remained buoyant 
(Graph 5.1), as indirect trade with Spain continued, and prize goods were 
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customable.
1
  
 Revenue collection was hampered by cumbersome Exchequer 
procedures. Lord Treasurer Winchester privatised administration in 1570, 
when Thomas Smyth, customer of London, secured a lease of general 
customs in London and the south-eastern ports, on terms which set the 
precedent for subsequent farms: he paid an entry fine (£5,000); his rent was 
calculated as an average of earlier receipts; and he kept the fees, paying his 
officials salaries.
2
 Meanwhile, in 1585 customs at other outports were leased 
to Secretary Walsingham. These farms collapsed under the strains of war: 
Smyth surrendered his in 1588; and Walsingham’s terminated upon his 
death in 1590. However, instead of reverting to medieval administrative 
practices, Smyth’s innovations were continued.3  
 War, dearth and inflation depressed customs revenues during the 
1590s (Graph 5.1), and in December 1594 Lord Treasurer Burghley and 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir John Fortescue were commissioned to 
revise the rates; initial projections suggested revenues would increase by 
£7,000 a year.
4
 In 1596 Burghley prosecuted the executors of Customer 
Smyth over a duty on alum imports, presumably to set a precedent. Yet, as 
Sir Edward Coke later explained, this judgement avoided considering the 
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substantive question of property rights, being resolved upon the technicality 
that impositions would come under the jurisdiction of the common law if 
farmed to a subject.
1
 The revised rates were never implemented, and the 
charges introduced over the next few years also avoided touching upon 
property rights: duties on gold and silver thread (1599), silk (1601) and 
tobacco (1604) applied to commodities previously unrated; while those on 
seacoal (1600), currants (1601), and the tin pre-emption (1601) were agreed 
by private treaty with the relevant merchants.
2
 However, two of these 
agreements failed in 1603, when the tin patent was surrendered, and the 
Levant Company defaulted on its annual rent of £4,000 for the currant 
farm.
3
  
******** 
 King James’s accession required a new Tunnage and Poundage bill, 
tabled in the Commons at the end of May 1604. A swift passage would have 
signalled England’s resolve to maintain the navy – the purpose for which 
customs were ostensibly levied – to Spanish diplomats newly arrived at 
Somerset House for peace talks. However, some controversy clearly ensued, 
as the Commons spent two weeks scrutinising the bill. Few details of these 
deliberations were recorded, but at the final report on 14 June, Sir Maurice 
Berkeley asked ‘whether this bill of tunnage and poundage were of 
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necessity, of policy or merely a gratuity’.1 Sir Henry Beaumont responded, 
‘that it was neither of necessity nor policy, but a mere gratuity’, which it 
was hoped would ‘quell the rumour of distaste between the King and the 
House’. Berkeley was related by marriage to Secretary Cecil, who may 
have choreographed this exchange.
2
 
 In the Upper House, Lord Treasurer Dorset noted ‘some omission or 
imperfection’ at the second reading. A conference (19 June) failed to 
address this issue, being distracted by Cecil’s criticism of the Commons’ 
refusal to vote supply (Chapter 5), but the judges ruled that the measure 
‘might pass as it was, without inconvenience or prejudice to his Majesty’.3 
The controversy may have involved the Book of Rates, which was not 
mentioned in the statute.
4
 With this act in place, Dorset, having made further 
adjustments to rates (an average 13.17% increase), invited tenders for a 
national customs farm. The lease was granted to a merger of two consortia, 
headed by Secretary Cecil and the merchant William Garway, paying an 
annual rent of £112,400, an improvement of £28,600 over the previous 
seven-year average.
5
 The farmers correctly gambled that the postwar trade 
boom would make them even larger profits (Table 6.3).
6
  
 Meanwhile, the dispute over tariffs focussed on the currant duty of 
5s. 6d. per hundredweight, collected by the Crown since 1603, and leased to 
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Lord Chamberlain Suffolk, with Cecil as sleeping partner.
1
 The Turkey 
merchants paid under protest, but their offer of September 1605 to take over 
the farm prompted Dorset to speculate that this duty, ‘and consequently all 
other impositions’ might be ‘settled forever’ – the precedent that had eluded 
Burghley in 1596. In a separate dispute, the Crown’s seizure of currants in 
lieu of purveyance provoked the London corporation to sue for restitution in 
November 1605.
2
 On 25 February 1606 the Commons gave a first reading to 
a bill against impositions, which required parliamentary approval for any 
‘tax, imposition or charge’ upon trade, and declared that any customs 
official levying unauthorised duties would forfeit his office.
3
 This loosely-
worded proposal was probably unenforceable, but served as an invitation to 
further negotiations. However, on 2 April the Privy Council raised the 
stakes, by committing the London merchant John Bate to the Marshalsea for 
resisting seizure of his currants. Five days later, Nicholas Fuller reported the 
currant imposition to the Commons as a grievance; Speaker Phelips 
conceded it might be ‘warranted by law, yet fit to be redressed’, indicating 
the Crown’s willingness to compromise.4  
 Counsel debated Bate’s case before the Commons on 11 April, when 
Bacon, opening for the Crown, insisted that the legal position was 
irrelevant, as the Levant Company had conceded the imposition in return for 
their charter; he was backed by Fortescue, who also urged the cases of cloth 
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(1558) and alum (1596) as precedents. Thomas Hitchcock, counsel for the 
Levant Company, argued feebly that foodstuffs were a necessity of life, and 
more pertinently that the judges’ ruling upon the 1558 cloth imposition was 
an opinion, not a verdict. The Turkey merchant Robert Myddelton warned 
against conceding this principle: ‘the like imposition may be imposed on all 
other commodities, and then merchandise [i.e. trade] must fall’; whereupon 
Sir Walter Cope proposed a seven-year moratorium on further impositions.
1
 
This offer probably originated with Salisbury rather than James, then 
hunting at Royston, but Britain’s Solomon doubtless approved the notion 
that the Commons should concede a principle which he then declined to 
exploit. The Venetian ambassador assumed the merchants had capitulated, 
but the postponement of Fuller’s attempt to report the long-delayed 
impositions bill (29 April) suggests talks continued behind the scenes, at 
least until Attorney-General Coke prosecuted Bate in the Exchequer (7 
May). From this point, a confrontation loomed: three days later Fuller 
reported the impositions bill and the grievances, including the currant 
imposition. As the Lords would have quashed the impositions bill, MPs 
delayed their third reading until 24 May, two days before the prorogation, 
thus depriving the Upper House of the opportunity to reject it.
2
 
 For want of a parliamentary solution, Bate’s case was heard in the 
Exchequer court in the week following the prorogation. Solicitor-General 
Doddridge and Bacon argued that customs rates were determined by the 
King’s ‘absolute power’: the Crown could restrain or license the person – 
and, implicitly, the goods – of any man from leaving the kingdom. By 
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contrast, Bate’s counsel insisted that peacetime customs duties were not part 
of the arcana imperii, and must therefore be explicitly authorised by 
statute.
1
 Having discussed the case privately with the judges, Lord Treasurer 
Dorset assured Salisbury that the verdict would provide ‘an assured 
foundation for the King’s impositions forever’, and on 8-10 November, the 
Exchequer Barons agreed that goods, as well as persons, could be restrained 
by the absolute prerogative. Chief Baron Fleming additionally ruled that, as 
goods could not be landed before paying custom, Bate’s currants lay outside 
the realm, and hence the jurisdiction of the common law; and that absolute 
prerogative ‘tends to the preservation of the entire kingdom, and is 
governed not by rules of equity and justice, but by policy’; thus impositions 
derived their legitimacy from reason of state, of which the Crown was sole 
arbiter.
2
  
 Chief Justice Coke expressed reservations about this vindication of 
the prerogative in a private conversation with Chief Justice Popham, and 
(years later) stated in print that ‘that judgement was against law’. More 
immediately, Bate sued a writ of error, but the technicalities pleaded in 
mitigation were dismissed on 17 November.
3
 When Parliament reconvened 
the following day, James answered the grievance petition the Commons had 
submitted at the end of the previous session. Claiming credit for allowing 
his prerogative ‘to be disputed in the common form of law’, he warned that 
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‘if any other persons… shall further importune them [the Commons] to deal 
with his Majesty in cases so greatly concerning them, he expecteth they 
shall be rejected’. The Commons, having agreed to focus on the Union 
(Chapter 1), laid the issue aside, though later in the session, Fuller and 
Sandys tartly noted that Scottish merchants were not burdened with 
impositions.
1
 
 
The Impositions Controversy, 1608-24  
 The tariff controversy reignited in June 1608 when Salisbury, newly 
appointed Lord Treasurer, used O’Doherty’s rebellion in Ireland as a pretext 
for increasing customs rates. Following consultation with merchants, these 
‘new impositions’ doubled existing rates, although most foodstuffs and 
domestic manufactures, including cloth, were exempted; the currant 
imposition was also reduced to 3s 4d per hundredweight, presumably to 
mollify the Levant Company. There was ‘some little contradiction’ among 
the London merchants when the increases were announced, but the annual 
revenue of £60,000 (Graph 5.1), while short of the £100,000 projected, was 
collected without significant controversy.
2
 In fact, impositions had a 
marginal impact on trade: in 1615 Lionel Cranfield, Merchant Adventurer 
and Surveyor-General of Customs, reckoned the new rates still undervalued 
goods by 20-33%, making impositions, at most, a 2% tax on gross turnover 
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– perhaps one-tenth of a merchant’s profit margins.1  
 Nevertheless, complaints were anticipated when Parliament 
reassembled in 1610: in a speech to the new Lord Mayor on 30 October 
1609, Salisbury blamed the controversy on ‘ill-disposed shopkeepers’ who 
had ‘raised all commodities to a treble and quadruple value, and yet 
impudently and untruly laid the cause thereof upon that imposition’. 
Broaching the subject at the start of the parliamentary session on 15 
February, Salisbury warned against infringement of the prerogative, but 
emphasised that impositions were not intended to harm trade – leaving room 
for negotiations over the rates for specific goods.
2
 However, the Commons’ 
grievance committee, chaired by Sandys, insisted on debating the point of 
principle. This was clearly intended to link impositions to negotiations over 
the Great Contract: James was expected to concede the principle of no 
taxation without representation in order to secure augmentation of the 
Crown’s ordinary revenue.  
 The Commons’ grievance committee, having considered the principle 
of imposing on 24-5 April, resolved to undertake the herculean task of 
collating legal precedents.
3
 The Lords, debating the Great Contract on 26 
April (Chapter 3), advised MPs against questioning impositions, and on 11 
May James urged them to ‘take heed they touched not upon the point of 
prerogative’; this merely provoked a heated dispute over freedom of 
speech.
4
 Solicitor-General Bacon and Attorney-General Hobart repeated 
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Salisbury’s invitation to discuss specific rates; while on 21 May James 
offered ‘hereafter not to take them [impositions] but in Parliament’, in order 
to halt the debate about the prerogative.
1
 The Commons stood firm, and on 
24 May James allowed the debate to proceed, on condition that MPs 
promised ‘not to impugn his prerogative’ by reversing the Exchequer 
judgement, and to make good any diminution in his revenue.
2
 The 
Commons resumed the scrutiny of precedents, but on 11 June, Salisbury, 
pursuing a vote of subsidy, announced that impositions would be reduced 
by £20,000 annually, and that no more would be inaugurated before the next 
parliamentary session. These concessions failed to sway the Lower House: 
Sir Francis Goodwin recalled the King’s reluctance to permit debate, while 
Fuller called for a bill against unparliamentary impositions.
3
  
 The impositions debate began on 23 June, and continued, after the 
end of the law term, from 28 June to 2 July; 23 of the 27 recorded 
participants were lawyers.
4
 Yet for all the forest of precedents cited, polemic 
swayed the Commons as much as legal erudition: Fuller stated ‘the King 
cannot impose without assent of Parliament’; while Thomas Wentworth 
invoked the Ten Commandments as proof that ‘subjects as well as kings 
should enjoy their own’. Several MPs raised the spectre of arbitrary 
government: James Whitelocke noted ‘the greatest use they [kings] make of 
assembling of Parliament… is the supply of money’, which would be 
superfluous if impositions were allowed to stand; Hakewill deplored those 
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who would countenance temporary impositions upon ‘sudden and 
extraordinary occasions’; John Hoskins, Sir Robert Hitcham and Hakewill 
suggested ‘judges or jury’ should set customs rates – although Hoskins 
suspected none ‘can judge what gains is reasonable for a merchant his 
adventure’.1 The only merchant to speak, Richard Gore, moved for 
impositions to be replaced by domestic excises, a Dutch innovation which 
would have relieved the burden on merchants, but provoked another 
controversy.
2
  
 In a sceptical House, little was gained by extolling the prerogative; 
Henry Yelverton, bidding for royal favour with a robust defence of the 
Crown’s actions, was ridiculed for his ‘tyrannical positions’.3 Crown 
counsel echoed Chief Baron Fleming in insisting that the common law had 
no jurisdiction over foreign trade; and if so, Recorder Montagu insisted, ‘the 
object [of the Crown’s critics] is the King’s power’.4 In fact, the agreement 
not to question the judgement in Bate’s case meant that advocates of the 
prerogative did not need to be as aggressive as their opponents. Serjeant 
Doddridge recited the many limitations on the Crown’s revenue-raising 
powers; Recorder Montagu stressed that impositions were laid in response 
to O’Doherty’s rebellion, and had been proportionably rated; Solicitor-
General Bacon observed that while impositions had sometimes been 
rescinded, there was no record of any being struck down by the lawcourts; 
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Sir Walter Cope invited MPs to ratify impositions retrospectively by 
statute.
1
 Wrapping up for the Crown, Dudley Carleton spurned Yelverton’s 
extremism, insisting that ‘reason of state is preservation of the state, and not 
the ruin of the state’.2  
 Despite the best efforts of the Crown’s supporters, the Commons’ 
grievance petition of 7 July urged ‘that all impositions set without assent of 
Parliament may be quite abolished and taken away’.3 Salisbury responded 
three days later, recapitulating earlier arguments: impositions were a 
response to the threat of rebellion in Ireland; there had been consultations 
with merchants before rates were set; the Exchequer court had ratified the 
duties; and they had not diminished trade. MPs registered their 
dissatisfaction in the supply debate of 11 July, voting only a single subsidy 
and fifteenth (Chapter 4).
4
 A bill was also tabled to abolish impositions, 
which, like the 1606 draft, barred anyone collecting such duties from office. 
However, it also stipulated that impositions collected ‘without assent of 
Parliament… are and shall be adjudged in the law void’. Nullification 
without compensation was a deliberate provocation, and the Lords naturally 
spurned this bill, giving it only one reading before the prorogation; it was 
presumably understood that the issue would be revisited during the next 
session.
5
 Finally, the Commons collected their precedents relating to 
impositions, but plans to have them printed were never implemented.
6
  
 During the summer, Sir Herbert Croft drafted an economic critique of 
impositions, claiming they would invite retaliation from foreign princes; 
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would depress the trade of English merchants; and would excite criticism of 
James’s profligacy.1 In September, Salisbury kept his promise of 11 June, 
removing many impositions on exports, and halving some on exports, a 
move which reduced impositions receipts by 25%, or £15,000 per annum 
(Graph 5.1).
 2
 An extra 3d./lb tariff was subsequently imposed on imports by 
alien merchants, which raised £3,000 a year; this proved less controversial, 
because it reduced the competition for English merchants, and was based on 
medieval precedents.
3
  
 Parliament reconvened amid widespread misgivings about the Great 
Contract (Chapter 4): on 25 October 1610, Salisbury claimed that financial 
concessions, including the reductions in impositions promised on 11 June, 
would undermine the economic basis of the Contract, and insisted ‘the King 
must not want’. Sir Roger Owen provoked a confrontation on 3 November 
by moving that impositions be repealed completely. James responded by 
demanding an impossibly large supply of £500,000 above the annual 
revenue offered by the Contract, whereupon several MPs attacked 
impositions, and other grievances supposedly resolved on 10 July.
4
 
Negotiations over the Contract were presently abandoned; on 14 November 
Salisbury offered a modified list of concessions, including parliamentary 
approval of impositions, in return for supply.
5
 Two days later, Samuel 
Lewknor insisted – despite the evidence of buoyant customs receipts (Graph 
5.1) – that impositions ‘will make the merchants both unable and unwilling 
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to yield supply’; James raised the issue with a group of MPs that afternoon, 
and on 21 November he again offered not to take further impositions 
without parliamentary approval. James Whitelocke, who had opposed 
impositions in July, urged acceptance of this deal, but others demurred, 
while hopes for a separate agreement over wardship (Chapter 4) were lost 
after John Hoskins and Thomas Wentworth slandered James, who 
terminated the session.
1
 
******** 
 Contrary to Lewknor’s assertion, merchants showed little opposition 
to impositions: in April 1611 a consortium offered a £200,000 entry fine for 
an 11 year farm, provided rates remained unaltered.
2
 Sir Henry Neville, 
discussing the management of a future Parliament with James in 1612, 
assumed MPs would refrain from demanding ‘anything unjust, or 
unreasonable, or that may derogate from his Majesty in point of 
sovereignty’.3 However, at the start of the 1614 Parliament, the Commons 
gave two readings to a bill ‘concerning taxes and impositions on merchants’ 
– doubtless a revival of the draft of July 1610, as it characterised 
impositions as being ‘against the law’. This aggressive stance – clearly 
prearranged – was endorsed by many who had spoken in the 1610 debates, 
although the courtier Sir George More cautiously advised that the 
Exchequer judgement be re-examined before it was overturned. The bill 
committee was scheduled for 3 May, and it was agreed that supply should 
not be debated until it was passed.
4
 King James intervened on 4 May, 
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promising ‘I never will upon home-bred commodities, spent within the 
land, lay any imposition’, and offering to have this confirmed by the 
judges. However, he also rescinded his 1610 offer of statutory ratification 
for any further impositions: ‘to bar me from my right, to rob my Crown of 
so regal a prerogative… is mere obstinacy’. This signalled an ideological 
divide deeper than that of 1610; the debates which followed sought to 
establish whether there were grounds for a compromise.  
 On 5 May, official spokesmen moved to hold the subsidy debate, 
but the House opted to hear Sir Edwin Sandys’ report from the impositions 
committee, which had, he said, concluded that ‘we are bond[men], if the 
King may at his pleasure impose’. Yet the bill, it transpired, had been laid 
aside, in favour of a petition to James to reconsider his stance;
1
 MPs 
resolved to appeal to the Lords for support, and a committee was named to 
prepare for a conference. At this stage, few non-official speakers 
expressed any sympathy for the Crown: Sir Herbert Croft objected to the 
interruption of the motion for supply; the lawyer Leonard Bawtree 
pronounced himself reluctant ‘to cross the King’s pleasure’, for which he 
was hissed at; while the merchant Robert Myddelton – original sponsor of 
the impositions bill – vainly urged the vote of a single subsidy.2  
 During the week spent planning the conference on impositions, 
pressure was clearly applied on the Crown’s behalf, as on 16 May it was 
agreed to hear objections to the Commons’ case. Naturally, these were all 
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dismissed: the relevance of Chief Justice Dyer’s report on the judges’ 
conference of 1559 was discounted; and when Thomas Hitchcock argued 
the Crown might levy a charge within the realm if it were ‘of more profit 
than hurt to the subject’,1 it was observed that the Crown’s lawyers had 
already conceded ‘that the King could not impose on anything within the 
land’. On 19 May, Leonard Bawtree’s objections were held so ‘tedious’ 
that the House emptied before he had finished speaking.
2
 Two days later, 
as the Commons rehearsed the case they planned to present to the Lords, the 
diplomats Sir Henry Wootton and Secretary Winwood argued that many 
European princes laid impositions without parliamentary approval. Owen, 
Sandys and Digges expressed alarm that such ‘tyrannical courses’ might 
come to pass in England, while Sandys and Thomas Wentworth feared that 
James, like Henry IV of France, risked assassination by pursuing arbitrary 
government.
3
  
 When MPs requested a conference with the Lords on 21 May, Bishop 
Neile intervened, attacking the Commons’ interference over a ‘noli me 
tangere…4 [for] in this conference we should… strike at the root of the 
imperial Crown’. This provocative stance took everyone by surprise. Lord 
Chancellor Ellesmere, supported by the two archbishops, spoke to a 
completely different brief, moving to consult the judges, a pragmatic 
initiative repeated by several Privy Councillors on 23 May. Neile then 
repeated his slanders, fearing that ‘if we should meet with the Lower House, 
there would pass from them undutiful and seditious speeches unfit for us to 
hear’. The Lords turned to the judges, but Chief Justice Coke nullified 
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Ellesmere’s efforts by ruling that ‘it should be good to hear somewhat from 
the Lower House, and that answered by the King’s counsel, and then us to 
judge of it’. There remained no option but to reject a conference, a motion 
driven through the Lords on the following day by the bloc votes of Privy 
Councillors and bishops. There were protests from many lay peers, 
including the Earl of Southampton, who lamented this decision to ignore 
‘the just complaints of the people in a matter of right’.1  
 News of the Lords’ decision spurred the Commons to scrutinise 
Neile’s speeches, which caused outcry when quoted the next morning; the 
courtier Sir Walter Chute even claimed James himself had deplored the 
activities of such an ‘ill-wisher’. By the time the Lords sent word about their 
decision to refuse a conference, MPs had resolved to make a formal protest 
about Neile.
2
 This complaint divided the Lords, but as no-one had called the 
bishop to order when he spoke, peers were obliged to exonerate him in order 
to defend their own honour. When questioned on 31 May, Neile tearfully 
denied any ‘evil intent’ in his speeches. Sir James Perrott dismissed this as 
‘an answer answerless’, and attempted to discredit the bishop by claiming 
he had once granted a false certificate of conformity to a recusant. The 
clamour which ensued demonstrated the breakdown of the session, and 
when James insisted on a vote of supply, the Commons defiantly insisted 
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their case against impositions receive a hearing first.
1
 On the day after the 
dissolution, those who were to have presented the case against impositions 
had their notes burnt before the Privy Council.
2
  
 The impositions controversy wrecked the Addled Parliament. Neile, 
sometimes identified as the key saboteur, would hardly have acted without 
encouragement from the King, who, on both ideological and financial 
grounds, could ill afford to have impositions struck down by Parliament. 
Coke’s motives are harder to discern, but his private misgivings about 
Bate’s case, and ongoing quarrels with James about the common law, 
suggest malice aforethought. Yet the session should not have reached this 
impasse – both the decision to sideline the impositions bill in early May, 
and the hearing MPs later granted those who dissented from their case 
signalled a willingness to compromise. This indicates that James was the 
one being intransigent, which made it difficult to discuss impositions for the 
remainder of his reign.
 3
 
******** 
 Deadlock over impositions soured the prospects for any future 
Parliament. When Privy Councillors discussed a fresh summons in 
September 1615, they broadly agreed with Secretary Lake’s assertion that 
‘the smart which hath most grieved the people and been most insisted upon 
is the matter of impositions’. Lord Treasurer Suffolk feared ‘the point of 
right would be insisted upon’ in Parliament, but Lord Chancellor Ellesmere 
hoped the Commons would agree, as in 1610, to waive the debate over 
principle. To promote compromise, Cranfield planned to restructure the 
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customs, ‘not directly, as a laying down of the impositions, but in respect of 
advancing the exportation above the importation’, a refinement of 
Hitchcock’s argument from 1614; Attorney-General Bacon hailed this 
scheme as ‘revenue that cannot be questioned in point of law’.1  
 While James rejected a summons of Parliament, Suffolk still declined 
to confront the issue of impositions. In November 1618, shortly after the 
treasurer’s fall, the pretermitted custom – one of the projects Cranfield had 
submitted to the Privy Council in 1615 – was inaugurated. This imposed an 
extra 1s. 8d. on each shortcloth exported, raising cloth duty to 2d./lb. wool 
content, equivalent to the medieval custom on wool; it was imposed on the 
same basis as the cloth duty of 1558, and thus avoided reliance on Bate’s 
case as a precedent.
2
 The Merchant Adventurers, having recently paid 
£50,000 to recover their monopoly of cloth exports to the Low Countries 
and Germany, objected to this additional burden, but the £20,000 annual 
revenue could not be foregone, being required, in the first instance, to 
reimburse the Queen’s creditors.3 Anne died only months later, and in 
February 1620, with many of her debts cleared, the Exchequer took over the 
revenues.
4
 Also in 1618-19, Cranfield secured minor alterations to duties on 
coal exports and sugar and tobacco imports, while the imposition on 
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currants, reduced in 1608, was reinstated at the rate of 5s. 6d./cwt authorised 
by Bate’s case, in return for which the Levant Company was awarded a 
monopoly on trade to the eastern Mediterranean.
1
 
 In October 1620, the Bohemian crisis obliged James to summon 
another Parliament. Careful preparations for the session, including a 
proclamation against licentious speech in matters of state, made no specific 
mention of impositions. James also avoided the subject in his opening 
speech (30 January 1621), although in granting freedom of speech on 3 
February, he insisted that MPs ‘should not be lion-like to speak of 
prerogatives above their capacities’, echoing his position of 4 May 1614 
over impositions.
2
 On 5 February 1621 Sir Edward Giles complained about 
the arrests made after the dissolution of 1614, and Sir Robert Phelips moved 
for a bill to guarantee free speech. Freedom to debate the legality of 
impositions was one aspect of this dispute: on 12 February Sir Henry Poole 
complained about the burning of MPs’ notes about impositions, while 
Phelips recalled the Lords’ refusal to accept a conference about 
impositions.
3
 The confrontation over free speech was resolved on 15 
February, when James offered an anodyne formula which reiterated the 
traditional privilege he had granted the Commons on 3 February.
4
 An 
agenda had clearly been agreed behind the scenes, as the Commons 
promptly voted two subsidies (Chapter 2), while MPs were permitted to 
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investigate alleged abuses by patentees and the judiciary.
1
  
 The agreement between James and his critics apparently included an 
undertaking to avoid questioning the legality of impositions, an issue barely 
mentioned during the session.
2
 However, duties not covered by Bate’s case 
were treated as fair game: on 13 March there were complaints about the 
Merchant Adventurers’ private tariffs on cloth and lead;3 and on 31 May 
John Delbridge unsuccessfully moved to petition for the suspension of 
duties imposed since 1614.
4
 Sir Edward Coke, now an MP, was clearly 
privy to this undertaking: while he asserted that ‘no impositions… can be 
laid on the subject, but by their consent’ during the Virginia tobacco debate 
(18 April), he left the wider application of this principle unexplored.
5
 In 
December 1621, when King and Commons fell out again over free speech, 
Phelips explicitly protested that MPs ‘never meddled with impositions 
(though highly concerning the subject’s interest), to make this a Parliament 
only of union’, while the ‘Dialogue’ he wrote in preparation for the 1624 
Parliament alluded to an agreement over this issue in 1621.
6
  
 The truce over impositions continued in 1624, as the ‘patriots’ 
worked hard to avoid provoking the King in any way.
7
 When Sir Edwin 
Sandys reported complaints to the Commons’ committee for decay of trade 
on 2 April, he dismissed the legality of impositions as a question ‘fit not to 
enter into… now’. On 11 May, Edward Alford moved to add impositions in 
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the Commons’ grievance petition; and while conceding that ‘the dispute of 
the right be waived’, he argued it was ‘fit to continue our claim’.1 As in 
1621, customs increases not founded upon the 1606 Exchequer judgement 
faced more strident criticism: on 9 April the pretermitted custom, tariff 
alterations in the 1623 Book of Rates, new duties on wine imports, and 
purveyance on grocery imports came under investigation, as part of a wider 
attack on their promoter, Lord Treasurer Cranfield. On 13 April, the lawyer 
Robert Berkeley argued that the pretermitted custom was ‘not due by any 
law or statute, but by prerogative law’, while Sir Francis Seymour 
dismissively referred to ‘mere impositions’. Yet when King’s Serjeant Sir 
Robert Hitcham, responding for the Crown two days later, attempted a 
detailed justification of the principle of impositions; he was halted, and his 
speech razed from the Commons’ Journal. These debates were reported on 
28 April, when William Noy urged the House not to question ‘the point of 
imposition’ or the 1558 cloth duty; the final grievance petition confined its 
complaint to the original currant duty of 1606.
2
 Cranfield’s impeachment 
included allegations of bribes taken from the farmers of the duties 
introduced in 1622 to support the Palatine cause; after careful consideration, 
the Commons resolved not to discuss the legality of these impositions in the 
charges submitted to the Lords.
3
 The session also saw concerted attacks on 
the Merchant Adventurers’ levies on cloth exports, which were, again, 
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included in the grievance petition.
1
 
 Why did MPs discontinue their vehement protests over the principle 
of impositions? The dissolution in 1614 established that James would brook 
no argument on this topic, but the fact that other customs duties were 
criticised in 1621 and 1624 suggests that the issue still rankled. Two factors 
had changed: the dispute over the prerogative was, for many, trumped by 
the desperate plight of the Protestant cause in Germany; while James’s 
grave illness in the spring of 1619 provided stark evidence of his mortality.
2
 
This made it possible to postpone a confrontation until the next reign, when 
the need for a new Tunnage and Poundage statute would give the Commons 
extra leverage over impositions. None of this boded well for Charles’s 
relations with his subjects. 
 
Tunnage and Poundage Disputes, 1625-8  
 The Tunnage and Poundage Act lapsed with James’s death, and 
duties were thereafter collected under Privy Seal warrants.
3
 Customs 
legislation should have been a priority during the 1625 Parliament, but 
Charles’s quest for war finance obscured the issue. On 22 June 1625 Sir 
Robert Phelips moved to resolve the impositions dispute with fresh 
legislation; Sir Edward Coke demurred, but called ‘to establish a settled 
book of rates’. Either proposition would have required lengthy debate, 
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unfeasible in a time of plague.
1
 Draft legislation, which received two 
readings in a rapidly thinning Commons on 5 July, neglected to mention 
impositions, the pretermitted custom or a new Book of Rates, for fear, it was 
said, of ‘what might become of these things if none but the courtiers were 
remaining’. When Sir Walter Erle and Phelips recommended passing a 
temporary grant, to last a year, Solicitor-General Sir Robert Heath 
grudgingly acquiesced; but ministerial opinion had clearly changed by the 
time the bill reached the Lords, where it foundered after a single reading.
2
 
Opinion also hardened in the Commons: on 11 August, when Buckingham’s 
competence as Lord Admiral was attacked, Erle recalled that Tunnage and 
Poundage was granted for defence of the seas; while Henry Rolle noted that 
under Edward III, merchants had threatened to withhold customs and defend 
themselves.
3
  
 Meanwhile, the Crown argued with the syndicate leasing the Great 
Farm of the customs, headed by Sir Maurice Abbot and Henry Garway, 
about the £160,000 annual rent due under their lease of 1621 – the contract 
for the year ending Christmas 1625 was only signed in October 1625. The 
depredations of the Dunkirkers that autumn cost the farmers £5,000 in lost 
revenue, and they cancelled their lease in December, but continued to 
administer the farm until new terms could be agreed.
4
 Offering a reduced 
rent of £148,000, they faced a rival bid of £150,000 from Alderman 
Cockayne and Sir Paul Pindar. The latter may have been encouraged by 
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Buckingham, who doubtless wished to see Abbot – brother of his critic 
Archbishop Abbot – removed from a key position in the Crown’s finances. 
Cockayne and Pindar co-opted two of the outgoing syndicate, Sir John 
Wolstenholme and Abraham Jacob, and secured a five year contract on 5 
April 1626, a bargain struck on the assumption that disputes over customs 
rates would be resolved in the 1626 Parliament.
1
 
 Complaints about customs resurfaced in the Commons on 15 
February 1626, when Richard Spencer introduced a bill to seize the goods 
of Edmund Nicholson, projector of the pretermitted custom. That afternoon, 
the Londoner Robert Bateman tendered a petition to stay proceedings 
against those refusing to pay the additional imposition placed on wine in 
1622. The Devon merchant John Delbridge moved, provocatively, ‘to deal 
with all impositions in general’, and while Archbishop Abbot’s client Sir 
Dudley Digges advised the House to stick to particular complaints, Richard 
Spencer objected to the collection of Tunnage and Poundage by Privy Seal.
2
 
The Londoners’ petition was reported on 20 February, when Thomas 
Wentworth, Recorder of Oxford, punctiliously insisted that Charles had laid 
no new impositions since his accession; Mr. Ashton, more aggressively, 
asserted ‘no King before Jac[obus] claimed imposing as his right without 
assent of Parliament’; and while Solicitor-General Sir Richard Shilton 
called for ‘the question [of principle] not to be disputed’, a committee was 
appointed to examine all tariff revisions since 1603, which opened the 
general issue of impositions to debate.
3
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 Despite this hostility to impositions, Sir John Coke’s motion of 25 
February, for a bill for a wartime duty on coal to fund escorts for the east 
coast shipping, attracted considerable support, although Spencer remained 
‘loath to countenance the project’. Yet on 6 March, when ministers 
protested about the lack of funds for the Navy – the original purpose of 
Tunnage and Poundage – Sir John Strangways made the obvious retort: 
‘what became of the money which we gave for that end?’1 Complaints about 
the Crown’s continued failure to table a Tunnage and Poundage bill 
eventually secured two readings for a draft on 23-24 March. The committee 
first met on the afternoon of 27 March, when, with an euphoria perhaps 
reflecting the Commons’ grant of supply that morning, Sir Nathaniel Rich 
hinted that King James’s offer of 1610 – confirmation of existing customs 
revenues in return for parliamentary approval of future impositions – might 
form an acceptable compromise. A sub-committee was appointed to draft a 
composite Book of Rates, presumably superseding the committee of 20 
February.
2
  
 Negotiations over customs were tacitly linked to the progress of 
Buckingham’s impeachment, which proceeded apace. On 27 April Rich 
encouraged a chorus of complaint about the collection of duties without 
statutory authority since Charles’s accession. Despite Sir Humphrey May’s 
protest that Elizabeth and James had collected customs before meeting their 
first parliaments, MPs resolved to draft a remonstrance. However, another 
hostile motion, to summon customs officials to explain their actions, was 
defeated.
3
 The unauthorised collection of customs was added to the 
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grievance petition (24 May), and was censured in the draft petition of 13 
June as an example of ‘new counsels’ condemned as being ‘against the 
ancient settled course of government’.1 The Tunnage and Poundage 
committee, meeting on 8 June, was informed that consultations about 
revaluing the Book of Rates would prove ‘a work of great labour’, and 
risked disclosing information which might be used to raise fresh impositions 
after the end of the Parliament. This gloomy prognosis, on the same day the 
King offered a modest concession to the Lords, by allowing the Earl of 
Arundel to resume his seat in the Upper House, indicates that MPs had 
abandoned any hope of compromise with the Crown. The Commons agreed 
to petition Charles to honour his father’s promise not to raise any further 
impositions without parliamentary approval, but this remonstrance was 
incomplete at the dissolution on 15 June.
2
  
******** 
  As the Privy Council delicately noted on 8 July 1626, the dissolution 
of Parliament ‘before those things which were there treated of could be 
perfected’ left customs without statutory authority. Letters patent were 
sealed, ordering collection to continue ‘until such time as by Parliament, as 
in former times, it may receive an absolute settling’; meanwhile, the Council 
was authorised to imprison refusers for contempt.
3
 Although such ‘new 
courses’ had been attacked in Parliament, few customs duties attracted 
serious controversy over the next eighteen months. One exception was the 
2s. 2d./cwt currant imposition, removed in 1610, but reinstated in 1619 and 
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farmed to the Earl of Arundel. Charles had little incentive to exert himself 
on behalf of one of Buckingham’s chief critics, but in September 1626 Lord 
President Manchester offered to take over Arundel’s currant farm, together 
with the pre-emption of tin (one of the Levant Company’s chief exports).1 
When Manchester raised his bid for the contract to £17,000 a year, it 
emerged that widespread evasion of this currant imposition would affect 
revenue projections, thus in February 1627 the Privy Council embargoed the 
landing of currants with outstanding duties unpaid. Governor Hugh 
Hammersley asked the Levant Company whether they wished to leave the 
merchants affected by this order to complain individually; members 
resolved upon a general protest, not with any expectation of success, but ‘to 
free them from any future imputation that may be cast upon them if they 
should consent without complaining’.2  
 Resistance to the currant imposition suggests principled opposition to 
impositions among merchants, but in this instance, economics reinforced 
politics: from 1619, currants paid multiple duties worth 7s./cwt to the 
Crown, and a further 12d./cwt as consulage to the Levant Company – a 
surcharge for providing diplomatic representation in the Ottoman Empire, 
which attracted criticism from Samuel Vassall and other merchants.
3
 With 
currant prices soaring to 60s./cwt in 1627, duties of 8s./cwt eroded much of 
the merchants’ gross profit margin (perhaps 15s.-20s./cwt), hence the 
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controversy over enforcement of this levy.
1
  
 Alongside the currant dispute, from October 1627 the Privy Council 
embargoed the goods of merchants who failed to pay the 1622 charge of 
£1/tun on French wine landed in London, and 13s. 4d./tun in the outports. 
Collection of this duty had also collapsed after King James’s death, and it 
was presumably the Petty Farmers, whose arrears had been waived in their 
new lease of September 1627, who required its enforcement thereafter.
2
 The 
customers seized wines to cover the cost of unpaid duties, and in February 
1628 nine London vintners, having refused orders from their company and 
the Council to purchase a proportion of these seizures, were gaoled for 
contempt.
3
  
 Controversies over currants and wine were an embarrassment to the 
Crown, but the fiscal impact was trivial. Meanwhile, the farmers rendered 
invaluable service to the Crown by extending a line of credit predicated on 
future customs yields. The Great Farmers and collectors of the pretermitted 
custom advanced  £18,000 at the dissolution of Parliament in June 1626; 
while during June to December 1627 – after receipts from the Forced Loan 
dwindled (Graph 4.6) – Charles raised £106,600 from anticipations, chiefly 
in return for improving the terms under which the Great and Petty farmers 
held their leases (Graph 5.2).
4
 At a time when Auditor Sir Robert Pye and 
Sir George Goring, two of Buckingham’s closest confidants, privately 
admitted that ‘his Majesty’s revenue of all kinds is now exhausted’, these 
sums, together with the Royal Contract concluded with the London 
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corporation in January 1628 (see above), allowed the regime to stave off 
bankruptcy and attempt a reconciliation with Parliament.
1
  
 
 
 
 During 1626-8, those urging Charles to dispense with Parliament 
needed to raise new sources of revenue without parliamentary approval. 
One of the more controversial options was a revision of the Book of Rates, 
ordered by the King in December 1626 and discussed by the Crown’s 
commissioners for revenue reform. A proposal was submitted to the King in 
July, and allowance was made for such alterations in the new contract for 
the Great Farm in October – little change seems to have been envisaged in 
the duties on wines or currants, as the Petty Farmers were allowed to pocket 
any increases made during the four-and-a-half years remaining on their 
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contract of September 1627.
1
 Also at this time, the customs official John 
Harrison suggested a radical plan to resume direct administration of the 
customs for the first time since 1604, which would have allowed the Crown 
to enjoy the full profits of its most lucrative revenue. The farmers opposed 
to the idea, and their invaluable role as creditors persuaded Buckingham to 
oppose this scheme on his return from the Île de Ré in November 1627.
2
 
Charles’s continued doubts about the wisdom of summoning a fresh 
Parliament led him to issue a commission ‘for raising of moneys… by 
impositions or otherwise’ on 29 February 1628, but he later rescinded this 
decision, and the commission apparently never met.
3
 
 On 21 March 1628, the first day of business in the new Parliament, 
Richard Spencer urged the Commons to proceed with the Tunnage and 
Poundage bill, which received two readings on 2 and 4 April. The House 
was preoccupied with the issue of arbitrary imprisonment, but in the supply 
debate of 2 April Edward Alford and Sir Edward Coke observed that the 
Crown was making a poor fist of coastal defence, the purpose for which 
customs were granted. At the bill’s second reading Coke objected to the 
clause requiring payment of arrears accrued since King James’s death, while 
John Delbridge moved ‘that no other imposition may be laid on merchants 
but what is by this bill given’ – which suggests that the draft avoided the 
subject of impositions.
4
 Charles was unlikely to accept a deal on these 
terms, but on 9 April the Commons raised the stakes further, deciding to 
revive the remonstrance against impositions drafted in June 1626, and to 
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update the Book of Rates. This latter task could be advanced or delayed 
according to political circumstances, and throughout the session, customs 
disputes served both the Crown and its critics as a proxy to test mutual 
resolve in the confrontation over the Petition of Right.
1
  
 In first months of the 1628 session, MPs complained about wine, 
currant and coal duties. On 22 March French wine merchants petitioned 
about the Council’s incarceration of those who refused the £1/tun duty of 
1622. Edward Alford criticised the illegality of impositions, while four days 
later Phelips observed that the Great Farmers’ patent of 1604 had claimed 
an inappropriate ‘power to impose’ on wines. Sir Edward Coke warned 
against provoking the King, arguing that the specific revenue under 
consideration – the 1622 increases – had been condemned at Cranfield’s 
impeachment in 1624. At Phelips’s entreaty, MPs petitioned to rescind the 
wine duty; the vintners were ordered to be released on 21 May, giving bond 
to pay such dues as were ratified by Parliament.
2
 Their release was held up 
for several days, at a key moment in the debates over the Petition of Right, 
when the Lords debated whether to add a ‘saving clause’ for the 
prerogative. Henry Waller raised a complaint about this delay in the 
Commons on 24 May, when he was reassured by Sir Humphrey May, 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, that the release would be arranged for 
the following morning.
3
 
 On 7 April, the London MP Henry Waller complained about the 
seizure of currants – said to be ‘half perished already’ – for non-payment of 
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the 2s. 2d./cwt imposition; Secretary of State Sir John Coke undertook to 
consult the King. It was also claimed that merchants been required to give 
bond for payment regardless of any future judgement about the legal merits 
of their case, which provoked Sir John Eliot to claim this as grounds for 
impeachment proceedings. On 17 May, Secretary Coke explained that the 
bonds were only required for ‘so much as by law upon trial shall be 
adjudged’. However, MPs, then awaiting the Lords’ decision about the 
Petition of Right (Chapter 1), were in no mood to listen: Sir Edward Coke 
pronounced his disillusionment with the principle of impositions, and was 
seconded by Phelips. Charles quickly cancelled the 2s. 2d./cwt duty, 
presumably in hope of concessions over the Petition of Right.
1
 
 The other duty investigated by the Commons was the 6d./chaldron 
imposed on coastwise shipments of Newcastle coal in July 1627 to fund 
convoy protection for the east coast trade (Chapter 2). Collection ceased on 
27 November, the day of the verdict in the Five Knights’ case, and 
merchants, when consulted about its renewal, opted to provide their own 
protection – plans to reimpose this duty in February 1628 were apparently 
never implemented.
2
 On 7 May 1628 the Newcastle Hostman Sir Thomas 
Riddell moved for an investigation, while Phelips warned that an imposition 
upon a domestic commodity set a dangerous precedent.
3
 Ten days later, the 
Ipswich coal merchant William Cage complained about this duty, while 
Digges cited King James’s censure of this duty in 1610: ‘God forbid any 
imposition should be laid on anything within the land, it were an 
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abomination’.1 Sir Peter Riddell and Sir Thomas Grantham made further 
complaints about the coal duty, but it went unmentioned in the remonstrance 
of 14 June.
2
  
 A more controversial issue was raised on 17 May, when John 
Harrison named the Exchequer auditor Sir Edmund Sawyer as author of two 
new Books of Rates, one to increase annual revenue by £50,000, the other 
by £100,000. No-one doubted the utility of this project – the Commons’ 
sub-committee for the Book of Rates asked to see his papers – but it 
highlighted Charles’s fascination with ‘new counsels’; unsurprisingly, 
Sawyer went into hiding.
3
 It was initially expected that controversies over 
customs would be resolved after the King’s assent to the Petition of Right. 
However, the furore which followed Charles’s first, unsatisfactory answer to 
the Petition (2 June), and his rejection of the Commons’ remonstrance 
against Buckingham (17 June), apparently led MPs to retaliate by delaying 
the Tunnage and Poundage bill.
4
 It is unclear how much progress the bill 
committee had made in its many meetings since 4 April, but protestations of 
lack of time, made over two months later, sound a little hollow.
5
  
 Charles, like his critics, could play at brinkmanship – on 15 June he 
reinstated the recently cancelled currant imposition. When Tunnage and 
Poundage was next debated, on the afternoon of 19 June, it was hoped that a 
temporary bill would settle matters until the next parliamentary session. 
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Attitudes had hardened by the following morning, when the Commons 
sidelined the currant imposition, and sought to make a scapegoat of Auditor 
Sawyer: he and his associate Abraham Dawes claimed to have acted on 
Charles’s orders, but John Glanvill insisted ‘the King’s command contrary 
to law is void, and the actor stands single’. This notwithstanding, on 21 June 
Charles confirmed that Sawyer and Dawes had acted under his instructions; 
Sir Thomas Wentworth called for Sawyer’s impeachment, but the latter was 
merely expelled from the House and committed to the Tower.
1
  
 Speaker Finch then tried to reassure the King that legislation would 
confirm most existing impositions – the deal offered in 1626 – but on 23 
June Charles proposed an abrupt end to the session, just three days later. 
This raised a storm of protest: Digges gently suggested the prorogation be 
changed to an adjournment, which would allow the bill committee to meet 
over the summer; but Sir Nathaniel Rich provocatively moved to revive the 
1610 bill abolishing impositions; while others attacked a wide range of 
impositions, and the pretermitted custom. The House eventually heeded Sir 
Robert Phelips’s advice that legislation ‘is a work of long time which our 
few hours will not admit’, and resolved upon a remonstrance ‘of our right, 
and of the undue taking of Tunnage and Poundage and impositions without 
Act of Parliament’.2 The text reported to the Commons on 25 June 
condemned both Jacobean impositions and the collection of customs 
without statutory authority since 1625, and disingenuously hoped Charles 
would refrain from taking action against ‘loving subjects who shall refuse to 
make payment’ – an open invitation to a tax strike. Charles brought the 
prorogation forward by several hours, to forestall the presentation of this 
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remonstrance, insisting in his valedictory address that ‘it is not in the power 
of the Houses to declare or enact any law without my consent’, and that 
customs were revenues ‘without which I neither may nor can subsist’.1 
Sawyer was released from the Tower as soon as Parliament rose, and 
unfounded rumours circulated that he was to be made a peer, and 
Chancellor of the Exchequer.
2
 
 
Confrontation and Compromise, 1628-40  
 Failure to pass the Tunnage and Poundage bill in June 1628 
encouraged resistance to customs duties, which came from members of the 
Levant Company. The first refuser, Samuel Vassall, failed to pay the 
pretermitted custom on cloth exported on 25 May 1628. After parliamentary 
debates about the 2s. 2d./cwt currant duty were reported to the company on 
2 July, other merchants began refusing this duty, and on 20 July Charles 
issued an Order in Council summoning such ‘private men of refractory 
humour’ before the Board. From 13 August the Levant Company faced an 
additional, punitive measure, when the Council ordered cargoes of currants 
to be detained until this duty was paid.
3
 Protestors insisted this violated a 
statute of 33 Henry VIII,
4
 and Secretary Coke, speaking in the Commons on 
17 May, had acknowledged that merchants were entitled to take possession 
of their goods, provided they entered a ‘bill of sufferance’ for payment of 
duties ultimately judged lawful. However, from 13 August, refusal of any 
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currant duty, even the contentious 2s. 2d./cwt levy, led to immediate 
sequestration of a merchant’s entire cargo. This provocative order was said 
to have provoked a widespread refusal of all customs on currants; by Easter 
1629, Attorney-General Heath claimed £30,000 was due to the Crown, 
which (at 7s./cwt) would comprise more than a year’s imports.1  
 The Council order of 13 August, if strictly enforced, threatened 
merchants with swift bankruptcy, for two reasons: first, as currants were 
perishable, delays could render a cargo unsaleable; secondly, as long 
distance trade involved considerable financial leverage, interruptions to 
cash flow had a major impact upon profit margins. During the month after 
the order was issued, eleven Turkey merchants removed currants from the 
Custom House by ‘force’. It is likely their actions constituted forcible entry 
only in a technical sense, as several later pleaded in the Exchequer court that 
they had (as before 13 August) entered bills of sufferance. The fact that a 
servant of Nicholas Leate (formerly deputy governor of the Levant 
Company) broke the locks on the warehouses suggests the degree of 
resentment involved, while those who removed their goods included the 
Petty Farmers Alderman Sir Maurice Abbot and William Garway, who 
stood to lose revenue if the collection of other currant duties was affected. 
Royal messengers were dispatched to the Custom House to re-establish 
order, and admiralty officials set to watch for merchants smuggling goods 
onshore.
2
  
 Confrontation erupted in late September, when Richard Chambers, 
                     
1
  TNA, E112/206/248; C&T Charles, I.433-4; HMC Lonsdale, 61. 3,410 tons of 
currants were imported in YE X1628, and 2,338 tons in YE X1629: TNA, E351/632-3. 
Heath’s figure is implausible, unless it comprises customs owed on all goods seized 
from refusers of currant duties. 
2
  APC, 1628-9, pp.123, 154-5; TNA, AO1/741/580; TNA, SP16/117/20; TNA, 
E112/206/248; Ashton, Money Market, 107; Popofsky, ‘Crisis over Tunnage and 
Poundage’, 59; Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, 231-2. 
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facing the detention of £7,000 worth of silks and other goods, protested to 
the Council that ‘merchants are in no part of the world so screwed and 
wrung as in England. In Turkey they have more encouragement’; his goods, 
and those of another merchant, John Foulke, were sequestrated. Chambers 
was committed to the Marshalsea, but bailed four weeks later by King’s 
Bench upon a writ of habeas corpus. He obtained his release upon a 
technicality – the return did not recite the words of his contempt – but was 
presently cited into Star Chamber.
1
 On 30 October, ten days after Parliament 
was again prorogued, the Council denied other merchants the right to 
remove their currants from sequestration. This made a confrontation with 
the Commons almost inevitable, as one of those affected was the MP John 
Rolle, who had goods worth £5,000 seized, despite claiming parliamentary 
privilege, at which the customers jeered, ‘if all the Parliament were in you, 
this we would do and justify’.2 In the first instance, Rolle and four others 
secured writs of replevin from the court of Common Pleas for restoration of 
their goods. Lord Treasurer Weston issued injunctions from the Exchequer 
court to suspend these writs, but avoided a substantive hearing by insisting 
that the case was ‘only fit for the Parliament now shortly to be reassembled, 
there to be finally settled, as the desire of his Majesty and of the discreeter 
sort of merchants is it should be’.3  
                     
1
  APC, 1628-9, pp.170-1; TNA, E112/206/236; S.R. Gardiner, History of 
England from the accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War (3
rd
 edition, 10 
volumes, London, 1904), VII.7; PP1640, I.418-19, 423; Popofsky, ‘Crisis over Tunnage 
and Poundage’, 59-60; P.D. Halliday, Habeas Corpus: from England to Empire 
(Cambridge, MA, 2010), p.106. 
2
  CD1629, pp.7, 88-9, 129, 162, 228; HMC Lonsdale, 60-1; HoP1604, I.lii; 
VI.88. 
3
  TNA, E125/5, ff.174v-5; TNA, E126/3, ff.259r-v, 262v-3; C&T Charles, I.438-
40; Barrington Family Letters, 1628-32 (Camden Society, 4
th
 series, XXVIII) ed. A. 
Searle (London, 1983), p.39. The Exchequer order is more circumspect than suggested 
by C. Thompson, ‘The divided leadership of the House of Commons in 1629’ in 
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 Divisive as proceedings against the Turkey merchants were, they do 
not indicate a general refusal to pay Tunnage and Poundage, although 
events were reported thus by some contemporaries,
1
 and are often so 
interpreted by historians.
2
 In November 1628 the Cambridge don Joseph 
Mead claimed East India merchants had refused Tunnage and Poundage, but 
his information was either wrong or garbled: many merchants invested in 
both the Levant and East India companies, but the records of the latter do 
not discuss customs refusal. Indeed, the Indiamen were preoccupied with 
restructuring their venture and bolstering their share price, which would 
have collapsed at the threat of a dispute with the Crown.
3
 Nor did the Great 
Farm accounts for the year ending Christmas 1628 make any allowance for 
defaults, although the handful of merchants whose cargoes were 
sequestrated apparently withheld Tunnage and Poundage as well as 
impositions. Henry Waller probably hit the mark in February 1629 when he 
claimed that ‘500… are discontented’, but the administrative and legal 
evidence suggests that outright refusal was, to that point, confined to around 
15 Turkey merchants.
4
  
 In December 1628 Lord Goring claimed ‘the Turkey merchants only 
pinch hard to awaken us’, but in the New Year crowds of armed men 
oversaw the landing of some of the 1,300 tons of currants held on ships in 
the Thames; this may have been the point at which merchants not involved 
                                                            
Faction and Parliament ed. K. Sharpe (Oxford, 1978), pp.248-9. 
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  C&T Charles, I.432-4; HMC Skrine, 172. 
2
  Popofsky, ‘Crisis over Tunnage and Poundage’, 61; M. van C. Alexander, 
Charles I’s Lord Treasurer (Basingstoke, Hampshire, 1975) p.134; R. Cust, ‘Was there 
an alternative to Personal Rule? Charles I, the Privy Council and the Parliament of 
1629’, History, XC (2005), pp.332, 341; Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, 233-4. 
Dietz, English Public Finance, 375 offers a more conservative estimate. 
3
  CSP Col. EI, 1625-9, pp.525-614; Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, 230-2.  
4
  TNA, E351/632-3; CD1629, p.198, misquoted in Popofsky, ‘Crisis over 
Tunnage and Poundage’, 61.  
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in the currant dispute began to enter bills of sufferance, the first step 
towards a more widespread defiance of royal authority. The Council 
stationed two royal messengers at Custom House quay thereafter, and 
ordered officials of the Levant Company to urge payment of the currant 
duties upon their members. This motion was rejected on 5 January, as was 
Governor Hammersley’s attempt to confine protests to the 2s. 2d./cwt duty.1 
Four days later, the Privy Council, possibly advised by Hammersley, 
allowed those who refused the 18d. subsidy and 3s. 4d. imposition on 
currants to enter bills of sufferance (as before 13 August 1628). Refusers of 
the 2s. 2d. duty were to have currants sequestrated to three times the value 
of the duty owed; while only those who refused all customs were to have 
their entire cargoes seized.
2
 
 A final consequence of the refusal of currant duty was that it affected 
the revenues of the Petty Farmers, who were discouraged from making 
advances to the Crown on the strength of an uncertain income. The Great 
Farmers may also have been worried at the prospect of other merchants 
joining this tax strike: it was only in January 1629, as Parliament 
reassembled, that they loaned £30,000 (Graph 5.2). Thus both the Crown 
and its critics played for high stakes in the 1629 parliamentary session. 
******** 
 John Rolle reported the seizure of his goods to the Commons on 22 
January 1629, when Phelips condemned ‘violations by inferior ministers 
that overdo their commands’ and called for a committee to investigate. 
Secretary Coke and Sir Benjamin Rudyard urged moderation, but Edward 
Littleton moved to summon the customers ‘to have their doom’, and was 
                     
1
  TNA, SP16/123/8; APC, 1628-9, pp.292-3; TNA, SP105/148, ff.195v-6; C&T 
Charles, II.5-6; CSPV, 1628-9, p.502. 
2
  LMA, Remembrancia 6/160, an expansion of the order in APC, 1628-9, pp.295. 
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seconded by Eliot, who urged the breach of privilege be investigated by the 
whole House, which would have offered the widest forum for his views.
1
 
Rolle’s complaint was, instead, referred to a select committee, while two 
days later, King Charles offered his critics an olive branch, insisting that his 
speech of 26 June 1628 was ‘to show you the necessity and not the right by 
which I was to claim’ Tunnage and Poundage; he urged the dispute be 
resolved by passing the required legislation.
2
  
 On 26 January Secretary Coke tabled a Tunnage and Poundage bill, 
but Eliot attacked his assumption that customs were an ‘ordinary’ revenue,3 
and that the Crown had ‘power to lay impositions at pleasure’ – shorn of 
rhetorical flourishes, this suggests that Coke’s draft placed fewer limitations 
on the prerogative than that of 1628. The courtier Sir Robert Harley called 
for it to be read, but John Selden quibbled that it contravened the custom of 
the House to have a royal servant move a supply bill. Digges disagreed, but 
he, too, was dissatisfied with the existing draft, suggesting that ‘a fit bill’ be 
framed to answer Eliot’s criticisms. Phelips and the Grimsby MP Henry 
Pelham then urged that Rolle’s case take precedence, and Coke’s bill was 
laid aside.
4
 
 Two points arise from this debate: first, while anti-Spanish MPs such 
as Harley and Digges were prepared to support the Crown, Secretary Coke 
                     
1
  CD1629, pp.7-8; HMC Lonsdale, 60-1; Thompson, ‘Divided leadership’ in 
Faction and Parliament, 250-1.  
2
  CJ, I.921a; CD1629, pp.10-11; HMC Lonsdale, 63-4; TNA, SP16/133/4; 
Barrington Family Letters, 59; CSPV, 1628-9, p.530. 
3
  The implication was, presumably, that an ordinary revenue would be passed 
without lengthy scrutiny. Eliot cited Sir John Fortescue, On the Laws and Governance 
of England translated and ed. S. Lockwood (Cambridge, 1997), pp.96-7 on customs as 
an extraordinary revenue. 
4
  CD1629, pp.11-12, 108-9; HMC Lonsdale, 62; TNA, SP16/133/24; CSPV, 
1628-9, p.530; Thompson, ‘Divided leadership’ in Faction and Parliament, 251-2; 
Popofsky, ‘Crisis over Tunnage and Poundage’, 62-3; Cust, ‘Alternative to Personal 
Rule?’ 346-7. 
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had failed to persuade a backbencher – Rudyard was the obvious choice – to 
propose this draft bill; and secondly, some of the Crown’s critics, 
particularly Eliot and Selden, were determined to punish the customers as 
the price of legislation. These differences explain why Francis Rous, John 
Pym and Sir Nathaniel Rich diverted the House’s attention to the problem of 
Arminianism, hoping that an agreement over this issue might create the 
goodwill needed to resolve differences over customs.
1
 Charles twice urged 
MPs to give priority to the Tunnage and Poundage bill, but did not order the 
House to forbear its investigation of Arminianism. Customs remained a 
potential flashpoint: Eliot persuaded the Commons to protest that royal 
messages wasted time better spent on business; and Secretary Coke, accused 
of misquoting Charles’s intentions in the Tunnage and Poundage debate of 
26 January, craved pardon for his error.
2
 
 While some MPs sought compromise, attitudes hardened at the 
Levant Company on 22 January, when Deputy Governor Anthony Abdy 
tendered a draft petition for submission to the Commons about the 2s. 
2d./cwt currant duty, a complaint which would have precluded a wider-
ranging protest. This apparently upset many of those present, as Governor 
Hammersley, having argued the same case on 5 January, kept silent on this 
occasion. Abdy’s proposal was rejected in favour of ‘a general complaint, as 
well for all duties upon other commodities as this of currants’; another vote 
resolved that the whole company should endorse the petition, not merely 
those directly affected. This controversy influenced the company elections 
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  Russell, PEP, 403-6 suggests the rejection of this bill wrecked the Parliament, 
but Thompson, ‘Divided leadership’ in Faction and Parliament, 251-3 is sceptical; 
Cust, ‘Alternative to Personal Rule?’ 347 explains why Russell was mistaken. 
2
  CD1629, pp.18, 22, 29-33, 111-14, 121; HMC Lonsdale, 65; CJ, I.923b, 925b; 
Thompson, ‘Divided leadership’ in Faction and Parliament, 254-5, 262; Reeve, Road 
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on 3 February, when Hammersley’s offer to resign in favour of the customs 
farmer Sir Paul Pindar was rejected; yet Abdy, who had sought re-election, 
stood down; while Richard Chambers was elected one of the company’s 
assistants.
1
  
 The Levant Company petition was delivered to the Commons on 28 
January, as was another from Chambers; both were referred to the 
committee for Rolle’s complaint. Chambers made another fruitless attempt 
to execute his replevin on 29-30 January, while on 6 February the Commons 
received petitions from John Foulke and Bartholomew Gilman, leaders of 
the break-in at the Custom House in early January.
2
 However, such defiance 
was exceptional: the customer Abraham Dawes later testified that ten other 
erstwhile refusers had quietly promised ‘they will pay all duties’, asking ‘to 
have their names concealed from other merchants’.3  
 With the attack on Arminianism stymied, the Commons returned to 
the customs dispute on 7 February, scheduling a fresh debate on Tunnage 
and Poundage for 12 February. Concessions by both sides might have 
secured a reading for a draft bill at this stage, but moves were afoot to 
frustrate this aim. First, a subpoena was sealed on 7 February, summoning 
Rolle before Star Chamber on a charge of conspiracy ‘against the peace of 
the kingdom’. It was no sooner served (9 February) than Attorney-General 
Heath rescinded it, but news of this fresh breach of privilege caused 
offence.
4
 Secondly, on 9 February, Eliot, chairman of the committee 
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  TNA, SP105/148, ff.196v-8; Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, 234-5. 
2
  CJ, I.923b-6a; CD1629, pp.112, 115; PP1640, I.418-19, 423-4; TNA, 
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investigating seizures of merchants’ goods, reported William Acton, one of 
the sheriffs of London, for failing to execute Chambers’s replevin, a 
contempt which earned Acton two nights in the Tower.
1
 It should be noted 
that Eliot attacked Acton before Rolle’s subpoena was served, indicating 
that there were those on both sides working to frustrate a settlement. On 12 
February, Waller reported that Chambers, Foulke and Gilman had also been 
cited into Star Chamber; the resulting protests drowned out Treasurer 
Edmondes’s plea to read the Tunnage and Poundage bill. Eliot and Coryton 
then secured an order to the Exchequer court to lift its injunctions against 
the merchants’ writs, but the Barons responded that while their orders ‘did 
not determine the right of Tunnage and Poundage’, a replevin was ‘no 
lawful action or course in the King’s case’.2 On 15 February the Privy 
Council repeated earlier orders detaining merchants’ goods, and asked the 
East India Company to borrow a warehouse to store further seizures.
3
  
 Having failed to reverse the Exchequer injunctions, the Commons 
grilled three customs officials on 19-20 February. With over a week’s notice 
to attend, they had been briefed: when they denied that Rolle’s goods were 
covered by parliamentary privilege, Duchy Chancellor May and Solicitor-
General Shilton insisted privilege did not extend to Crown revenues. 
However, their claims to be acting under royal orders were dismissed on the 
grounds that the King could not order his subordinates to commit an illegal 
                                                            
treason charge, against which privilege did not lie. 
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Barrington Family Letters, 53. 
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act.
1
 It was eventually resolved that the customs farmers could not prove 
they were accountable to the Crown; their seizures were therefore deemed to 
be made for their personal gain, and thus Rolle could be allowed privilege 
without impugning Charles’s honour. However, the question of whether to 
censure of the customers as delinquents proved more controversial, and was 
terminated abruptly on 23 February, when Secretary Coke reported 
Charles’s confirmation that his officers had, indeed, acted ‘by his own direct 
order and command’.2  
******** 
 The 1629 session did not collapse; it was wrecked by the ill-will of 
both ministers and their critics. The issues at stake over Tunnage and 
Poundage were little different from those rehearsed during June 1628, and a 
happier outcome required concessions on both sides. Pym’s plan to trade 
customs for the Arminians – though uncongenial to Charles – addressed this 
problem, but Eliot’s determination to censure those who violated property 
rights offered the King nothing but humiliation. This point was grasped by 
the godly MP Sir Thomas Barrington at the end of February 1629: ‘princes 
should in policy have some time and way left to evade when point of honour 
is in competition’; while John Davenant, Bishop of Salisbury, believed the 
dispute should have been ‘presently settled to the contentment of all’ after 
Charles’s speech of 24 January.3 Of course, Eliot’s criticisms went higher 
than the customers: on 23 February he alluded to the machinations of ‘some 
great persons near the King’; and on 2 March he accused Bishop Neile and 
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Lord Treasurer Weston of plotting to ‘break Parliaments, lest Parliaments 
break them’.1 Bishop Williams had attempted to reconcile Weston and Eliot 
at the end of February, when Eliot was said to have insisted the customers 
be censured, but conceded that Charles could pardon them. No agreement 
was reached, and when Parliament met for prorogation on 2 March, Eliot 
and his associates held Speaker Finch in his chair while the House passed 
his motion censuring Arminians and customs officials, and declaring those 
who paid Tunnage and Poundage ‘betrayer[s] of the liberties of England and 
an enemy to the same’.2  
 Although the Commons’ remonstrance of 25 June 1628 had inspired 
only a handful of merchants to refuse payment of customs duties, Eliot’s 
declaration of 2 March 1629, coming at the end of six months of rising 
tensions, provoked mass disobedience. While Charles’s proclamation of 27 
March dismissed refusers as ‘unworthy of our protection’, those who paid 
were – as Eliot had urged – slandered as ‘traitors to the country’.3 The 
Council reiterated its orders for royal messengers to arrest ‘any merchants, 
freighters, porters or others’ removing goods by force, but the unrest 
apparently spread to Colchester by the end of March, and Hull thereafter. In 
August some Londoners attempted to load their goods onto ketches at 
Dover, and smuggle them ashore at small havens, while others were said to 
have advised their factors not to freight any inbound cargoes until further 
notice. Council orders against customs evasion were repeated for two years, 
while in 1633 the Great Farmers were allowed to defalk £3,000 from their 
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rent to cover accumulated losses, and the messengers remained at the 
Custom House until 1637.
1
 In Easter term 1629, Chambers and other Levant 
merchants had the effrontery to sue the customs officials in the Exchequer 
court for restitution of their goods, a challenge which never reached a 
verdict. The Crown counter-sued Chambers in the Exchequer, and revived 
the proceedings against him Star Chamber, where he was fined £2,000. The 
Council ordered that his goods were not to be restored until after he had 
paid this fine, and he remained in the Fleet prison for six years. In December 
1640, he and Samuel Vassall claimed losses of £10,000 apiece.
2
  
 Although open defiance damaged Charles’s authority, the Great 
Farmers’ losses of £3,000 on import duties represented a tiny fraction of 
their revenues. The most alarming aspect of the resistance during the spring 
of 1629 was the refusal of the great trading companies to export any cloth. 
The Venetian ambassador claimed Weston, ‘as if he foresaw this rupture’, 
had husbanded his cash reserves since autumn 1628, a wise precaution, as 
the cessation of trade prevented the farmers from offering the Crown any 
significant revenue anticipations in the spring of 1629 (Graph 5.2).
3
 The 
slump also disrupted cloth-making districts: on 16 April the weavers of 
north-eastern Essex petitioned the Chelmsford quarter sessions for relief, 
claiming sales had slumped in the previous 5-6 weeks – since Eliot’s 
demonstration. Once the clothiers stopped buying, problems mounted 
swiftly, and in May unemployed weavers pillaged a shipment of grain at 
                     
1
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Maldon, Essex.
1
  
 The Council kept its nerve, seeking accommodation with merchants 
who – anticipating a swift resolution to the crisis – had stockpiled cloth 
bought at a discount. In mid-March, as the East India fleet was warped 
down the Thames laden with 400 bales of cloth, Governor Sir Maurice 
Abbot and Treasurer Robert Bateman persuaded the company to solicit the 
customers for a bill of sufferance. With investors at loggerheads over future 
ventures, the convoy promised a vital infusion of cash; thus when the bill of 
sufferance was refused, the majority still agreed to pay without protest (18 
March), a decision upheld even after the customers relented, and granted 
this request.
2
 The Treaty of Susa (14/24 April 1629), which re-opened 
French markets closed to English merchants for two years, offered some an 
incentive to compromise, while others pledged compliance in the event of a 
peace with Spain.
3
 In late April,
4
 the Merchant Adventurers attended the 
King in Council to explain their cessation of trade. When a merchant cited 
Charles’s undertaking to indemnify customs officials against parliamentary 
proceedings and Eliot’s protestation, the Earl of Manchester rehearsed the 
Crown’s case, and observed that the company enjoyed its license to export 
undyed cloth under the prerogative. These arguments were unanimously 
rejected by the Adventurers, while similar approaches to the Dutch strangers 
and the Levant Company were also spurned.
5
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 Towards the end of May, the Merchant Adventurers were won to 
compliance with promises of protection against the Dunkirkers; many other 
merchants resumed trade over the summer, to protect their cash flow; and in 
August the Levant Company bowed out of the controversy over the 2s. 
2d./cwt currant imposition, leaving its members ‘to their own liberty’ in 
pursuing a further petition to the Privy Council.
1
 At just over £214,000, 
customs revenues for 1629 were substantially reduced, but this was due 
more to the anticipations of the previous two years than the temporary 
cessation of trade (Graphs 5.1 and 5.2). Under Weston’s stewardship, short-
term loans on the security of tallies struck for future receipts of customs 
revenues became a mainstay of Crown finances: Charles borrowed £90,000 
to £170,000 (30-45%) of customs revenues annually during 1628-40 (the 
blue bars in Graph 5.3). Weston also renegotiated the contracts for the 
customs farms, and by his death in March 1635, preparations were afoot for 
a revision of the Book of Rates, including a reduction of 1s. 2d./cwt in the 
contentious currant imposition.
2
 These tariffs were implemented in the 
following November, increasing the yields of the petty farm and new 
impositions by around £80,000 annually. By 1638 customs revenues 
exceeded £400,000, which, together with anticipations of £150,000 a year, 
played a major part in funding the Bishops’ Wars, even in the absence of 
loans from the City (Graphs 6.1, 6.2).  
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Conclusion  
 Customs and credit engendered political controversy because they 
offered the prospect of revenue streams flexible enough to meet the 
contingencies faced by the early modern state without regular recourse to 
Parliament. Elizabeth managed to retain her sister’s swingeing tariff 
increases in 1559, yet any major reforms thereafter were sure to be 
challenged. Thus proposed revisions to the Book of Rates were abandoned 
when legal precedents were found wanting, and legislation was not 
contemplated, presumably because Burghley decided against exposing the 
prerogative to parliamentary veto.  
 What changed after 1603? James’s exalted conception of the 
prerogative encouraged lawyers such as Ellesmere and Fleming to express 
similar views, which undoubtedly worried the legal profession at large. 
However, Dorset and Salisbury were more concerned about the practical 
matter of the Crown’s growing burden of debt, and the City’s reluctance to 
extend its credit. Bate’s case was a gamble, and while the King may have 
been surprised by the parliamentary outcry in 1610, the merchants’ payment 
of the new duties undercut the lawyers’ protests. James remained unwilling 
to subject Bate’s case to parliamentary review in 1614, when the angry 
dissolution banished impositions to the margins of the political agenda for 
the remainder of the reign.  
 Exchequer officials kept tinkering with customs rates throughout the 
1620s, but the distractions of Court faction and war meant that Parliament 
did not address the issue seriously until 1628; the victimisation of the 
Turkey merchants that autumn galvanised the merchants to support a tax 
strike most had hoped to avoid. Yet in attacking the government over this 
issue in the 1629 Parliament, Eliot and his associates overlooked the fact 
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that the deficit which rendered the Crown dependent on Parliament could, 
by then, be bridged by a combination of peace, domestic economies and 
short-term credit from the customs farmers. This delivered the Caroline 
regime into the hands of different vested interests – Court factions and City 
financiers – for the next decade.1  
                     
1
  In the absence of comprehensive figures for revenues or expenditure before 
1640, budgetary deficits cannot be precisely calculated. They probably peaked in 
James’s reign, at around £100,000, approximately 20% of annual revenues (Graph 0.1). 
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CONCLUSION: 
Revenue and the political culture of early modern 
England 
 
 What can a study of revenues tell us about the broader political 
culture of early modern England? It is universally appreciated that disputes 
over Crown finances were part of the political landscape, but the theoretical 
implications of these practical debates are rarely explored by historians of 
political thought.
1
 This is partly because the 'political arithmetic' of state 
finances only developed later in the 17
th
 century,
2
 and partly because the 
Crown actively discouraged its subjects from articulating broad critiques of 
the functions and purposes of state, church and society,
3
 However, rival 
visions of what England was, and might become, did exist, and informed the 
political practices of the early 17
th
 century, even if they did not evolve into 
overtly partisan politics until after the Civil War.
4
  
  Was it possible to have a ‘loyal opposition’ in early modern 
England? Monarchy, focussed upon the will of an individual, requires some 
                     
1
  The study of early Stuart political thought focusses on the constitution, law and 
the church, but not finances, see J. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal 
Law: a study of English historical thought in the seventeenth century (2
nd
 edition, 
Cambridge, 1987); J.P. Sommerville, Royalists and Patriots: politics and ideology in 
England, 1603-1640 (2
nd
 edition, Harlow, Essex, 1999); G. Burgess, The Politics of the 
Ancient Constitution (University Park, PA, 1992) and idem, Absolute Monarchy and the 
Stuart Constitution (New Haven, CT and London 1996); A. Cromartie, The 
Constitutionalist Revolution (Cambridge, 2006); M. Peltonen, Classical Humanism and 
Republicanism in English Political Thought, 1570-1640 (Cambridge, 1995); C.W. 
Brooks, Law, Politics and Society in early modern England (Cambridge, 2008). 
2
  J.O. Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century 
England (Princeton, NJ and Guildford, Surrey, 1978). 
3
  Proclamations, I.495-6, 519-21, 527-34; II.93-5, 226-8; D. Colclough, 
Freedom of Speech in Early Stuart England (Cambridge, 2009). 
4
  For a radical reinterpretation of the Catholic critique of post-Reformation 
England, see M.C. Questier, Catholicism and Community in Early Modern England 
(Cambridge, 2006). 
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degree of common purpose, whereas the management of vested interests 
tends to promote faction. However, the consensual politics of the period did 
not require unanimity, merely a willingness to strive towards consensus.
1
 
What this meant in practice was that serious disagreements had to be 
expressed in non-partisan language. Considerable attention has been paid to 
the importation of the classical republican concept of 'the state’ into 
common usage, as a governmental entity distinct from monarchy; 
Elizabeth's ministers used it to make the case for institutional continuity at a 
time of religious and dynastic uncertainty, and it achieved a wider currency 
because it facilitated criticism which avoided personal attacks on the 
monarch.
2
  
 Disputes over revenue were another political language, with a 
technocratic vocabulary which allowed its exponents to call the Crown to 
account, not just in the narrow financial sense, but as part of a broader 
critique of policy – many of the direst consequences of war, dynastic 
marriage and Court factionalism could be silently mitigated by keeping the 
Crown short of funds. This approach was intentionally difficult to detect, 
and most financial historians fail to engage with the political subtext of 
arcane debates about legal and administrative technicalities.
3
  
 In taking a thematic approach, this study is as short-sighted as many 
others, so in conclusion, it is appropriate to stand back from the sources, and 
offer a critical analysis of the political economy of early modern England, 
                     
1
  M. Kishlansky, Parliamentary Selection: social and political choice in early 
modern England (Cambridge, 1986), pp.225-30.  
2
  For the wider implications of this trend, see P. Collinson, Elizabethan Essays 
(London, 1994), pp.31-58 and essays in The Monarchical Republic of Early Modern 
England ed. J.F. McDiarmid (Aldershot, Hampshire, 2007). 'Evil counsellor' rhetoric 
performed a similar function in the 1620s. 
3
  One exception is J. Cramsie, Kingship and Crown Finance under James VI and 
I, 1603-25 (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2002). 
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addressing the questions posed at the start of this study: were debates over 
Crown finances a ‘hidden transcript’ of criticism in early Stuart politics? 
Why did it prove impossible to achieve a political consensus over increasing 
revenues in early Stuart England? Was there a systemic failure in English 
state finances in the early modern period?  
 
The Fiscal Conservatism of Elizabethan England  
 Mid-Tudor England was dominated by a succession of regimes which 
promoted radical reforms in religion, diplomacy, social policy, 
administration and finance. The early Elizabethan regime was the last of 
these, espousing an agenda which Patrick Collinson called the ‘monarchical 
republic’, the origins of which have been traced back to the writings of 
William Cecil and Sir Thomas Smith in the later 1540s. They advocated a 
realm Protestant in religion and diplomacy; governed by a monarch whose 
prerogatives were exercised in consultation with Parliament and limited by 
the common law; supported by parliamentary taxation; and united with a 
(Protestant) Scotland.
1
 This was a partisan agenda in 1558, and significant 
aspects of it were never fully accepted, even by the Queen and some of her 
Councillors, but Elizabeth's longevity allowed the ambitions of her tight-
knit governing clique to become identified with the national interest.  
 For all their success, the first generation of Elizabeth’s Councillors 
never forgot their origins as a radical faction leading a conservative nation, 
and Burghley, the most influential and longest-lived of their number, 
tempered confessional diplomacy and sympathy for domestic puritans by 
                     
1
  P. Collinson, Elizabethan Essays (London, 1994), pp.31-58; D. Hoak 'Sir 
William Cecil, Sir Thomas Smith and the monarchical republic of Tudor England' in 
The Monarchical Republic of Early Modern England ed. J.F. McDiarmid (Aldershot, 
Hampshire, 2007), pp.37-54. 
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pursuing social and financial policies which were deeply conservative.
1
 In 
this, he was doubtless affected by his experience as secretary to Lord 
Protector Somerset, when a combination of war, religious change and 
inflation provoked uprisings toppled his master and briefly called the social 
order into question.
2
 As Lord Treasurer from 1572, Burghley pursued 
financial policies which were intended to build the largest possible affinity 
for the Crown, as a bulwark against religious, factional or social unrest. 
Critics attacked the Elizabethan elite for cronyism, but it was not merely 
Councillors who helped themselves to lands, office and economic 
concessions: the humblest of Court officials could expect leases of Crown 
lands or wardships at preferential rates (Chapters 2 and 3); Crown tenants 
enjoyed artificially low rents (Chapter 2); and tax evasion was allowed to 
flourish unchecked (Chapter 4). If there was a systemic failure of Crown 
finances in early modern England, it derived from Burghley’s refinement of 
the Machiavellian compact Henry VIII had offered his subjects: low taxes 
and a share of the material spoils of the pre-Reformation church, in return 
for compliance with a controversial religious and diplomatic agenda – a 
bargain many were prepared to accept.  
 Burghley's conservative instincts precluded financial reform, which 
would have undermined the vested interests whose political support the 
regime relied upon. It is difficult to believe that a statesman of his calibre 
can have failed to appreciate the pressing need to overhaul the 
                     
1
  Burghley's confessional radicalism is emphasised in P. Collinson, The 
Elizabethan Puritan Movement (London, 1967); D.J.B. Trim, 'Seeking a Protestant 
alliance and liberty of conscience on the Continent, 1558-85' in Tudor England and its 
Neighbours ed. S. Doran and G. Richardson (Basingstoke, Hampshire, 2005), pp.139-
77. 
2
  A. Wood, The 1549 Rebellions and the Making of Early Modern England 
(Cambridge, 2007), pp.21-88; S. Alford, Burghley: William Cecil at the Court of 
Elizabeth I (New Haven, CT and London, 2008), pp.38-40. 
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administration of Crown lands in the 1570s, but with net yields increasing 
naturally upon the death of ex-monastic pensioners, reform was postponed 
for another generation (Chapter 2). As the chief beneficiary of perquisites 
from the Court of Wards, Burghley was never likely to address its problems; 
although he took an interest in the revenues of the royal Household, which 
lay outside his purview as Lord Treasurer (Chapter 3). Subsidy yields were 
allowed to continue their decline until 1605 (Chapter 4), and in 1597, fears 
about dearth trumped the need for funds in the war against Spain: payment 
of the first of the subsidies voted in that year was deferred until the autumn 
of 1598.
1
 This proved a false economy, as the rebel Earl of Tyrone's victory 
at the battle of Yellow Ford (August 1598) caused the collapse of English 
authority throughout Ireland. Thanks to Queen Mary's initiative, customs 
were not an urgent priority early in Elizabeth's reign, but Burghley was 
reluctant to press the case for tariff reform, for fear of provoking both 
merchants and lawyers (Chapter 5). 
 Even in a narrative of fiscal modernisation, it is not entirely fair to 
portray Burghley as the villain – his role as the Crown's chief minister 
saddled him with the unenviable task of weighing the relative perils of 
short-term deficit and long-term debt, diplomatic imperatives and financial 
necessities. One criticism which can be offered is that, in gathering so many 
of the reins of power into his own hands, he diminished the likelihood that 
the Privy Council or Parliament would undertake the strategic analysis 
which might have increased awareness of the urgent need for reform – it is 
hard to imagine the 1602 exchange about peace with Spain, with which this 
study opens, taking place during Burghley's tenure, as this would only have 
                     
1
  The parliamentary debates offer no evidence as to how this decision was 
reached; it presumably took place at the committee stage. 
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invited criticism of his policies as either statesman or Treasurer.  
 
Reform and Vested Interests in Jacobean England  
 Burghley’s financial administration was predicated on the assumption 
that he was the custodian of a weak regime which constantly needed to 
appease its faint-hearted supporters. This was a plausible assessment for the 
1560s, but discouraged him from addressing the implications of change later 
in the reign. The task of reform was bequeathed to his successor, Lord 
Buckhurst (later Earl of Dorset), who came from a younger generation more 
confident about the durability of the Elizabethan state, but alarmed at the 
fiscal implications of Burghley’s financial stewardship. Happily, the new 
King's decision to declare a ceasefire with Spain in 1603 created both the 
opportunity for sweeping reform, and the economic prosperity which looked 
likely to smooth its passage. So what went wrong? 
 James enjoyed all the advantages and disadvantages of a new 
monarch, particularly a foreigner: he had the option to initiate sweeping 
reforms while his new subjects were still keen to win his favour; but needed 
to reassure them that their interests would not be neglected, or granted to 
Scottish favourites. After a brief honeymoon where many of the diplomatic, 
religious and financial priorities of the Elizabethan regime were questioned, 
reform was allowed to slip down the political agenda.
1
 However, the 
largesse showered upon English and Scottish favourites was continued, 
fuelling the resentment of those expected to pay for this generosity, while 
increasing the need for retrenchment. 
                     
1
  The radicalism of James's early years is discused in R.C. Munden, 'James I and 
the 'growth of mutual distrust': King, Commons and Reform, 1603-1604' in Faction and 
Parliament ed. K. Sharpe (Oxford, 1978), pp.73-104; D. Newton, The Making of the 
Jacobean Regime (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2005). 
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 Despite James's lukewarm enthusiasm, Dorset embarked upon reform 
with a vigour which suggests considerable forethought. He rebuilt some 
measure of public credit with his handling of the Privy Seal loans of 1604 
(Chapter 4), and a smaller loan from the City of London (Chapter 1). He 
also intervened to ensure that the Exchequer Barons' judgement in Bate's 
case (1606) provided the long-awaited precedent for tariff reform (Chapter 
5). His inauguration of the Great Farm of the customs (Chapter 5) fostered 
the development of a plutocratic elite among the London merchants, who 
became the chief investors in subsequent Crown revenue projects, 
particularly land sales (Chapter 2). Meanwhile, he proceeded with a 
comprehensive survey of the Crown estates, distinguishing those which 
might yield significant profit from those which would not (Chapter 2). After 
Dorset's death in May 1608, his reforms were continued by Salisbury:
1
 
Bate's case was used as a precedent for tariff increases (Chapter 5), and 
sales of uneconomic 'quillets' of Crown land were stepped up (Graph 2.5). 
However, tenants on the larger Crown estates fought doggedly to defend 
their low rents and security of tenure, and little benefit was ultimately 
derived from Dorset's painstaking and costly surveys: Salisbury admitted 
defeat in May 1609, when he granted the Eldred-Whitmore consortium a 
contract to issue reversionary leases of unimproved Crown lands (Chapter 
2). 
 Dorset's initiative was superseded by a visionary reform plan, devised 
by Salisbury and Caesar, which aimed to bind both Crown and subject to a 
comprehensive financial settlement. James was required to accept an entail 
on the main Crown estates – presumably intended to be confirmed by statute 
                     
1
  His initial efforts are effusively chronicled in L.M. Hill, ‘Sir Julius Caesar’s 
journal of Salisbury’s first two months and twenty days as Lord Treasurer’, BIHR, LXV 
(1972), pp.311-27. 
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– and a 'Book of Bounty' establishing bureaucratic limitations on royal 
generosity towards courtiers.
1
 Parliament was offered a deal to replace 
wardship, purveyance and other revenues with a perpetual land tax – to be 
voted in perpetuity, like the French taille – while impositions and a Dutch-
style excise on beer were subsequently suggested as part of the new revenue 
package. These reforms, if implemented, would have inaugurated a modern 
revenue system,
2
 and while Caesar reckoned the Crown's net gain would 
barely have covered the annual deficit (Chapter 3), increasing the yield of 
this carefully calibrated new tax system would have been a straightforward 
political exercise. There is no empirical evidence that contemporaries made 
this connection, but the controversy which erupted at the same time over 
impositions (Chapter 5) suggests the link between fiscal reform and 
arbitrary government was clear to all. Both sides backed away from a 
confrontation in the autumn of 1610, but Crown and Parliament did not 
negotiate over the question of fiscal reform again until 1660. It may be 
concluded that James had tacitly reached the same calculation as Burghley, 
allowing vested interests to trump reform. 
 The decade after 1610 has been described as a Jacobean 'Personal 
Rule', but aspirations to dispense with Parliament altogether required a 
degree of financial planning which was conspicuously lacking.
3
 Royal 
finances were kept afloat by a succession of temporary expedients: the sale 
of baronetcies and Crown lands, loans, fines, projects, and the repayment of 
                     
1
  Cramsie, Kingship and Crown Finance, 89-94. 
2
  This conforms to the 'tax state' defined in J. Schumpeter, 'The crisis of the tax 
state', International Economic Papers, IV (1954), pp.5-38. 
3
  A.D. Thrush, 'The Personal Rule of James I, 1611-1620' in Politics, Religion 
and Popularity in early Stuart England ed. T. Cogswell, R. Cust and P. Lake 
(Cambridge, 2002), pp.84-102. 
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Elizabethan loans by the Dutch and the French.
1
 The vigour with which the 
London brewers opposed the purveyance on beer (Chapter 3) suggests fears 
that it might be the harbinger of a general excise, but Lord Treasurer Suffolk 
placed his faith in projects rather than fiscal reform.
2
 Meanwhile, the 
financier Lionel Cranfield helped the Exchequer squeeze more out of the 
customs farmers, and slashed costs in the Great Wardrobe by cutting waste 
and using his personal credit to ensure that bills were paid promptly.
3
 
Following his appointment as Treasurer in October 1621, Cranfield 
promoted efficiency across the board, with some success, notably in 
balancing the Irish budget. However, his mania for cost-cutting undermined 
the financial interests of Buckingham and his affinity, who promoted his 
impeachment in 1624.
4
 
 
The Potential for absolutism in Caroline England  
 The ‘canker of want’ haunted later Jacobean politics, particularly 
after 1618, when the chronic lack of funds circumscribed plans to 
intervene in the war in Germany. James was content to operate within 
these limitations, even turning them to his advantage – when Parliament 
clamoured for war in 1621 and 1624, he sought refuge behind huge (but 
not unrealistic) costings for a Continental expeditionary force.
5
 His 
                     
1
  F.C. Dietz, English Public Finance, 1558-1641 (New York, NY, 1932), 
pp.141-81; Cramsie, Kingship and Crown Finance, 123-79. 
2
  Cramsie, Kingship and State Finance, 137-42. 
3
  M. Prestwich, Cranfield: politics and profits under the early Stuarts (Oxford, 
1966), pp.116-20, 227-32, 259-64. 
4
  Ibid., 350-64; Cramsie, Kingship and Crown Finance, 191-3; V. Treadwell, 
Buckingham and Ireland, 1621-1628: a study in Anglo-Irish politics (Dublin, Ireland. 
1998), pp.186-241. 
5
  R. Zaller, The Parliament of 1621 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA and London, 
1971), pp.47-8; Russell, PEP, 89-90; R.E. Ruigh, The Parliament of 1624: politics and 
foreign policy (Cambridge, MA, 1971), pp.209-16. The 1621 estimates for an 
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interventionist critics – calling themselves 'patriots', in the Roman 
republican tradition – chafed at this fiscal straitjacket, but were hoist by 
their own petard in 1625, when their patron, Prince Charles, came to the 
throne and embarked upon the war they had long advocated.
1
 Their 
reluctance to underwrite Charles’s costly anti-Hapsburg alliance in a fluid 
diplomatic situation was (as subsequent developments proved) only 
prudent,
2
 but the new King regarded the linkage of the 1626 subsidy bill to 
Buckingham's impeachment as a betrayal, and there was talk of a resort to 
'new counsels' to fund the war without parliamentary supply.
3
  
 Fiscal reform had, in fact, been broached in the Commons on 5 
August 1625,when Sir Edward Coke recommended the reduction of 
bureaucratic fees, economies in the royal Household and Ireland, an end to 
customs farming, reform of land revenues, and the sale of royal forests and 
parks; while the subsidy debate of 25-6 April 1626 threw up other 
alternatives to supply, including collection of arrears of recusancy fines, 
charges on fees, usury and the sale of public office, and even calls to 
revive the Great Contract (Chapter 3).
4
 The only practical outcome of 
these debates was a petition urging Charles to undertake 'the rectifying of 
                                                            
expeditionary force are printed in HMC Hatfield, XXII.140-4. 
1
  For a discussion of the patriots' motives, see T. Cogswell, 'Phaeton's chariot: the 
Parliament-men and the continental crisis in 1621' and C. Russell, 'Sir Thomas 
Wentworth and anti-Spanish sentiment, 1621-1624', in The Political World of Thomas 
Wentworth, Earl of Strafford 1621-1641 ed. J.F. Merritt (Cambridge, 1996), pp.24-62. 
Clearly, for some patriots, strategic considerations were ultimately trumped by the 
domestic political agenda. 
2
  The diplomatic circumstances of the period are discussed in T. Cogswell, 
‘Prelude to Ré: the Anglo-French struggle over La Rochelle, 1624-7’, History LXXI 
(1986), pp.1-21; P.H. Wilson, Europe's Tragedy: a history of the Thirty Years' War 
(London, 2009), pp.373-84. 
3
  The Privy Councillor Dudley Carleton provoked an angry response when he 
mentioned the prospect of 'new counsels' in the Commons on 12 May 1626: HoP1604, 
III.447-8. 
4
  PP1625, pp.398-405; PP1626, III.62-6, 74-80; Russell, PEP, 244-6. 
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your own revenue' (4 May), which he did shortly after the dissolution: a 
commission for revenue reform inaugurated fresh sales of Crown lands, 
timber and charcoal rights (Chapter 2); proceedings against the holders of 
concealed Crown lands (Chapter 2); negotiations for the Royal Contract to 
pay off the Crown's debts to the City (Chapter 1); and composition for 
recusancy fines. Disafforestation and tobacco duties were also considered, 
but only carried into effect in the 1630s.
1
  
 The prime mover of 'new counsels' was Charles himself, who 
proclaimed the Commons' remonstrance against Buckingham 'an 
insufferable wrong' and resorted to unparliamentary means to raise the 
supply lost at the dissolution of June 1626. In circumstances of military 
necessity, the Privy Council supported him, devoting considerable 
personal effort to promoting the Forced Loan (Chapter 4).
2 
 Despite the 
political furore which erupted, the revenue yield of this venture 
encouraged Charles to pursue further innovations, including regular 
anticipations from the customs farmers and increased customs on coal and 
wine (Chapter 5). Preparations were also made for the levying of 
knighthood fines and substantial increases in customs tariffs (Chapters 4 
and 5). Other projects considered but discarded at this time included Ship 
Money (Chapter 4) and the debasement of the currency;
3
 while a 
commission to consider fresh revenue options, including a tax on 
officeholders, and excises on salt or beer, was suppressed following 
                     
1
  PP1626, III.170-1; London UL, Goldsmiths’ 195/1, ff.2, 4, 6v, 9v-10, 23r-v, 
27r-8v, 31r-v; Goldsmiths’ 195/2, ff.32v-42v, 45-8, 68; K. Sharpe, The Personal Rule 
of Charles I (New Haven, CT and London, 1992), pp.116-17, 120, 128; Dietz, English 
Public Finance, 354-5. 
2
  Proclamations, II.94; R. Cust, The Forced Loan and English Politics, 1626-
1628 (Oxford, 1987), pp.18-23, 27-31. 
3
  Select Tracts and Documents Illustrative of English Monetary History, 1626-
1730 ed. W.A. Shaw (London, 1896), pp.5-45. 
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parliamentary complaints.
1
  
 Most of these innovations were either common knowledge, or 
uncovered by the 1628 Parliament, and when their revenue potential is 
considered, it is hardly surprising they provoked fears of arbitrary 
government:
2
 on 5-6 June 1628, dismay at the King’s first answer to the 
Petition of Right, reinforced by threats to bring the session to a premature 
end, provoked wild speculation in the Commons that a royal coup d'état 
was imminent.
3
 Charles intended nothing of the sort; in fact, 
Buckingham's sudden demise and the fall of La Rochelle provided an 
opportunity to make peace with his enemies, both foreign and domestic.
4
 
However, his determination to proceed against customs refusers provoked 
Eliot's clique into wrecking the 1629 Parliament (Chapter 5). The decision 
to dispense with Parliament altogether was a gamble, because it was 
impossible to predict whether the tax strike Eliot had demanded on 2 
March 1629 would be sustained; but with financial alternatives to hand, 
Charles could afford to take the risk. 
 The Personal Rule depended on financial innovation, which 
succeeded beyond all reasonable expectations (Graph 0.1). Some of the 
new revenues – knighthood fines (Chapter 4), forest fines, disafforestation 
and enclosure fines (Chapter 2) – were no more than windfalls, although 
aggregate yields of £300,000 proved worth the effort. Administrative 
reforms produced substantial increases to existing revenues. The Court of 
                     
1
  PP1628, IV.241-2; C&T Charles, I.327; Cust, Forced loan, 76-7. 
2
  A point discussed in a much broader perspective by J. Miller, 'The potential for 
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4
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Wards yielded around £60,000 a year during the 1630s; while Cottington 
raised wardship revenues by a further 50% during the Bishops' Wars 
(Graph 3.1). Compositions for recusancy fines produced £175,000 in 
1628-40, twice the sum raised from enforcement of the recusancy statutes 
in 1612-24.
1
 The Book of Rates censured by the Commons in 1628 was 
finally implemented in November 1635, increasing customs by around 
£80,000 a year (Chapter 5). The most lucrative innovation was Ship 
Money, and for all that Hampden's case revealed a sharp divergence of 
opinion among the judiciary, and encouraged passive resistance among 
taxpayers, this initiative yielded £750,000 in six years (Table 4.4).
2
 
Excises also returned to the political agenda with less fanfare, and while 
many projects failed, some produced significant returns: after two decades 
of losses, the alum industry finally posted profits averaging £15,000 a 
year; the sale of licences to retail wine (from 1629) and tobacco (from 
1634) raised a total of £105,000; soap duties (from 1633) produced 
£120,000, and a levy of £2 per tun on wine raised £23,000 in 1638-40.
3
  
 The consequence of these sweeping changes was that, for the first 
time since the 1570s, the Crown was solvent – a trend which looked set to 
continue indefinitely until the Covenanters rebelled, forcing Charles to the 
prodigious effort of raising an army without parliamentary support. During 
the Bishops’ Wars, a host of short-term expedients were attempted, on the 
assumption that a quick victory would buy the time to resolve any 
financial problems which might arise. Customs and wardship revenues 
                     
1
  TNA, E351/416-32, 2596-7; TNA, E101/527/9, 630/9; TNA, LR7/87/1-3; 
TNA, SC6/Chas.I/1653. 
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  Brooks, Law, Politics and Society, 201-8. 
3
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were heavily anticipated (Graphs 3.1, 5.1 and 5.3); peers were summoned 
to serve in person or provide cash in lieu; and northerners who held their 
lands by tenant right were ordered to render unpaid military service. 
Additional measures contemplated after the Short Parliament refused 
supply in April 1640 – confiscation of bullion and spices, and currency 
debasement – smacked of desperation; and lack of funds meant royal 
forces had to remain dispersed until mobilization was complete. This 
allowed the Scots to catch Charles's army off guard at Newburn.
1
  
 Something was rotten in the state of England in 1640: the capture of 
London’s coal supply by Scottish rebels who controlled a smaller 
population, a lower tax base and almost no credit facilities was a minor 
reverse which should have marked the beginning of the war, not its end. Yet 
the Caroline regime collapsed within months: Cottington and Finch fled into 
exile; Strafford was executed; Laud, the judges who had given their verdicts 
for Ship Money, and the customs farmers were impeached; and most of the 
fiscal innovations of the 1630s were proscribed by statute.
2
 The political 
elites of England and Wales (and their Scottish and Irish counterparts) 
quickly fell to disputing what might replace the Personal Rule, but this 
should not obscure the remarkable fact that almost no-one except Strafford 
– not even those who would take up arms as royalists two years later – made 
any serious effort to defend the status quo.  
 How did a regime which had faced remarkably little overt criticism 
since 1629, and dealt swiftly with those who did cause problems, founder in 
a calm sea of indifference? The immediate trigger was military failure; 
                     
1
 Sharpe, Personal Rule, 587-90; M.C. Fissel, The Bishops’ Wars (Cambridge, 
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2
  Russell, FBM, 144-5, 206-73. For the scale of the Scottish war effort, see 
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successful resistance to the Personal Rule in one kingdom changed the 
matrix of politics in all three, and ultimately propelled them all into civil 
war.
1
 The crisis spread to England with the encouragement of the first 
organised opposition in English politics since 1569 – the ‘Junto’, a coalition 
of the Crown’s aristocratic critics and radical clerics. Many of them had 
been dismayed in the 1620s, when Charles had forsaken the 'patriot' cause in 
favour of 'new courses', but his determination to stifle criticism forced such 
views underground, where they mutated into the outspoken and often 
radical forms which resurfaced in the early 1640s. Furthermore, Charles's 
natural supporters – those who had profited from the Personal Rule, or 
disliked Presbyterians, Scots or rebels – remained un-co-ordinated, a 
perverse testimony to efforts to narrow the parameters of debate during the 
1630s.
2
  
 The Junto was spurred into action in 1640 not by the failings of the 
Personal Rule, but by its one undeniable success: the fiscal reforms which 
relieved the Crown from dependence on parliamentary supply, and 
fostered the development of a political culture something like the 
oligarchic absolutism then evolving in France.
3
 Thus one of the Junto's first 
priorities in the Long Parliament was the proscription of many of the 
Caroline financial innovations – although they then had to reconstruct a 
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more efficient version of the same to sustain their war effort against the 
King.
1
  
******** 
  How was it that a people prepared to fight and die for grand causes 
during the Reformation and the Civil Wars became so circumspect in 
articulating their political beliefs during the intervening decades? One 
conclusion of this study is that pleas of ignorance are no defence – many 
contemporaries understood that the financial resources of the state were 
being outpaced by those of its rivals, and lamented that England had 
become little more than a regional power, in stark contrast to the 
Continental horizons of the Plantagenet state during the Hundred Years’ 
War, or the global reach of the fiscal-military state after 1689.  
 The solution – more revenue – was obvious, but the issue of how the 
burden should be apportioned, and what it should be used for, raised 
questions best avoided, because there was little agreement over 
fundamentals: how could one dispassionately weigh the costs and benefits 
of a Protestant, politique or Catholic confessional state? Prerogative or the 
rule of law? Little England or greater Britain? Most monarchs became adept 
at quashing or diverting such arguments, and great issues were often 
discussed in terms of practical outcomes rather than general principles. 
However, this does not mean that the attacks on the prerogative about which 
King James fretted were a figment of Whig historiography.
2
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 Post-Reformation England evolved into a polity of low taxes and low 
strategic aspirations because this reconciled the interests of a divided social 
elite, where the state was run by a succession of partisan cliques held 
together by ideological, factional and financial self-interest. This is not to 
say that Elizabeth and her successors were unaware of the need to broaden 
their support base, or that there were no disagreements over policy within 
close-knit governing circles. However, debates over issues such as dynastic 
politics, religion and fiscal reform invariably exposed visceral differences, 
because they addressed the fundamentals of the relationship between state 
and society, which were a matter of perpetual contention. By undertaking 
radical and controversial reforms in church and state at the same time across 
three kingdoms, Charles exposed the fragility of the social compact upon 
which the early modern state rested, and, like Samson, brought the pillars of 
the temple down upon himself. 
 
 
 
                                                            
and Parliament: Old Hat and nouvelle vague’, Parliamentary History I (1982), pp.181-
215, and recast in J.C.D. Clark, Rebellion and Revolution (Cambridge, 1986). 
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